Denmark and European Integration
| Author | Peter Hansen |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083676900400102 |
| Published date | 01 March 1969 |
| Date | 01 March 1969 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Denmark
and
European
Integration
Peter
Hansen
European
integration
has
only
a
very
brief
history
as
an
issue
of
any
saliency
in
Danish
politics.
It
turned
up
sporadi-
cally
in
the
late
forties
and
early
years
of
the
Council
of
Europe,
but
remained
a
decidedly
peripheral
issue
throughout
the
formative
period
until
19571,
when
the
six
countries
completed
the
insti-
tutional
framework
for
a
narrower
union
based
on
the
three
Communities.
It
was
only
when
it
became
clear
be-
yond
doubt
that
the
projected
EEC
was
not
just
another
federalist
scheme,
but
a
project
about
to
be
realized
with
important
consequences
for
the
Danish
economy
in
general
and
agricultural
exports
in
particular,
that
the
issue
was
politicized.
Since
then,
the
European
policy,
or
more
precisely
and
prosa-
ically,
the
market
policy
of
Denmark
has
been
a
permanent,
and
at
times
hotly
disputed,
topic
in
the
political
de-
bate
as
well
as
an
important
element
in
Danish
foreign
policy.
The
aim
of
the
present
article
is
to
describe
some
of
the
problems
the
market
policy
is
designed’
to
solve,
and
some
of
the
important
factors
in
its
formulation.
I.
The
basic
framework
of
m~rket
policy
formulation
According
to
J.
B.
Duroselle 2,
the
for-
mulation
of
foreign
policy
takes
place
within
a
systeme
de
causalitg
(i.e.
the
product
of
external
forces
and
pressure)
as
well
as
in
a
systeme
de
finalité
(i.e.
the
goals
pursued
by
the
relevant
deci-
sion-makers).
These
two
systems
are
always
inextricably
intertwined
and
in-
terdependent
since
the
formulation
of
general
as
well
as
specific
goals
is
in-
fluenced
by
the
perception
of
the
exter-
nal
setting,
which
in
turn
is
influenced
by
the
values
and
goals
of
the
decision-
makers.
As
it
is
not
possible
within
the
space
available
here
to
attempt
an
anal-
ysis
of
all
the
various
external
and
internal
forces,
values
and
goals
which
have
entered
into
the
making
of
Danish
market
policy
decisions
during
the
past
twelve
years,
we
will
limit
ourselves
to
a
brief
outline
of
some
traditional,
basic
views
on
European
cooperation
and
in-
dicate
the
major
elements
in
the
attitudes
of
interest
organizations
and
political
parties.
This
policy
has
never
taken
the
form
of
action
in
pursuit
of
articulated,
positive
’European’
national
goals,
but
rather
of
reactions
to
protect
concrete
Danish
interests
against
the
consequences
of
organizational
develop-
ments
initiated
elsewhere
in
the
imme-
diate
political
and
economic
environ-
ment
in
Western
Europe.
Progress
in
the
Western
European
unification
pro-
cess
never
evoked
general
enthusiasm
in
Denmark.
The
problem
was
how
to
make
the
necessary
adjustments
to
changes
in
external
conditions
as
14
painless
as
possible.
It
was
symptom-
atic
of the
mood
in
the
early
phases
of
the
market
policy
debate
that
the
Min-
ister
in
charge
of
European
affairs
found
it
necessary
to
stress
that
’in
earlier
times
we
took
the
attitude
that
when
&dquo;the
big
ones&dquo;
did
something
we
ought
to
keep
out ...
but ...
now
it
is
no
longer
possible
to
keep
out.
We
must
follow ...
or
become
a
backward
country ...
like
Ireland’3.
This
kind
of
reaction
is
neither
new
nor
restricted
to
Denmark’s
policy
towards
European
cooperation;
it
is
deeply
rooted
in
the
Danish
foreign
policy
tradition.
As
Er-
ling
Bjol
notes
’the
possibility
of
having
’freedom
of
choice’
has
been
consistently
deemphasized
since ...
the
great
catastrophy
in
1864.
After
this ...
no
one
was
inclined
to
deride
the
argu-
ment
of
the
’European
necessity’
any
longer’4.
The
frequent
use
of
the
we-
have-no-other-choice
type
of
argument
in
the
market
policy
debate
has
at
times
given
it
an
almost
deterministic
flavour.
Certainly
the
location
of
Danish
mar-
ket
policy
on
a
causality-finality
spec-
trum
is
very
close
to
the
pole
of
causali-
ty.
Danish
market
policy
has
been
for-
mulated
within
the
framework
of
two
decisive
parameters
(i.e.
factors
which
are
constant
in
a
particular
case
under
consideration,
but
can
vary
in
different
cases5),
leaving
very
little
freedom
of
manoeuvre.
One
of
these
is
the
external
environment
or
causality
system,
whose
main
components
are
the
EEC
countries,
Great
Britain,
and
to
some
degree
the
other
Nordic
Countries.
The
varying
options
for
Danish
market
policy
have
been
products
of
changes
in
the
exter-
nal
environment
and
particularly
in
the
relationship
between
Great
Britain
and
France.
On
the
basis
of
available
op-
tions
we
may
distinguish
between
three
phases.
In
the
first
phase
(1957-59),
the
discussion
centred
around
participa-
tion
in
a
large
European
free
trade
area
combined
with
membership
in
either
the
EEC
or
a
Nordic
customs
union
for
which
negotiations
had
been
in
progress
since
1954.
