Determinants of political purges in autocracies: Evidence from ancient Chinese dynasties
| Date | 01 May 2021 |
| Author | Stan Hok-Wui Wong,Kelvin Chun-Man Chan |
| Published date | 01 May 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343319899155 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Determinants of political purges in autocracies:
Evidence from ancient Chinese dynasties
Stan Hok-Wui Wong & Kelvin Chun-Man Chan
Department of Applied Social Sciences, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Abstract
Why would dictators purge members of their ruling coalition? Some argue that doing so can minimize the risk to
dictators’ political survival, while others contend that dictators who mount purges are motivated by the desire to
share resources with fewer allies. In this study, we analyze an original dataset, compiled from biographical data on the
subordinates of the founding emperors of seven ancient Chinese imperial dynasties. Analyzing the data with
competing risks models, we find that military experience is a strong predictor of political purges. Emperors were
less likely to execute officers who had fought in more battles, but more likely to execute commanders, especially those
who had established military credentials prior to the founding of an empire. In addition, the incidence of political
purges heightened toward the end of an emperor’s life, which implies that the founding emperors were concerned
about the security threats against their designated successors. Potential challengers came not only from the military,
but also from the aristocracy. Indeed, we find that the blood relatives of the emperors were more likely to experience a
mild form of purges: deprivation of titles. These findings suggest that dictators are more likely to use purges to reduce
existential threats.
Keywords
ancient China, authoritarian politics, military, political dynasty, political purges
Introduction
In The Dictator’s Handbook, Bueno de Mesquita &
Smith (2011) state that the first rule of becoming a
dictator is to reduce the size of the ruling coalition.
Of all the possible ways to trim the ruling coalition,
political purges are arguably the most intriguing and
most widely used measure in history.
1
Yet, the reason
why dictators purge certain coalition members, but not
others, remains less well understood. In this article, we
critically examine the determinants of political purges.
Our central argument is that political purges are more
likely motivated by a desire to reduce perceived threats
against dictators’ political survival, rather than by greed
for more resources.
There is a growing body of literature on political
purges in authoritarian regimes. For instance, Easton
& Siverson (2018) find that severe purges are associated
with longer post-coup tenures of dictators. Braithwaite
& Sudduth (2016) show that purging high-ranking mil-
itary officials is conducive to the prevention of civil con-
flict. Albertus & Menaldo (2012) contend that purging
in the form of asset expropriation allows dictators to
signal their commitment to core supporters. On the
timing of purges, Sudduth (2017) shows that dictators
who came to office by way of coups are more likely to
conduct military purges early in their tenure.
These extant works are based on cross-national
empirical analyses. To examine why dictators purge cer-
tain coalition members, however, we need more fine-
grained data at the individual level. In this study, we
Corresponding author:
shw.wong@polyu.edu.hk
1
For instance, about 60% of all conspirators of failed coups were
either executed or imprisoned (Easton & Siverson, 2018).
Journal of Peace Research
2021, Vol. 58(3) 583–598
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343319899155
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analyze the logic of political purges by taking advantage
of an original dataset that contains the biographical
information of military officials under seven founding
emperors in ancient China. Our data are afforded by
the unique historiography of ancient Chinese literati
historians, who had a scholarly tradition of writing bio-
graphy for political figures. Most notably, the collection
of the classical Standard Histories contains hundreds of
such biographies that cover almost every single impor-
tant political figure under each emperor in each
dynasty. This rich collection provides us an important
source for tracking the military officials’ experience,
rank, and mode of death, which in turn allows us to
conduct a systematic investigation into the targets and
timing of political cleansing.
Our scope of analysis encompasses the military sub-
ordinates of the founding emperors of seven dynasties led
by ethnic Han Chinese. We choose these military offi-
cials as our unit of analysis because they posed great
threats against the founding emperors. Unlike that of
succeeding emperors, the political ascendancy of found-
ing emperors depended heavily on a team of highly com-
petent military officers to help them destroy the previous
regime, wipe out competing forces, and erect a new
empire from scratch. It is this military savvy that made
these officers a looming threat against the emperors’ own
survival. In addition, a founding emperor might not
necessarily be a ‘natural’ leader of his team from the
outset.
2
His leadership position might have been
acquired from brutal power struggles with his peers, who
might not see him as a sacrosanct ruler or a leader by
default.
3
Confronted by these competent and not neces-
sarily loyal subordinates, founding emperors faced a
more precarious political situation than succeeding
emperors. How these founding emperors responded to
the threats posed by their allies should provide important
insight into the logic of dictatorial survival, particularly
in the absence of modern power-sharing institutions
such as political parties.
We find that military experience is a strong predictor
of political purges. High-ranking military officials, espe-
cially those who had earned their military credentials
during empire-building battles, were more likely to fall
victim to purges. Military officials who had familial ties
with the founding emperors were unlikely execution tar-
gets, although founding emperors’ blood relatives
faced relatively higher chances of demotion. In addi-
tion, political purges were more likely to occur within
the first few years after empire-founding and toward
theendofthefoundingemperor’slife.Thesefindings
suggest that purges are driven mostly by existential
threats, rather than by distribution concerns. They
also imply that political threats come not only from
the military, but also from those who are able to
compete with the incumbent over political legitimacy,
namely, blood relatives.
Political purges: Theories and practices
We define a purge as an authoritarian leader’s act of
depriving a certain member of the ruling elite of his or
her political power. When purges happen, affected mem-
bers of the ruling coalition often need not only to relin-
quish their political power, but also to endure mishaps
such as the deprivation of titles, public denunciation,
exile, imprisonment, torture, or even execution. Dicta-
tors can implement purges without political institutions.
In fact, they may even need to bypass institutional con-
straints and due process, in order to carry out purges
effectively. One illustrative example is Mao Zedong, who
had a predilection for launching mass mobilization cam-
paigns – most notably, the Cultural Revolution – to
attack his rivals within the party, even at the cost of
undermining the party-state.
While political purges may lead to the downfall of
members of the ruling coalition, the damage endured
by the purged members is not always irrevocable. For
instance, Hugo Chavez, the leader of a failed coup in
Venezuela, eventually captured the presidential office of
the country. Deng Xiaoping, who had been purged three
times under Mao Zedong, became the supreme leader of
the country after Mao’s death.
What motivates dictators to purge their subordinates?
There are two distinct perspectives on this question. One
view, advanced by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003),
emphasizes the importance of the distribution of eco-
nomic benefits among coalition members. Dictators
have a strong incentive to keep the ruling coalition as
small as possible. With a small coalition, a dictator can
spend less on buying the political support of the coalition
members, which implies that s/he can then keep more
private goods for him/herself. In addition, holding con-
stant a dictator’s expenditure on coalition members, a
smaller coalition size should increase the loyalty of
2
The seven founding emperors were all male. We therefore use he as
the third-person pronoun when referring to these emperors. When
we refer to autocrats as a generic concept, we use s/he.
3
The same logic should hold in contemporary Chinese politics. Mao
Zedong serves as an illustrative example. He emerged as the leader of
the Chinese Communist Pa rty after decades of pol itical struggles
against his challengers within the party.
584 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 58(3)
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