Donatella Della Porta and Alberto Vannucci, The Hidden Order of Corruption: An Institutional Approach

Date01 December 2013
Published date01 December 2013
DOI10.1177/0004865813509326
AuthorAdam Graycar
Subject MatterBook Reviews
Donatella Della Porta and Alberto Vannucci, The Hidden Order of Corruption: An Institutional Approach,
Ashgate: Surrey, England, 2012; 320pp.: ISBN 9780754678991, £65 (hbk)
Reviewed by: Adam Graycar, Australian National University, Australia
I was discussing corruption with a diplomat who described the difference between two
countries in which he had worked. In X, he said, when you pay a bribe, you never knew
whether they would deliver or whether there would be a result. In Y, on the other hand,
when you paid a bribe there were no surprises, you got what you paid for. It reminded
me of the old adage about honest and crooked politicians – an honest politician is one
who when bought, stays bought!
Corruption mostly is clandestine and secret, and if a desired result is not forthcoming,
there is no recourse. You cannot complain to Consumer Affairs! Also the secret nature
of corruption poses many challenges for researchers trying to understand the phenom-
enon and to develop suitable preventive strategies and countermeasures.
In some societies, corrupt practices are open and blatant. Political leaders may expect
a percentage of major state contracts, or state projects will not go ahead. They may
expect that their families will get part of the action. Lower officials may extract bribes
from citizens with absolute impunity. Sometimes this greed is excessive and things blow
up enormously as we saw in the 2011 Arab Spring. A Tunisian street vendor was sick of
paying bribes about which the authorities took no action, and set himself alight in
protest, and this precipitated the downfall of several corrupt regimes in the region.
However, it is often the corruption that is hidden and little understood that causes
great damage to societies. The key to learning the dynamics of corrupt exchanges is to
understand what transpires in hidden transactions. In countries in which the rule of law
prevails and in which standards of ethical behaviour are expected, corruption is never-
theless egregious. Criminalising corruption has certainly not eliminated it.
Della Porta and Vannucci’s excellent book, The Hidden Order of Corruption: An
Institutional Approach, takes the reader through the complex network of corrupt
exchanges, through processes of corruption brokerage activities and explains how
enablers mediate corrupt situations. The authors have skilfully undertaken innovative
and path breaking research and woven it into a strong analytical narrative.
Defining corruption is never easy and the authors start with the commonly used
‘misuse of public power for personal gain’, but move forward quickly to promote the
principal/ agent approach. The principal (the state) gives the agent (an official or a
politician) salary and/ or delegation of power to do what is required. In return, the
agent does what s/he is contracted to do, deliver a service, make policy, regulate or so
forth. This is an official exchange and is transparent. When, however, the agent makes a
discretionary decision that benefits clients or contacts, and in return receives something
from the client, a corrupt exchange has taken place. Usually the benefit from the client to
the agent is hidden, for the only authorised and transparent return is the salary that the
principal pays to the agent. Benefits in corrupt exchanges are not always financial. They
also may comprise meals, holidays, sexual favour and there are always judgement calls
about whether these were genuine gifts in genuine relationships.
A corrupt exchange needs principal, agent and client. We certainly have situations
where there is fraud and embezzlement in government settings, but where an agent steals
from a principal, this can be understood as a straight criminal activity, not as corruption,
452 Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 46(3)

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