DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: THE CURIOUS CASE OF FLEMISH SCHOOL INFRASTRUCTURE
| Date | 01 June 2014 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12064 |
| Published date | 01 June 2014 |
doi: 10.1111/padm.12064
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC–PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS: THE CURIOUS CASE OF FLEMISH
SCHOOL INFRASTRUCTURE
TOM WILLEMS
This article questions the negative outlook on the democratic accountability in public–private
partnerships (PPPs). It challenges this widely held perception in the literature with the empirical
findings of a case study of Flemish school infrastructure (Belgium). A large design, build, finance,
and maintenance (DBFM) programme is compared with the regular subsidizing system through the
public agency AGIOn (Agency for School Infrastructure). This case study demonstrates that more
accountability forums and actors can be active in the PPP, that they can behave more actively in the
PPP, and that they get results in terms of accountability. It provides a critical example of having
more accountability in the PPP variant of school infrastructure than in direct public provision, and
there are reasons to argue that this also means improved accountability, because internal and latent
processes of accountability become external and actual ones.
INTRODUCTION
Guaranteeing accountability in modern public governance is quite a challenge. ‘Account-
ability easily gets lost in the cracks of horizontal and hybrid governance’, as formulated
by Bovens et al. (2008). Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are emblematic for this kind of
governance. A dominant account in the literature on PPPs points exactly to this assumed
lack of accountability. Skelcher (2010), for instance, states that ‘PPPs raise important
issues of democratic governance due to the changed nature of the state when it engages
in cooperative activities with private actors’. He warns of a democratic deficit due to a
shortfall in accountability arrangements.
New forms of governance are thought to erode the principle of ministerial responsi-
bility, which is thought essential in ensuring democratic accountability (Flinders 2001;
Hodge 2009). The direct control capacity of ministers seems challenged by them. As tasks
and responsibilities are placed at arm’s length from ministers, the lines of account-
ability become blurred. PPPs stretch this principle even further through the close
involvement of private actors. The tension between the public demands for openness
and the private desire for commercial confidentiality of information illustrates this
(Siemiatycki 2007).
Although one of the new elements of PPPs is the altered accountability assumptions
(Hodge et al. 2010), this article questions the almost ‘self-evident truth’ of a negative
conclusion. This is necessary for two reasons. First, most studies on PPPs have stressed
legal, managerial, financial, and technical dimensions. Only a few have addressed ‘political
issues’. Second, if they do so, they address them from a theoretical point of view, not
based on empirical research. This article fills this gap by presenting the empirical findings
of a critical case study. Variation is brought into the case by looking at a PPP and at more
direct public provision in the same public policy context. School infrastructure in Flanders
(the northern region of Belgium) offers an example. The Flemish government follows here
a two-track policy which is compared in terms of democratic accountability: (1) a design,
Tom Willems is in the Department of Political Science, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium.
Public Administration Vol. 92, No. 2, 2014 (340–358)
©2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 341
build, finance, and maintenance (DBFM) project called ‘Schools of Tomorrow’ with a total
value of 1.5 billion Euro; and (2) regular subsidies through the public agency AGIOn
(Agency for School Infrastructure).
Although one must be careful of drawing general conclusions from a single case study,
it is worthy of attention because it gives counterweight to a paramount tendency in
the literature. The article nuances and counters the widely held perception that PPPs
automatically lead to an accountability problem. It demonstrates that more accountability
forums and actors are active in this PPP, that those forums and actors behave more actively,
and even that they get results in terms of accountability. There is more accountability
in Flemish PPP school infrastructure than in the regular subsidizing system, but does
this also mean improved accountability? The article contributes to the challenge of
interpreting multiple empirical dimensions of accountability, not only by pointing to a
counterexample, but also by asking: How can we turn more accountability into improved
accountability? And how can redundancy as a strategy be of any help?
TURN MAGICAL CONCEPTS INTO MANAGEABLE ONES
PPPs and their political consequences
PPPs can be seen as exemplary for public governance nowadays. The tension between
efficiency and (democratic) accountability manifests itself strongly in them. Yet, the same
kind of questions are also relevant in diverse (sub)disciplines like local government
studies, EU studies, international relations, and development studies. They are all facing
the challenging task of democratic horizontal or network governance by both public and
private actors in a complex multi-level and/or multi-actor context (see also Klijn and
Skelcher 2007; S¨
orensen and Torfing 2008).
Although PPPs are fashionable concepts in both public governance literature and prac-
tice, a clear definition is missing (Hodge et al. 2010). An OECD (2008) report indicates the
richness in defining PPP arrangements; every international organization has its defini-
tion and emphases. A broad spectrum of arrangements between traditionally procured
government projects and full privatization exists, as many different ways of collabo-
ration/partnership between public and private partners try to fill this space, differing
from country to country due to different government traditions and political preferences
(Grimsey and Lewis 2007). Some features are common, but the list is not fixed: long-term
cooperation, private sector financing, risk sharing and allocation, delivering services
(instead of buying assets), complex contracts and projects, output specifications and
performance incentives, life cycle approach, innovation, and experience and knowledge
sharing (Steijn et al. 2011).
Hodge et al. (2010) identify different types of PPPs: (1) institutional cooperation for
joint production and risk sharing; (2) long-term infrastructure contracts which emphasize
tight specification of outputs in long-term legal contracts; (3) public policy networks in
which loose stakeholder relationships are emphasized; (4) civil society and community
development; and (5) urban renewal and downtown economic development. This article
focuses on the first two types: the participative and contractual model of PPP (see below)
(Edelenbos and Klijn 2009).
Most studies on PPPs are conducted from a rather ‘technical’ point of view and
evaluate whether they deliver value for money (VfM). PPPs, however, also raise a
raft of ‘political’ questions which have received less attention, at least in terms of
Public Administration Vol. 92, No. 2, 2014 (340–358)
©2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
To continue reading
Request your trial