Danish Security Policy in the Seventies
| Author | Nikolaj Petersen |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083677200700111 |
| Published date | 01 March 1972 |
| Date | 01 March 1972 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Danish
Security
Policy
in
the
Seventies:
Continuity
or
Change?
NIKOLAJ
PETERSEN
The
author
aims
at
defining
the
parameters
of
Danish
security
policy
in
the
seventies,
both
in
its
external
aspects
(alliance
policy,
etc.)
and
in
its
internal
aspects
(defence
policy).
The
study
is
based
upon
the
public
debate
and -
in
particular -
recent
official
reports
on
security
policy
which
are
presented
in
some
detail.
After
analysing
the
historical
background,
the
study
sets
out
to
present
official
Danish
views
of
the
international
environment,
both
at
the
global,
regional
and
sub-regional
levels,
and
in
more
detail,
of
its
implications
for
Danish
national
security.
The
study
then
goes
on
to
analyse
trends
in
Denmark’s
external
security
policy,
and
it
concludes
that
there
is
not
much
prospect
of
significant
departures
from
present
policy.
Finally,
the
current
debate
on
defence
policy
is
presented
with
special
attention
to
the
analysis
of
the
new
Defence
Act
of
1973
and
its
formulation.
I.
INTRODUCTION
The
aim
of
this
analysis
is
to
describe
some
of
the
main
features
of
Danish
se-
curity
policy
with
a
view
towards
giving
a
rough
indication
of
its
likely
courses
of
evolution
during
the
rest
of
the
decade.
It
is
not
my
intention
to
predict
exactly
what
policies
will
evolve
during
this
peri-
od,
but
rather
to
discuss
on
the
basis
of
the
present
structure
of
perceptions
and
values
in
the
field
of
security
policy
what
basic
attitudes
and
modes
of
behaviour
are
most
likely
to
prevail.
The
fundamental
problem
in
the
making
of
Danish
policy
in
relation
to
the
inter-
national
system
has
been
described
in
these
terms :
:
’
It
is
a
widely
held
view
in
this
country
that
the
foreign
policy
of
Denmark
is
determined
by
the
Danish
Government
and
Parliament.
This,
however,
is
correct
only
insofar
as
the
formal
decisions
through
which
this
policy
is
given
expression
appear
as
decisions
of
these
organs.
In
reality,
Danish
foreign
pol-
icy
is
determined
by
factors
on
which
the
Danish
Government
has
little
influence.
The
main
task
of
Danish
foreign
policy
therefore
is
to
keep
informed
about
these
factors
and
their
interplay
and
in
this
connection
to
form
an
opinion
on
the
right
moment
to
ex-
ploit
the
prevailing
situation
to
further
Denmark’s
interests.
Decisive
among
the
factors
whose
interplay
determines
Danish
foreign
policy
are
the
actual
power
rela-
tions
in
the
world
around
us,
especially
the
power
balance
between
the
Great
Powers
next
to
us.’
This
statement
by
Erik
Scavenius,
For-
eign
Minister
during
the
two
World
Wars
(1913-20
and
1940-43),
is
also
a
neat
description
of
the
three
analytical
focal
points
for
the
study
of
security
policy:
the
international
milieu,
which
constitutes
the
Creal’
or
’objective’
security
problem,
the
psycho-milieu,2
i.e.
the
security
problem
as
perceived
by
policy-makers
(the
’sub-
jective’
security
problem),
and
finally
the
relevant
features
of
the
domestic
political
system,
e.g.
attitudes
in
relation
to
the
perceived
security
problem.
It
is
on
the
psycho-milieu
and
the
attitudes
towards
it,
i.e.
the
systemic
variables,
that
this
article
will
concentrate.
This
choice
of
emphasis,
however,
does
not
reflect
a
hypothesis
of the
relative
importance
of
environmental
and
systemic
8
variables
in
the
shaping
of
Danish
security
policy
or,
still
less,
of
the
configuration
of
the
Danish
’security
equation’.
Indeed,
it
would
be
difficult
to
dispute
Erik
Scave-
nius’s
central
thesis.
For
more
than
one
hundred
years
Denmark’s
position
has
been
that
of
a
Small
Power
with
strictly
limited
material
and
human
resources
and
a
hardly
defensible
territory
situated
in
the
middle
of
an
area
characterized
by
the
abundance
of
military
power
and
the
in-
tensity
of
Great
Power
conflicts.