The
breakdown
of
the
OEEC
negotiations
for
a
large
free
trade
area
marked
the
beginning
of
the
second
phase
when
Denmark
was
left
with
the
alternatives
of
isolation,
EEC
member-
ship,
or
participation
in
the
smaller
industrial
free
trade
area
EFTA;
the
Nordic
customs
union
had
been
aban-
doned
during
the
EFTA
negotiations.
The
third
phase
(1961-
) has
been
characterized
by
the
two
British
appli-
cations
for
EEC
membership,
which
has
left
Denmark
with
the
choice
of
follow-
ing
Britain,
seeking
an
arrangement
short
of
full
membership
either
alone
or
jointly
with
the
other
Nordic
countries.
or
isolation.
The
deadlock
in
the
nego-
tiations
between
Britain
and
the
EEC
led
to
a
revival
of
the
idea
of
a
Nordic
Economic
Union
in
1967.
The
other
parameter
is
the
structure
of
the
Danish
economy
in
general
and
of
foreign
trade
in
particular.
This
is
the
source
of
the
problem,
and
the
stan-
dard
by
which
the
different
options
are
measured.
It
is
symptomatic
that
while
other
European
countries
and
notably
’the
Six’
considered
the
wider
political
aspects
of
the
’relance
europeenne’
to
be
at
least
as
significant
as
its
narrower
economic
aspects,
the
Danish
govern-
ment
exhibited
a
rather
one-dimension-
al
concept
of
the
development,
evaluat-
ing
it
almost
exclusively
in
economic
terms.
According
to
the
Minister
then
in
charge
of
European
affairs,
Mr.
J.
O.
Krag,
whose
portfolio
was
charac-
teristically
changed
from
Economy
and
Labour
to
Foreign
Economic
Affairs
15
’the
main
problem
is
that
Denmark’s
continental
agricultural
exports
could
be
endangered’6.
_
This
initial
response
to
the
beginning
of
an
important
new
phase
in
the
pro-
cess
of
European
integration
marked
no
new
departure
in
the
approach
and
style
of
Danish
foreign
policy-making,
but
was
in
perfect
accordance
with
a
long
tradition
of
giving
economic
considera-
tions
first
priority7.
In
a
commission
report
of
1907
on
the
organization
of
the
Foreign
Service,
it
was
stressed
that
the
main
task
of
Danish
diplomacy
is
’to
work
for
Danish
commercial
inter-
ests’8.
Mr.
Krag’s
above-cited
definition
of
the
problem
as
seen
from
Denmark
was
clearly
reflected
in
his
formulation
in
1957
of
the
Danish
goals.
’These
are
quite
clear ...
they
must
primarily
be
defined
as
something
we
want
to
avoid,
namely
that
Western
European
cooper-
ation
be
organized
in
such
a
manner
that
there
will
be
discrimination
against
the
exports
of
Danish
agricultural
goods
in
Western
Europe’9.
Although
this
formulation
strikes
a
main
theme
in
the
debate
on
market
policy,
the
arguments
have
not
been
exclusively
confined
to
cheese,
bacon,
and
cattle.
In
other
words,
the
economic
parameter
has
strongly,
though
not
totally,
dominated
the
system.
It
is.
however,
character-
istic
of
Danish
attitudes
toward
cooper-
ation
with
her
Southern
neighbours
that
political,
social,
cultural
and
se-
curity
aspects
of
Western
European
in-
tegration
were
initially
brought
into
the
debate
by
the
opponents
of
Danish
membership
of,
or
involvement
with,
the
European
Communities.
I I.
Early
attitudes
towards
European
unity
Danish
reactions
towards
earlier
’Euro-
pean’
initiatives
reflect
a
long
tradition
of
avoiding
involvement
in
anything
which
tasted
of
Grosspolitikk,
with
its
attendant
risks
of
Denmark
being
forced
to
side
against
powerful
neigh-
bours
as
well
as
a
preference
for
a
very
pragmatic
approach
to
political
institu-
tions.
’
The
European
movements
of
the
in-
ter-war
period,
such
as
Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s
Pan-Europa
movement,
never
gained
any
following
in
Denmark.
The
attitude
of
general
indifference
towards
earlier
ideas
of
European
unity
was
clearly
illustrated
on
two
occasions
when
Danish
political
parties
were
con-
fronted
with
more
or
less
specific
and
concrete
European
projects.
The
first
of
these
was
the
plan
of
the
Danish
ophthalmologist
C.
F.
Heerfordt
for
a
’Europa
Communis’.
He
outlined
the
institutional
framework
for
a
cus-
toms
union
and
common
European
pol-
icies
in
foreign,
defence
and
economic
affairsl°.
Heerfordt
approached
all
pol-
itical
parties
in
Denmark
and
the
other
Nordic
countries
in
an
attempt
to
gain
their
support
for
a
joint
Scandinavian
governmental
initiative
to
further
his
ideas.
The
fate
of
Dr.
Heerfordt’s
plans
is
a
good
illustration
of
the
difference
between
the
reception
of
such
ideas
in
Scandinavia
and
in
Continental
Europe.
While
they
attracted
some
attention
in
other
European
countries
they
were
al-
most
totally
ignored
in
Denmark
and
the
other
Scandinavian
countries.
Some
leading
politicians
did
endorse
his
pro-
ject
as
individuals,
but
his
attempt
to
organize
a
broad
popular
European
movement
i
Denmark
became
an
even
To continue reading
Request your trial