Distribution of Power and Military R&D
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629807074266 |
| Published date | 01 April 2007 |
| Date | 01 April 2007 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
DISTRIBUTION OF POWER AND MILITARY R&D
Vally Koubi and David Lalman
ABSTRACT
Military technology plays an important role for national security and the international
distribution of power. Yet it has received little formal attention in the literature. This
article aims at filling this gap. We build a dynamic model that links the properties of
military technology races (intensity and persistence) to the characteristics of the
international environment (the distribution of power) and the types of weapons under
development. The model is also used to discuss the implications of military technol-
ogy races for power transition, the incentives countries may have to engage in arms
control agreements and the circumstances under which it pays to engage in deception
strategies. We find that the intensity of military R&D is higher when a dominant
nation faces a potential challenger than under conditions of actual competition. The
intensity of weapons development and also the speed of power transition depend on
whether the challenger can be ‘intimidated’ through aggressive weapon development
or not. We also find that when the stakes associated with the development of a
weapon are high, then the optimal policy is to underplay one’s own success and exag-
gerate foreign accomplishments (threats).
KEY WORDS •distribution of power •military technological race •power transition
•R&D
1. Introduction
Over the past half century, the pursuit of technological superiority in both nuclear
and conventional weapons systems has dominated the thinking of many military
planners and resulted in international investment in research and development
(R&D) competition as well as overt arms races. Throughout this period, military
research has been intensive and sustained. Much of this effort has been at least par-
tially driven by the concern of maintaining (or overturning) a technological edge
against real or potential opponents. It is the new technologies and weapons
systems produced through R&D that make for qualitative arms races, which are
often thought to be as important as quantitative arms races. In the pursuit of a
qualitative technological advance that would give a military advantage, nations
typically pursue what are either partly or wholly secret development programs.
Expenditures on R&D for breakthrough weapons systems are commonly disguised
in national budgets. The unobserved nature of these expenditures dictates a theo-
retical rather than an empirical approach to understanding the patterns and the
Journal of Theoretical Politics 19(2): 133–152 Copyright © 2007 Sage Publications
DOI: 10.1177/0951629807074266 London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi
http://jtp.sagepub.com
interactions of incentives driving R&D investment. These programs are important
in that they can greatly alter the security of a state as well as alter the distribution
of power in an international system. The intensity of the SDI program pursued by
the USA in the early 1980s is a recent example of how the military technology is
believed to be important in deciding the distribution of world power. In spite of the
ambitiousness of this program, it is not at all atypical. It simply reflects the belief
that it is rational to pursue vigorously certain endeavors that, though they may have
a low probability of success, when successful are capable of bringing about sig-
nificant changes in the existing distribution of power.
The military R&D industry has grown significantly in terms of invested inputs
since the Second World War. Before the war, military R&D consumed on average
less than 1 per cent of the military expenditure of major powers (SIPRI Yearbook,
1974). Since that time, outlays for R&D have increased to the point that they now
account for around 11 to 13 per cent of expenditures (Acland-Hood, 1984), and
around 750,000 of the world’s best-qualified scientists and engineers are engaged
in military R&D (Acland-Hood, 1986). Within the US military budget, R&D is
the fastest growing item in military spending. For example, while the US military
R&D expenditure in 1944–5 amounted to only 513 million current dollars (not
counting the expenditures for the secret Manhattan Project), by 1987 the amount
had increased to nearly 42 billion current dollars (Weinberger, 1986). Although it
is difficult to offer any concrete, comparative figures for the Soviet military R&D
spending (because of Soviet secrecy and severe methodological problems), it is
certain that the Soviet Union too spent similarly large amounts of money in its
efforts to catch up and surpass the USA.1
The development of military technology is widely thought to play a major role in
arms races. Although a few scholars have argued that the effects of changing tech-
nology on arms competition have been overplayed (Evangelista, 1988), most
researchers attribute a major role to technology in arms races, and in particular to the
potential for a technological shift to destabilize international relations. Regarding
this possibly destabilizing effect, Schelling (1960: 897) writes, ‘The evolution of
military technology has exacerbated whatever propensities toward war are inherent
in the political conflict between us and our enemies’. Schelling and Halperin (1962)
went on to suggest measures to slow down or stabilize the arms race by also includ-
ing weapons research and development in bilateral arms control agreements.
Similarly, the development of military technology may play an important role
in power transition. Technology is a key determinant of military capabilities and
hence the outcome of a military R&D race on a major new weapon has the poten-
tial to induce or prevent (at least temporarily) a power transition.
134 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 19(2)
1. Holloway (1983: 134) notes that ‘Soviet military R&D effort is large, and it has expanded
greatly since the war...By 1987, according to the best Western estimate, 828,100 scientists and engi-
neers were engaged in R&D in the Soviet Union. It is possible that as many as half of these were
working to develop new weapons and military equipment’.
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