Since
the
1860s
the
salient
fact
in
Danish
policy-
making
has
been
the
proximity
to
the
strongest
military
Power
in
Europe,
tra-
ditionally
Germany,
since
1945
the
Soviet
Union.
But
while
the
basic
problem
has
re-
mained
practically
the
same
for
more
than
a
century,
the
possibilities
of
coping
with
it,
and
also
the
mode
of
actual
behaviour
have
undergone
significant
changes
since
World
War
II.
During
the
last
century,
Denmark
has
had
three
alternative
ways
of
solving
its
security
problem:
(a)
to
adopt
a
client
status
by
adjusting
to
the
perceived
interests
of
the
neighbouring
Great
Power,
(b)
to
attempt
to
evade
the
issue
through
a
low-posture
policy
of
non-
engagement
in
international
power
politics
-
a
posture
which
has
often
been
referred
to
as
a
’stay
put’
policy,
and
(c)
to
seek
a
counterbalancing
alignment.
(The
fourth
alternative:
to
establish
a
bilateral
balance
of
power
ceased
to
be
a
viable
option
with
the
1864
War
against
the
German
States.)
While
most
of
the
Danish
security
pol-
icy
until
World
War
II
can
be
analysed
in
the
terms
of
alternatives
(a)
or
(b),
alternative
(c)
has
been
the
basic
option
since
then.
The
main
reason
for
this
shift
is
the
fact
that
through
NATO
the
option
of
alliance
membership
has
become
a
viable
one,
which
it
never
was
before;
but
the
change
is
also
due
to
a
real
change
in
attitudes
towards
defence
problems
and
-
in
a
wider
sense
-
towards
active
participation
in
an
international
political
system
which
is
firmly
based
on
the
bal-
ance
of
power,
a
change
which
can,
for
a
large
part,
be
attributed
to
the
trauma
of
the
practically
unopposed
German
occu-
pation
of
Denmark
in
1940.
Thus,
both
environmental
and
systemic
factors
have
contributed
to
an
activization
of
Danish
security
policy,
a
tendency
that
has
been
further
accentuated
by
the
loosening
of
the
European
alliance
structure
in
the
1960s.
Thus,
while
it
is
true
to
say
that
environ-
mental
variables
are
still
predominant
in
the
shaping
of
the
Danish
’security
equa-
tion’,
it
also
seems
legitimate
to
claim
that
the
systemic
variables
analysed
here
have
become
relatively
more
influential
than
they
used
to
be.
II.
THE
SECURITY
POLICY
TRADITION
The
systemic
variables,
attitudinal
and
perceptional,
are
conditioned
by
the
milieu
as
well
as
by
the
particular
historical
tra-
dition
of
the
political
system
in
the
field
of
security
policy.
As
defence
policy
has
always
been
a
major
focal
point
for
con-
flict
and
alignment
in
Danish
politics,
a
short
introduction
to
the
tradition
of
Dan-
ish
security
policy-making
and
also
to
the
changes
that
have
taken
place
since
World
War
II
should
be
given.
In
view
of
the
dominant
role
of
the
political
parties
in
the
Danish
political
system
it
seems
legitimate
to
confine
this
survey
to
the
main
attitudes
of
the
parties
which
are
represented
in
the
Folketing
at
present,
viz.
the
Social
Democrats
(So-
cialdemokratiet),
the
Radicals
(Det
Radi-
kale
Venstre,
a
social-liberal
party),
the
Conservatives
(Det
Konservative Folke-
parti),
the
Liberals
(Venstre,
Danmarks
Liberale
Parti,
an
agrarian-liberal
party),
and
finally
the
Socialist
People’s
party
(Socialistisk
Folkeparti,
which
is
a
party
to
the
left
of
the
Social
Democrats).
The
Social
Democratic
party
is
the
largest
and
has
had
a
vote
in
the
34
to
38
percent
range
in
the
last
three
elections;
since
World
War
II
it
has
been
the
near
permanent
governing
party
(1945,
1947-
50,
1953-68
and
1971-).
It
started
in
the
late
19th
century
as
strongly
anti-
militaristic
with
a
preference
for-
a
militia-
9
type
defence
structure.
After
1900
it
evolved
into
an
outright
pacifist
party
advocating
unilateral
disarmament
and
strict
neutrality.
A
change
in
its
defence
policy,
influenced
by
the
rise
of
nazism
in
Germany,
started
to
take
place
in
the
1930s,
but
was
only
consummated
after
World
War
II
when
the
party
emerged
as
moderately
defence-oriented.
