Direct Elections to the European Parliament: Toward a Federal Future?
| Author | Juliet Lodge |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083677801300303 |
| Published date | 01 November 1978 |
| Date | 01 November 1978 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Direct Elections to the European Parliament:
Toward a Federal Future?
JULIET LODGE
Department of Politics, University of Hull
Lodge, J. Direct Elections to the European Parliament: Toward a Federal Future?
Cooperation and Conflict, XIII
,
1978, 215-230.
The direct election of the European Parliament is controversial for a variety of reasons.
In particular it is expected to stimulate a change in the exercise of political authority
in the EC to the advantage of the Commission and European Parliament. Following a
discussion of the origins, nature and key elements of direct elections, the controversy
over their implications for national governments is analysed. Zero sum assumptions
are rejected, and two institutional models for the future EC examined. The static
model represents minimalist approaches, whereas the dynamic model presages insti-
tutional developments along federal lines.
Since the inception of the European Com-
of the dilemma over direct elections, and
munities (EC), direct elections to the
to scrutinize their consequences for the
European Parliament have been associ-
EC’s institutional balance. The latter may
ated with political integration of a kind
be seen in static or dynamic terms. Fol-
that would not only result in the creation
lowing a discussion of the assumptions
of a European federation,’ but in the
behind the view that direct elections will
emasculation of the authority of member
change the EC’s institutional balance, the
governments and national parliaments,
static and dynamic models are outlined.
the erosion of national sovereignties,2 and
Governments’ concern with the EC’s
the division of popular loyalties on a
institutional balance in general and the
zero-sum basis between the member
states
European Parliament’s powers in par-
and supranational European authorities.
ticular following direct elections stem
The impact of direct elections on the
from the fact that the two have always
division of authority between supra-
been associated with the idea of ’demo-
national and national institutions has
cratizing’ the EC.4 On the one hand is
been seen to be negative by member gov-
the notion of democratization by provid-
ernments. Such negativity caused member
ing for the direct participation of EC
governments to procrastinate over per-
citizens in the EC’s political life and de-
mitting the holding of direct elections
cision-making by way of direct universal
since for a long time these have also been
suffrage.5 On the other hand is the notion
linked to an increase in the European
of democratizing decision-making by af-
Parliament’s legislative authority: an in-
fording EC’s citizens’ representatives real
crease which it was supposed would be
legislative competence. The two are
won at the expense of national author-
linked because only if the European Par-
ities.3 This fear persists but increasingly
liament’s legislative competence is in-
member governments are beginning to
creased can Members of the European
appreciate that direct elections - whether
Parliament (MEPs) be said to participate
accompanied by a simultaneous increase
effectively in decision-making. If the le-
in the European Parliament’s powers or
gislative powers of the chamber remain
not - will also have an impact on the
negligible the extent to which MEPs in-
distribution of authority between the EC’s
fluence the EC’s decisional outputs will
institutions themselves, and notably be-
remain severely limited.6 Moreover, the
tween the Commission, European Par-
decision-making process (whereby the
liament and Council of Ministers. The
Commission proposes and the Council of
aim of this paper is to examine the origins
Ministers disposes and acts as a legislative
216
chamber) is regarded as undemocratic in
its direct election. This was justified on
the sense that it does not conform to the
the grounds that firstly, directly electing
ideals of parliamentary democracy pre-
a powerless Assembly was illogical; and
valent in Western Europe.7
secondly, that only if MEPs were direct-
Against this, member governments have
ly accountable to (and elected by) EC
rejected an increase in the European
electors should the European Parlia-
Parliament’s powers while MEPs were
ment’s powers be increased.lo
neither directly elected nor of sufficiently
Whereas the Rome Treaty does not
high calibre (since they were often back-
prescribe the granting of legislative power
bench delegates to the chamber) to en-
to the European Parliament, its direct
able them to perform a legislative func-
election is provided for under Article
tion competently. The idea that the Euro-
138. Even so, the European Parliament
pean Parliament’s legislative competence
had great difficulty in persuading member
should be increased at all has also been
governments to take the requisite action
disputed since there is no treaty provision
at the supranational level in their capacity
for this; the European Parliament not be-
as the Council of Ministers.
