Does “Smarter” Lead to Safer? An Assessment of the US Border Accords with Canada and Mexico
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2435.00251 |
| Published date | 01 December 2003 |
| Author | Deborah Waller Meyers |
| Date | 01 December 2003 |
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK, and
350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
© 2003 IOM
International Migration Vol. 41 (4) 2003
ISSN 0020-7985
*Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC, USA.
Does “Smarter” Lead to Safer?
An Assessment of the US Border
Accords with Canada and Mexico
Deborah Waller Meyers*
ABSTRACT
The terrorist attacks of September 11 and their immediate aftermath along the
US-Canadian and US-Mexican borders focused attention on border manage-
ment strategies in ways previously unimaginable. Suddenly confronted by the
fact that existing systems and processes were not particularly effective either at
protecting security or facilitating legitimate traffic, the United States, in con-
junction with the Canadian and Mexican Governments, demonstrated an un-
characteristic willingness to reconceptualize its approach to physical borders.
While initiating a series of internal policy adjustments to secure themselves against
terrorist threats, the US, Canadian, and Mexican Governments also signed two
bilateral agreements – the 12 December 2001 United States-Canada Smart Bor-
der Declaration and the 22 March 2002 United States-Mexico Border Partner-
ship Agreement. These agreements represent an important development in the
US’s relationship with each of its North American neighbours, acknowledging
not only the deep economic, social, and cultural ties, but also the new reality that
the United States cannot attain the additional security it desires through
unilateral actions alone. Thus, while September 11 forced a reassessment of
vulnerabilities, it simultaneously provided the United States an opportunity
to work more systematically with its contiguous neighbours for security bene-
fits, a realization likely to flow into other areas where the benefits of cooper-
ation eclipse those of unilateralism.
This paper analyses the first year of the two border accords, tracking their imple-
mentation and evaluating their successes and failures. Most importantly, the
paper outlines outstanding challenges, highlights steps that the governments
should take to achieve additional border security and efficiency, and draws con-
clusions regarding factors likely to make their efforts more, or less, successful.
6Meyers
INTRODUCTION
Among the most immediate impacts of the September 11 attacks was an increased
state of alert at US land, air, and sea borders. Although the border technically
remained open, lines at US land ports of entry along both the Canadian and Mex-
ican borders stretched for miles, lasting for hours and disrupting the regular flows
of people and goods. Students could not get to school, workers could not get to
their jobs, and automobile assembly lines had to be stopped for hours at the cost of
millions of dollars. Given that a country’s borders physically and symbolically
represent notions of sovereignty and security, the inclination to heighten border
inspections and controls as a first response was understandable, particularly since
it was unclear whether more attacks were imminent and how and where the terrorists
had entered the country. Government officials soon realized, though, that the
situation at the border was untenable even in the short term. After all, there are
nearly half a billion crossings at US borders with Canada and Mexico annually,
and Canada and Mexico are the US’s two largest trading partners, with trade
averaging US$1.4 billion per day with Canada and approaching US$1 billion per
day with Mexico.1
Faced with growing gridlock, policy makers quickly understood that changes at
the border would be necessary to resume the flow of traffic and trade so vital to the
United States and its North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) neighbours.
These changes would enhance physical security while simultaneously facilitating
legal traffic. Moreover, US policy makers began to appreciate that a unilateral
approach to security needs would be ineffective. Unless the United States literally
walled itself off from its neighbours, Canadian and Mexican cooperation, in con-
junction with domestic policy changes,2 would be required to protect tourism and
trade while preventing terrorism. As then-Director of the White House Office of
Homeland Security, Tom Ridge said, “We are working with Canada and Mexico
to institute smart borders that will keep terrorists out, while letting the flow of
commerce in... We’re working toward a more orderly twenty-first century manner,
which includes... pre-certifying people and commerce far away from the border so
you can move across quickly...” (Ridge, 2002).
Canada and Mexico were willing partners in this exercise, as they realized that for
various reasons, including that the United States would act to protect itself either
way, cooperation with the United States in the war on terrorism was in each of
their national interests as well. For Canada, the reasons largely were economic,
though they also reflected the long history of friendship and cooperation between
the two countries and many shared values. Canada’s economy is highly integrated
with, and dependent on, the United States, with US$475 billion in two-way
trade and 85 per cent of all Canadian exports headed to the United States annually
7
Does “smarter” lead to safer?
(Chrétien, 2002). Further, well more than 100 million people cross the US-
Canadian border each year and 90 per cent of the Canadian population lives within
100 miles of the border (Papademetriou and Meyers, 2001: 62). For Mexico, the
economics of the situation also played a large role, with two-way trade nearing
US$300 billion annually, as did the desire to earn the respect of the Americans in
law enforcement situations and to earn good will that would bode well for a future
migration agreement. More than 300 million people cross the US-Mexico border
each year, approximately 10 million people live in the US-Mexico border area, and
Mexico is the single largest sender of legal migrants to the United States each
year. Moreover, approximately half of the US’s undocumented population is
believed to be comprised of Mexican nationals and many communities along the
border truly are binational, with family members living on both sides
(Papademetriou and Meyers, 2001). At a minimum, neither Canada nor Mexico
wanted to be victims of the next major terrorist attack, nor did either want to be a
country of transit for would-be terrorists. A more secure North America would
benefit all three countries.
Thus, in December 2001 and March 2002, the United States signed Smart Border
agreements with Canada and Mexico, respectively. What has facilitated cooper-
ation between the United States and its neighbours with regard to border manage-
ment? What bilateral or multilateral agreements have been reached between the
countries, and what, if any, internal actions have Canada and Mexico taken to
secure their own countries against the terrorist threat before it can even reach the
United States? To what extent have action items been implemented? Can their
relative effectiveness in increasing security be measured in any tangible way?
And what steps lay ahead for the three governments?
This paper seeks to answer some of these questions, taking into account the con-
text of the discussion. Drawing on both public documents and informal interviews
with current and former government officials,3 the paper briefly reviews initial
anti-terrorism measures in all three countries after September 11, then turns to a
status report on the Smart Border Accords and their immigration-related compon-
ents. Analysing the relative successes and failures of the past year, I then highlight
some of the issues that should be addressed in the next phase of the process,
including recommendations on how to proceed.
CONTEXT
Following the horrific events of September 11, both Canada and Mexico took
unilateral and bilateral legislative, regulatory, and/or policy steps within their coun-
tries to increase their own security and that of the US population as well. These
To continue reading
Request your trial