Decentralization in Cambodia: New Wine in Old Bottles
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1002/pad.1765 |
| Published date | 01 October 2016 |
| Date | 01 October 2016 |
DECENTRALIZATION IN CAMBODIA: NEW WINE IN OLD BOTTLES
NETRA ENG*
Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), Cambodia
SUMMARY
The usual arguments for decentralization by its advocates are that it can achieve accountability, transparency, participation and
democracy. In reaching these goals, however, proponents of decentralization reform have articulated concerns about whether
government officials have sufficient capacity to implement decentralization policies, particularly at local level. This article as-
serts that in Cambodia, where decentralization has unfolded gradually since its adoption some 15 years ago, lack of capacity
is not the main problem. Decentralization is designed and implemented as part of the ruling political party's strategy to
strengthen its grip at the sub-national level rather than as an exercise for improving accountability and democracy. Although
decentralization is unlikely to lead to democratic gains, it does provide an opportunity for the rejuvenation of a patronage-
based party in ways that could increase state capacity and improve development outcomes. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley &
Sons, Ltd.
key words—decentralization; political economy of reform; capacity; Cambodia
INTRODUCTION
Decentralization is increasingly adopted as a core governance reform program in many countries. The usual argu-
ments put forward by donors and advocates of decentralization focus on its promise for fostering bottom-up ac-
countability, empowerment and citizen participation in local politics and decision making, all of which are
crucial elements for good governance and democracy (Grindle, 2007). However, a number of recent studies from
various regions of the world have shown that many if not most decentralization reforms have failed to deliver on
these promises, for two reasons. First, although governments formally espouse the kinds of normative goals men-
tioned above when conceiving decentralization programs, these goals are not then explicitly linked to their imple-
mentation. For example, the literature on the political economy of decentralization has shown that many
decentralization reforms which are ostensibly endorsed by governments to promote normative goals of democracy
and good governance have in fact been designed and implemented to preserve and sometimes empower the inter-
ests of central government and powerful elites (Eaton, 2001; Ribot et al., 2006; Eaton et al., 2010; Lange, 2010;
Smoke, 2015). Second, decentralization reforms fail when key contextual variables are absent, namely a vibrant
civil society, an enabling political culture, an educated citizenry and a free media, among others (Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2006).
A particularly significant concept in discussions of successful decentralization is the concept of state capacity.
Reform proponents often express concern that a lack of capacity of government officials thwarts the realization of
decentralization's promise (Brinkerhoff, 2005; Smoke, 2010). For example, Paul Smoke notes that “Capacity de-
velopment is critical to decentralization reform and the need for capacity development is widespread”(Smoke,
2010, p. 201). He argues that the capacity of local governments to implement decentralization is often lacking, par-
ticularly in developing countries, although he also advocates a much broader perspective on the nature and targets
of capacity building than is typically taken in the mainstream literature.
*Correspondence to: N. Eng, Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), 56 Street 315, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. E-mail:
engnetra@yahoo.com; netra@cdri.org.kh
public administration and development
Public Admin. Dev. 36, 250–262 (2016)
Published online 20 September 2016 in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/pad.1765
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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