ing, as the successor of the Common As-
The European Parliament has pressed
sembly, in ’the logic of the functionalist
for direct elections and greater powers
plan’.8 Spinelli sees it as an ’almost pure-
since 1958. Directly after its constitution
ly formal concession made by the Treaty
in March 1958, its Political Affairs Com-
negotiators to the democratic-federalist
mittee (PAC) considered the question of
approach’. A further concession, he con-
direct elections. A
special working party,
cedes, to this approach lay with the power
set up under the chairmanship of Mr.
granted the European Parliament to cen-
F. Dehousse, reported on all the prob-
sure the Commission and thus to require
lems associated with direct elections. In
the accountability of one branch of the
March 1960, the PAC adopted a draft
bicephalous Executive to a parliamentary
Conventionli on direct elections which
forum. In this inheres much of the
outlined problems concerning electoral
rationale for altering the institutional bal-
procedures, transitional periods, the num-
ance more clearly along parliamentary
ber of MEPs, links with national parlia-
lines, and for requiring the accountability
ments, election dates, and general prob-
of the other branch of the Executive: the
lems associated with the introduction of
Council of Ministers.9
direct elections. It was explicitly stated
It was suspicion of federalism, coupled
at this stage that the question of in-
with both the fear that direct elections
creased powers for the European Parlia-
were tantamount not simply to a pooling
ment and the question of direct elections
but a transfer of popular sovereignties
should be dealt with separately,12 and it
from national parliaments to the Euro-
was stressed that the accretion of the
pean Parliament, and that the latter’s
Assembly’s powers was not a prerequisite
legislative powers would be won at the
for direct elections. Even so, the fears
expense of the former and the Council
of the member governments were not
of Ministers (and hence the national gov-
allayed.
ernments represented in it) that led mem-
In May 1960, the European Parliament
ber governments to be chary of direct
adopted resolutions on direct elections
elections. So long as they were seen as
which are significant in that they showed
synonymous with accretion of the Euro-
early recognition of the fact that in any
pean Parliament’s powers, member gov-
transnational direct elections the Euro-
ernments refused to consider permitting
pean Parliament saw itself playing a spe-
217
cial informative role vis-d-vis the pre-
consider direct elections at this stage can-
paration of European public opinion for
not simply be attributed to pressure from
elections by direct universal suffrage to
the European Parliament. On the con-
the European Parliament. As in the draft
trary, it was in part due to the changed
Convention, attention was also accorded
political leadership of many member
the question of increased powers for the
states (for example, in France, de Gaulle
chamber. Nevertheless, it proved impos-
had been replaced by Pompidou; and in
sible to elicit the member governments’
the Federal Republic of Germany, Brandt
approval.
had become the first SPD Chancellor and
The European Parliament’s resolution
was leader of a party that had for many
of 27 June 1963 on the powers and res-
years been committed to realizing the
ponsibilities of the European Parliament,
principle of parliamentary democracy at
stated that direct elections were essential
the supranational level)14 and to the fact
to the democratization of the EC, and
that the EC of the Six had not only con-
unsuccessfully called upon the Council of
solidated itself with the end of its own
Ministers and the member governments
transitional period in sight, but was seri-
to realize the draft Convention on direct
ously contemplating enlargement to in-
elections. Progress was further hampered
clude Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Nor-
by the 1965 crisis which climaxed over
way. Significantly, one of the important
the Commission’s three-pronged proposal
arguments advanced in support of British
which advocated a slight modification to
entry by Europeans was the notion of
the European Parliament’s powers that
Britain’s parliamentary heritage which it
was tantamount to increasing the cham-
was felt would contribute much to real-
ber’s authority.13
izing ’democracy’ of a British parlia-
Not until 1969 did the European Par-
mentary type in the EC. This was an
liament wager...
To continue reading
Request your trial