Donald George Jerrard v Hamish Blyth and Others
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Sir David Eady |
| Judgment Date | 11 March 2014 |
| Neutral Citation | [2014] EWHC 647 (QB) |
| Docket Number | Case No: HQ13D03140 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division |
| Date | 11 March 2014 |
[2014] EWHC 647 (QB)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Sir David Eady
(Sitting as a High Court Judge)
Case No: HQ13D03140
The Claimant appeared in person
Yuli Takatsuki (instructed by Barlow Robbins LLP) for the Second Defendant
Victoria Shore (instructed by Harveys Solicitors LLP) for the Third Defendant
The First Defendant was not represented
Hearing date: 21 & 24 February 2014
Approved Judgment
I direct that pursuant to CPR PD 39A para 6.1 no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.
The factual background
These prolonged and no doubt expensive libel proceedings arise out of one word published on or about 28 July 2011 on a website of interest mainly to those living in and around Liphook in Hampshire ( www.liphook.co.uk). The post appeared to emanate from a user named Graeme Irwin. I understand that the offending word was removed about two months later. The Claimant, generally known as Don Jerrard, is a retired solicitor who has been active in local politics and was elected to the Bramshott and Liphook Parish Council in May 2011. Although he was not named in the post in question, there was reference to certain individuals who had been recently elected, including a "disbarred solicitor", and it is the Claimant's contention that some readers would have reasonably understood this to refer to him. The word "disbarred" was in due course replaced by the unobjectionable description " former solicitor". It is not disputed that "disbarred" would be a false description if it had indeed been understood as referring to the Claimant, since he had neither been "disbarred" nor "struck off" (which would be the more accurate terminology for any solicitor who had been deprived of the right to practise).
Although it may not have been read by very many readers (compared to the readership of a newspaper), nevertheless it can hardly be doubted that to allege of a solicitor that he has been "struck off" is defamatory and likely especially to cause damage to such a person standing for or elected to public office (at whatever level).
The Claimant told me that what he wanted primarily was a prompt withdrawal and apology. A letter of complaint was written in October 2011 to the Second Defendant, Jeremy Austin Olsen, suggesting that he must have been the author of the post because Graeme Irwin was the name of one of his work colleagues (who had himself already denied any responsibility) and, what is more, the author had revealed a detailed knowledge of the affairs of Liphook Parish Council. This, says the Claimant, would tend to point towards the Second Defendant (he having formerly been a member of the council himself).
The response of the Second Defendant's solicitors on 24 November 2011 not only denied any responsibility on his part but also attributed the post to the First Defendant, who at the time of publication had been working on a temporary basis in the same office with the Second Defendant. What is more, he had expressly admitted his own responsibility. The Claimant, however, does not accept the truth of the Second Defendant's denial or of the First Defendant's admission. That is despite the fact that his own particulars of claim, served on 22 November 2012, currently plead the First Defendant's admission and assert that he was repeating an allegation made to him by the Second Defendant (which he, the Second Defendant, intended should be passed on). The Claimant now wishes to make a different case and to demonstrate, at trial if necessary, that the situation is analogous to the recently notorious case in which the wife of a member of Parliament had tried to exonerate her husband of liability for a speeding offence by pretending that she had been driving at the material time. In other words, the Claimant wishes to contend that the First Defendant is simply trying to let the Second Defendant "off the hook" by falsely claiming responsibility for the offending post. These submissions were developed by the Claimant at some length in the course of the hearing on 21 February 2014. It soon became apparent both that these new allegations were very serious (implicating the First and Second Defendants apparently in a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice) and that this radically different case required a clear and express pleading – for which permission would obviously be required. Ms Takatsuki considered the matter with her client over the intervening weekend and, on Monday 24 February, I agreed to adjourn the relevant part of the application so that (i) an amended statement of case could be drafted and (ii) an opportunity given for the relevant parties to prepare and submit evidence on the issue of whether permission should be granted.
Exactly why the First Defendant is supposed to have made the false admission is at the moment, at least to me, unclear. Nevertheless, in light of those admissions, subsequently confirmed in an email as long ago as 26 February 2012, I understand that judgment was entered in default against him.
An audio recording was played before me in court, on 21 February, of what apparently passed between the Claimant and the First Defendant during a visit to the address where the First Defendant now lives in Scotland. He and his wife called upon him, I was told, in July 2013. The First Defendant reacted with a good deal of abuse and threatening language. But none of this really impinges on the applications now outstanding before the court, which relate primarily to the Second and Third Defendants.
The Second Defendant was served with the proceedings about a year after his solicitors' denial, but without any further communication or warning, on 22 November...
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Mark Robin Sands (as Joint Trustee in Bankruptcy of Richard Raymond Rufus) v Bruce Antonio Dyer
...with Rule 12.9 does not render it a nullity (applying Aktas v Adepta [2010] EWCA Civ 1170, [2011] QB 894 at [18], Jerrard v Blyth [2014] EWHC 647 (QB) at [9] with support from r.12.64 IR 2016). Therefore, the common law principles of submission to the jurisdiction apply, as expressed by ......