Decentralization, provincial policy making and the law in Papua New Guinea
| Published date | 01 October 1984 |
| Author | W. Andrew Axline |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1002/pad.4230040402 |
| Date | 01 October 1984 |
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
Vol.
4,305-323
(I
984)
Decentralization, provincial policy making and the law in
Papua New Guinea
W. ANDREW AXLINE
University
of
Ottawa
SUMMARY
Shortly after independence in
1975
Papua New Guinea decided to decentralize political power
by creating nineteen provincial governments, complete with legislatures and executives. The
division of powers between the two levels of government was set down in the Organic Law on
Provincial Government and subsequent delegations of power by the National Executive
Council (cabinet). The ability of provincial governments to fulfil the role in policy making set
out for them depends on
a
number
of
political, financial and legal factors at both the national
and provincial levels.
A
close examination of the legal base of provincial policy making
reveals
a
number of shortcomings and incoherencies in the legal arrangements which pose
obstacles to the realization
of
effective decentralized policy making. There are several possible
approaches to resolving these problems, but the most appropriate one requires co-ordination
between the National Government and provincial governments in replacing delegated powers
with provincial legislation.
INTRODUCTION
Papua New Guinea’s commitment to decentralizing political and economic power is
found in the broad national goals known as the ‘Eight Aims’. The ‘decentralization
of economic activity, planning and government spending’ is how this goal is
expressed, and steps have been taken to realize it through the creation of nineteen
provincial governments. One of the perceived benefits of decentralization was the
bringing of decision-making closer to the people in order to respond better to local
needs and conditions, and to permit greater participation in decision-making. The
success of provincial governments in contributing
to
the decentralization of political
power will depend
inter
alia
on
their ability to carry out effectively the processes
of
policy making-the planning, formulation, adoption and implementation of
policies-and to involve the people
in
these processes. There are many
factors
which
affect the ability of provincial governments to assume this role. They include the
formal rules which define the powers and activities of provincial government, the
political processes through which decisions are made, social conditions under which
provincial governments operate, and the continuing commitment to the
establishment
of
an effectively decentralized state.
This article is part of a larger project
on
decentralization and development policy
in Papua New Guinea which studies the factors which influence the planning and
W.
Andrew Axline is Professor of Political Science, University of Ottawa, Canada. From
1982-1984
he
was Senior Research Fellow at the Papua New Guinea Institute of Applied Social and Economic
Research.
0271-2075/84/040305-19$01.90
0
1984
by John Wiley
&
Sons, Ltd.
306
W.
Andrew
Axline
policy-making capacities of provincial governments (Axline, 1982). It is hoped that
eventually specific factors can be identified which inhibit or contribute
to
the
capacity of provincial governments to plan and cary out policies for development in
their provinces. Based on the results
of
the research
it
should be possible to
understand better the process
of
decentralization in Papua New Guinea, to arrive at
an evaluation
of
the way it is being implemented and to make recommendations for
increasing the probability that its aims will be achieved.
The larger research project will examine the policy environment
of
provincial
governments and undertake an aggregate analysis of provincial policy-making. The
present article deals with one of the more formal aspects
of
the policy environment,
the legal basis of provincial policy making.
THE NATURE OF THE QUASI-FEDERAL SYSTEM
The formal structure of the decentralized political system in Papua New Guinea is
defined by the various laws and decisions involved in setting up provincial
governments, principally the National Constitution and the Organic Law on
Provincial Government. It should be pointed out that no attempt is made here to
present an exhaustive legal analysis of constitutional law in Papua New Guinea.
Rather the legal framework will be examined with particular regard to its role in
influencing the ability
of
provincial governments to carry out effective planning and
policy making.
The Papua New Guinean form of decentralization is not federal, in spite of the
facts that the constituent units are called provinces, that they have full-blown
legislative and executive institutions, and that their powers are entrenched in an
organic law. It is more accurately described as a politically decentralized unitary
system with clearly marked federal features (Committee
of
Review on Financial
Provisions
of
the Organic Law on Provincial Government, 1982, p. 49). The
provinces do not share co-ordinate powers with the central government as in a truly
federal system. The system was designed to provide for a strong central government
with a significant degree of autonomy for the provinces (Watts and Lederman, 1975,
p.
2)
through
a
devolution of powers to provincial governments (Wolfers, 1978).
The term quasi-federal has been used to describe this type of decentralized unitary
state (Tordoff, 1982, p.
1;
May, 1981, p.
6;
Conyers, 1982; Goldring, 1978,
p.
71;
Watts and Lederman, 1975, p. 27).
In
effect, it means that the formal relationship
between the central and provincial levels of government is defined by law but that
this law can be altered by the central government alone without the participation or
consent of provincial governments. This means further that ultimately the limits on
the activities of provincial governments are political, even though they are embodied
in law, some
of
which is constitutional law (Wolfers, 1978, p. 8).
Because of the circumstances surrounding the establishment and implementation
of provincial government in Papua New Guinea this body
of
law is not as coherent
as is sometimes found in newly constituted political systems (May, 1981, pp. 25-29).
The quasi-federal arrangement chosen by Papua New Guinea is an unusual
approach to decentralization among developing countries. More common
approaches would include a federal structure where the co-ordinate powers of the
two levels of government are spelled out clearly in law, and even entrenched in
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