After
the
collapse
in
1949
of
Nordic
defence
nego-
tiations
to
which
the
party
had
set
great
store,
it
shred
its
old
neutrality
doctrine
and
together
with
the
Liberals
and
the
Conservatives
decided
for
membership
in
NATO.
As
the
dominant
party
it
also
became
the
main
architect
of
a
low-posture
policy
in
relation
to
NATO,
which
is
characterized
by,
inter
alia,
the
absence
of
foreign
bases
in
Denmark
proper,
a
ban
on
nuclear
weapons
on
Danish
territory,
and
relatively
low
defence
budgets.3
In
co-
operation
with
the
other
NATO
parties
(in
the
late
1950s
joined
by
the
Radicals)
it
participated
in
the
enactment
of
the
various
defence
acts
(1950-51
and
1960)
until
1968
when
it
formally
withdrew
from
the
four-party
group.
The
reason
given
was
that
it
had
not
been
consulted
on
a
125
million
kroner
cut
in
the
1968/
69
defence
budget
carried
through
by
the
newly
formed
Radical-Conservative-Lib-
eral
government
coalition.
According
to
the
party
this
constituted
a
breach
in
the
rules
of
the
game.
This
was
undoubtedly
correct,
but
other
factors
seem
to
have
been
just
as
operative,
among
them
the
temptation
to
use
defence
policy
as
a
wedge
against
the
coalition
where
it
was
most
vulnerable,
but
also
a
concern
that
it
might
appear
less
willing
to
accept
de-
fence
cuts
than
the
Liberals
and
the
Con-
servatives.
In
1969
the
Social
Democrats
abstained
on
the
new
Defence
Bill
claiming
that
it
should
have
included
a
revision
of
strength
targets
as
well
as
the
whole
de-
fence
mix.
(The
1969
Defence
Act
intro-
duced
only
organizational
changes.)
In
1970
the
party
put
forward
a
proposal
for
a
defence
reform,’
which
was
introduced
as
a
Government
Bill
in
December
1971.
The
Bill,
which
was
based
on
the
continua-
tion
of
NATO
membership
under
the
present
conditions,
including
the
right
to
leave
with
one
year’s
notice,
but
which
introduced
major
changes
in
the
entire
defence
structure,
is
analysed
extensively
below.
In
foreign
policy
the
party
is
internationalist
and
stresses
the
importance
of
the
UN
and
cooperation
with
the
dev-
eloping
countries.
It
is
strongly
in
favour
of
European
d6tente,
and
is
also
strongly
committed
to
Danish
membership
in
the
European
Community
despite
the
fact
that
about
one-fifth
of
its
MPs
and
a
consider-
able
section
of
its
rank
and
file
were
against
entry.
The
Radical
party
was
born
’anti-
militarist,
so
to
speak,
as
anti-militarism
was
a
very
important
factor
in
its
creation
as
a
splinter
group
from
the
Liberals
(1905).
From
its
start
and
through
the
inter-war
period
the
party
favoured
heavy
defence
reductions
combined
with
a
policy
of
strict
neutrality.
After
World
War
II
the
Radical
party
revised
its
old
doctrine
that
a
military
defence
of
Denmark
was
fundamentally
futile,
but
still
favoured
small
defence
budgets
and
non-alignment
in
international
politics.
The
party
voted
against
membership
in
NATO
and
the
1950-51
Defence
Acts.
In
1957
when
it
entered
a
Social
Democrat-led
coalition
government
(until
1964),
it
had
to
accept
NATO
membership,
and
in
1960
it
had
reluctantly
to
assume
responsibility
for
the
new
Defence
Act.
After
leaving
the
Gov-
ernment
in
1964
the
Radical
party
became
more
free
to
pursue
its
programme,
espe-
cially
the
demands
for
a
reduction
in
the
conscription
period
and
for
a
frank
and
unprejudiced
discussion
of
the
security
policy
alternatives,
including
the
possi-
bilities
of
a
Nordic
defence
arrangement,
in
1969
when
membership
in
NATO
could
have
been
cancelled
with
one
year’s
notice;
for
some
time
the
Radical
party
advocated
that
the
question
be
decided
by
referen-
dum.
From
1968
to
1971
the
party
was
a
member
of
a
bourgeois
government
coa-
lition
(led
by
Hilmar
Baunsgaard,
its
parliamentary
leader)
with
the
Conserva-
tives
and
the
Liberals
which
was
pre-
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