Doncaster MBC v Haigh and Others
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Nicholas Wall |
| Judgment Date | 22 August 2011 |
| Neutral Citation | [2011] EWHC 2412 (Fam) |
| Court | Family Division |
| Date | 22 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. SE09C01011 |
[2011] EWHC 2412 (Fam)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Addendum: the local authority's “information document
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
The Rt. Hon. The President
Sir Nicholas Wall
Case No. SE09C01011
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I am giving this judgment in open court.
The principal application with which I have to deal in this case is, in my experience, unprecedented. Doncaster Metropolitan Borough authority (“the local authority”) seeks to put into the public domain aspects of care proceedings under Part IV of the Children Act 1989, which, in accordance with normal practice, were heard in private.
There is a second application made by the local authority, which is supported by both the father of the child concerned and her guardian in the proceedings, for an order against the mother under s.91 (14) of the Children Act 1989, designed to prevent any application by the mother in relation to the child under the Act without the court's permission for a period of two years. I will deal with that application at the conclusion of this judgment.
The local authority's principal application is supported by the father of the child and by the child's guardian, albeit with the important exception that in any publication of material the prohibition against naming the child herself should be maintained. This was the prohibition imposed by Baker J., sitting in the High Court earlier this year. During the course of argument on 15th August 2011 when I heard the case it became apparent that differences between the local authority and the guardian on this point could be accommodated, with the result that the order I propose to make at the conclusion of this part of my judgment will preserve the child's anonymity. I will amplify my reasons for taking this course later in the judgment. I propose, accordingly, to call the child “X”.
X's mother is Victoria Haigh. She told me on 15 August 2011 that she now lives in the Irish Republic. Although it has been held that supervised contact between Ms. Haigh and X is in the latter's interests, Ms. Haigh has declined to take up the local authority's offer of such contact and has thus not seen X since X was removed from her care. The local authority now has an order under s.34 (4) of the Children Act 1989 permitting it to refuse to allow contact between Ms. Haigh and the child. The absence of any contact between X and Ms. Haigh is thus entirely the mother's choice and is an illustration of her inability to act in the child's best interests.
I recognise, of course, that many people know who X is. She goes, for example, to a local school. For the purposes of this judgment it is sufficient for me to say that X will be 8 later this year. She is currently in the care of the local authority and living with her father, Mr. David Tune. This is in accordance with the local authority's care plan which has been approved by the court. X is thus likely to be cared for by her father during the rest of her minority.
X's case has been before the court on a number of occasions. Two are of particular significance. The first is a finding of fact hearing conducted by His Honour Judge Robertshaw over a period of 10 days in January 2010. X was then The principal issue before the judge was whether or not X had been sexually abused by her father. In a long and careful judgment the judge found not only that X had not been sexually abused by her father but that the allegations of abuse which she undoubtedly made, notably in two ABE interviews, had originated in the mind of the mother and were false. As Judge Peter Jones was later to summarise the position, Judge Robertshaw found the following (this is from Judge Jones):
“Put shortly, the learned judge found that the father had not sexually abused X at all, nor had he behaved in a sexually inappropriate way towards her, but allegations of sexual abuse were first made by the mother and not by X. These were false and the mother knew them to be false. In 2009, X was coached by the mother to make a false allegation of sexual abuse against the father, which originated in the mind of the mother. As a result of inappropriate pressures and prompting, X came to make and believe the allegations. The mother used allegations of sexual abuse manipulatively as part of her irrational and longstanding hostility to contact which she sought to obstruct.”
As will be apparent, Judge Robertshaw rejected the mother's conclusion that what the child was saying represented her own attitude and perception. He found the mother unconvincing and, at times, evasive as a witness. He rejected the submission made to him by counsel for the mother that she was seeking to distance herself from the allegations of sexual abuse and was not in fact seeking a finding that Mr. Tune had sexually abused the child. He did not, however, change X's residence. She continued to reside with her mother. Judge Robertshaw concluded his judgment with the following words:
“Those who are charged with the task of advising the court as to orders necessary to promote X's welfare in the future bear a burden more onerous than I have had to discharge at this hearing. The weapon of last resort, changing X's residence, will obviously need to be considered and a balance struck between the risks involved in that course against the risk of mother continuing to frustrate and impede contact in a way that will inevitably be emotionally damaging to X. Frustration at her past deplorable conduct must not be allowed to obscure the fact that the issue is welfare and that there are undoubtedly risks in employing the weapon of last resort.
Direct contact will now need to be reinstated in some form. It will have to be regulated, not because of any risk posed by the father but simply because of the time that has elapsed since it last took place and, for the time being at least, to safeguard him from further allegations of abuse. Time alone will tell whether the mother is now able to embrace the letter and spirit of the principle that contact with a non-residential parent promotes the well-being of a child of separated parents. Any indication that she has not must involve the case being returned to me on short notice so that whatever steps may be appropriate, however draconian, can be taken.”
The mother did not seek permission to appeal against Judge Robertshaw's order.
The second key judgment is that given by Judge Peter Jones on 22 November 2010. By this time Judge Robertshaw had retired. Like Judge Robertshaw, Judge Jones gave a long and careful judgment. At its conclusion he decided that X should be the subject of a full care order and that she should move to her father's care. Once again, the mother did not seek permission to appeal against that order.
As I propose to release both judgments, suitably anonymised, into the public domain, I will give only short extracts from the second judgment:
“The mother's stance has, of course, severely circumscribed the arguments which could be deployed on her behalf, and counsel, who has put the case fully and in a measured and realistic fashion on her behalf, conceded as much in argument, accepting that the mother had to grasp at any straw in presenting her case…This is a mother who has been found to have caused her daughter emotional harm by the making of repeated, false allegations of sexual abuse which she knew to be false at the time she made them and, subsequently, to have coached X into making a false allegation which she knew to be untrue. She has also used those allegations manipulatively in the course of the family proceedings…
Over several years the mother has made a number of allegations against the father, with the result X has been subjected to four medical examinations, police interviews and has had numerous contacts with professionals. Despite the court's findings, the mother accepts no responsibility for this state of affairs, complaining instead of the local authority's ‘negligence’ and that her treatment has been incredibly harsh ‘with no-one really explaining the reasons why’. I am quite satisfied that this intelligent woman knows exactly why X was removed from her care in January 2010 and why the professionals continue to take the view that X would suffer further emotional harm if rehabilitated to her. In addition, sadly, while professing her concern for X's well-being, the mother consistently prioritises her own needs over those of her daughter…
I have carefully considered all the papers. They make for rather depressing reading. The mother appears to be convinced that she is the only person in the right and everyone else involved with her and her family are wrong. As recently as 6th September 2010, she wrote in an email that she had made her decision and no amount of therapy would change her opinion of something she did not believe in. She accuses the guardian of bias and the local authority of negligence and, as recently as 8th November, of ‘tyranny, scare tactics and bullying methods’……
I am satisfied it would not be in the best interests of X to delay making a final decision in this case for further work to be done with the mother or with X and her father. In the light of the findings of Judge Robertshaw and all the evidence before this court, there are no good reasons why there should be any...
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