Does R2P matter? Interpreting the impact of a norm
| Author | Luke Glanville |
| DOI | 10.1177/0010836715612850 |
| Published date | 01 June 2016 |
| Date | 01 June 2016 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Cooperation and Conflict
2016, Vol. 51(2) 184 –199
© The Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/0010836715612850
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Does R2P matter?
Interpreting the impact
of a norm
Luke Glanville
Abstract
There is a curious tendency among some scholars and commentators to denigrate the impact of
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Drawing on constructivist scholarship that illuminates both
the regulative and constitutive ways that norms matter and that explains how the effects of norms
can be interpreted, I argue that the R2P norm has a real and observable impact on the behaviour
of states. I demonstrate that this impact can be detected not only in instances of compliance, such
as in Libya, but perhaps even more clearly in examples of violation, such as in Syria.
Keywords
Constructivism, Libya, norms, Responsibility to Protect, Syria
Introduction
There is a curious tendency among some scholars and commentators to denigrate the
impact of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). One observer has described R2P as ‘sound
and fury signifying nothing’; a mere ‘slogan employed for differing purposes shorn of
any real meaning or utility’ (Hehir, 2010: 218−219). Another has insisted that, for all the
talk of R2P, state responses to mass atrocities continue to be dictated by ‘rational calcula-
tions premised on self-interest’ (Murray, 2013: 16). Some have denied that R2P was ‘a
major influencing factor’ in the decisions of states to intervene in response to threats of
mass atrocities in Libya in 2011 (Morris, 2013: 1272). Others have concluded that the
lack of external intervention to resolve the ongoing crisis in Syria indicates that R2P ‘is
about to expire and its death is not avertable’ (Nuruzzaman, 2014).
Each of these claims is flawed. Such claims, I suggest, tend to stem from a problem-
atic understanding of how norms matter and how their impact should be interpreted.
Drawing on resources provided by three decades of constructivist international relations
Corresponding author:
Luke Glanville, Department of International Relations, Hedley Bull Centre, Australian National University,
Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia.
Email: luke.glanville@anu.edu.au
612850CAC0010.1177/0010836715612850Cooperation and ConflictGlanville
research-article2015
Article
Glanville 185
scholarship, I argue that the R2P norm in fact has a very real and readily observable
impact on the behaviour of states. I demonstrate that this impact can be detected not only
in instances of compliance with the norm, but perhaps even more clearly in examples of
violation. As such, the purpose of the article is not to advance a new theoretical claim
about norms so much as it is to draw on well-established theoretical claims in order to
refute those who deny the impact of the R2P norm.
I advance the argument in three sections. First, I draw on constructivist scholarship to
explain how we might fruitfully interpret the impact of a norm such as R2P. I examine
how norms can have both regulative effects, prompting actors to act in accordance with
the norm for instrumental reasons, and also constitutive effects, leading actors to inter-
nalise the norm such that they define their identities and interests in accordance with it. I
detail how we can recognise these regulative and constitutive effects, in cases of both
compliance and violation, through analysis of the deliberations of actors, the justifica-
tions they offer for their actions, and the responses they make to the actions of others.
And I explain the importance of establishing reasonable expectations for a norm such as
R2P, given that it involves positive duties that are in potential tension with other cher-
ished norms and values.
In the second section, I interpret the impact of R2P in an example of compliance. I
argue that the available evidence suggests that the Obama administration was moved by
a felt imperative to act to protect Libyan civilians in 2011. Indeed, President Obama
chose to intervene in Libya despite the expressed concerns of leading officials within the
administration that the United States had no strategic interest in doing so. I suggest that
the impact of R2P and related ideas of human protection in this case is clear.
In the third section, I interpret the impact of R2P in an example of violation. I note that
it is false to suggest that the absence of military intervention in Syria represents a viola-
tion of the R2P norm, as the norm does not require imprudent action that would likely do
more harm than good. However, it seems clear that the international community has
failed to discharge its responsibility to do what it can, short of military intervention, to
protect the people of Syria since the crisis erupted in 2011. In this sense, the international
community has violated the R2P norm. This is deeply regrettable. Nevertheless, we can
still detect the impact of the norm in several ways: in the acceptance of the international
community that the crisis in Syria is one to which they are bound to respond; in the
efforts of states to justify the significance of the actions they have taken to protect the
vulnerable and to provide excuses when they have refused to act; and in the willingness
of states to condemn those, particularly Russia and China, who they claim are standing
in the way of the international community discharging its responsibility to protect. States
thus recognise that the R2P norm matters and that they need to justify, excuse, or shift
blame for its violation.
Indeed, states have tended to proclaim that the international community has a respon-
sibility to protect populations from mass atrocities more boldly with respect to the Syrian
crisis than they did when deliberating how to respond to earlier crises such as in Libya.
Although this offers no consolation for those suffering in Syria, we know that such discur-
sive practices can often have profound effects on the diffusion of a norm. To be sure, norm
development is never inevitable. Nevertheless, it is often the case that actors become
‘rhetorically entrapped’ by the arguments they use in one case such that expectations for
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