Disobedience to Law – Debbie Purdy's Case
| Author | David Schiff,Richard Nobles |
| Date | 01 March 2010 |
| Published date | 01 March 2010 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2010.00798.x |
information to consumers. Moreover, in Intel the ECJ approached protection
against blurring with some caution, noting,‘proof that the use of the later mark
is or wouldbe detrimental to the distinctive characterof the earlier mark requires
evidence of a change in the economic behaviour of the average consumer of the
goods or services for which the earlier mark was registered’.
65
In contrast, L’OreŁal
makes it clear that imagewill be protectedi ndependently,even when the essential
function remains una¡ected. Since such protection cannot be justi¢ed in terms of
the essential function, and this function was the shield against a free movement
challenge, this layer of image protection is wide open to attack. It does not
respond to identi¢able harm and has no obvious bene¢t to consumers or to the
functioning of a competitive common market.
Disobedience to Law ^ Debbie Purdy’s Case
Richard Nobles and David Schi¡
n
This case note examines the implications of the House of Lords decision to order the DPPto issue
o¡ence speci¢c guidelines allowing those contemplating assisting terminally il l persons to com-
mit suicide to know the risk they face of prosecution under section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961.
On the assumption that these guidelines will be law, and binding upon the DPPas well as the
CPS,does th is represent a change in the law,or a situation in which it may be unlawful to e nforce
the law, or even generate a legal right of disobedience to law?
The poignantcase of Purdy
1
involves a womansu¡ering from multiple sclerosis,a
terminal and increasingly disabling disease, and a devoted husband, Mr Puente,
who wishes to assist her to commit suicide at a time of her choosing by helping
her to travel to a country where assisted suicide is legal. Given the wording of
section 2(1) of the SuicideAct 1961, which prohibits the aiding,abetting, counsel-
ling or procuring the suicideof another, and admits of no exceptions in itself, this
assistance will constitute a crime.
2
Whether it will also constitute a moral wrong
65 n 26 above at [81].
n
Department of Law, Queen Mary University of London. We wish to thank our colleague Peter
Alldridgeand Gavin Phillipson fromDurham Universityfor theircomments on a draftof this case note.
34 [176].
1R (onthe applicationof Purdy)(Appellant) vDirectorof PublicProsecutions(Respondent)[2009] UKHL 45,
2 Whether the common law defences of necessity or duress open up the possibi lity of an exception is
not a question that we address here, nor whether the fact that the suicide occurs outside England
and Wales might make s 2(1)i napplicable. On the latterpossibi lity, see M. Hirst,‘Assisted Suicide
after Purdy:TheUnresolved Issue’[2009] Crim LR 870.Se e also R.Huxtable, Euthanasia,Ethicsand
the Law:FromCon£ict to Compromise (Routledge-Cavendish: Oxford,20 07) especially ch 3: Assi sted
suicide in ‘the shadowy area of mercy killing’; R. Huxtable,‘The SuicideTourist Trap: Compro-
mise Across Boundaries’(20 09) 6 BioethicalInquiry (2009) 327.
Richard Nobles and DavidSchi¡
295
r2010The Authors. Journal Compilation r2010The Modern Law ReviewLimited.
(2010)73(2) 282^304
To continue reading
Request your trial