DPP v Jones and Another
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 23 January 1997 |
| Date | 23 January 1997 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division |
Crime - Public order - Trespassory assembly - Order in force prohibiting trespassory assemblies - Peaceful, non-obstructive assembly on highway - Extent of public's rights of access to highway - Whether assembly trespassory -
The defendants took part in a peaceful, non-obstructive assembly on a highway in respect of which there was in force an order under section 14A of the
On appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions by way of case stated: —
Held, allowing the appeal, that members of the public had the right to use the public highway for passing and repassing and any uses ancillary thereto which were usual and reasonable; that such right did not include the holding of a peaceful assembly on the highway, even if it caused no obstruction; and that, accordingly, the Crown Court had erred in holding that there was no case to answer and the matter would be remitted for rehearing (post, pp. 583D–H, 584A–C, H, 587C–D).
The following cases are referred to in the judgments:
Burden v. Rigler [
Harrison v. Duke of Rutland [
Hickman v. Maisey [
Hirst v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire (
Hubbard v. Pitt [
Lewis, Ex parte (
Llandudno Urban District Council v. Woods [
Rassemblement Jurassien v. Switzerland (Application No. 8191/78) (
The following additional cases were cited in argument:
Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Hancock [
News Group Newspapers Ltd. v. Society of Graphical and Allied Trades 1982 (No. 2) [
CASE STATED by the Crown Court at Salisbury.
On 3 October 1995 the defendants, Margaret Jones and Richard Lloyd, were convicted at Salisbury Magistrates' Court of trespassory assembly under section 14B(2) of the
The defendants appealed against the convictions. The appeal was heard at the the Crown Court at Salisbury on 3 and 4 January 1996.
The prosecutor called evidence to prove the following. (a) An order under section 14A(2) of the Act of 1986, as inserted by section 70 of the Act of 1994 prohibiting the holding of trespassory assemblies within a four-mile radius of Stonehenge had been made on 22 May 1995 and was in force for the period covering 29 May to 1 June 1995 inclusive. (b) Police were in attendance at Stonehenge on 1 June 1995. On the afternoon of that day some banners were draped over the perimeter fence to the west of the heelstone and some people were playing music on a grass verge on the road side (A344) of the perimeter fence. (c) At 18.45 hours the police judged that there were in excess of 20 persons in a group by the heelstone, strung out along the fence for a distance of some 20 to 30 yards; three officers independently counted 21. (d) The police took the view that that was trespassory assembly, and moved to disperse it. The inspector in charge informed the group that the assembly was prohibited under the order, and invited it to disperse and move on. The first defendant protested that there were only 19 in the group. Officers moved among the group handing out copies of the order. (e) When they refused to disperse the defendants and one other person were arrested.
At the close of the prosecutor's case, the defendants submitted to the court that there was no case to answer. Counsel for the defendants produced a skeleton argument which set out the various submissions made. After hearing legal argument from both sides, the court concluded that there was no case for the defendants to answer.
The defendants succeeded in their contention that they and others there present were doing no more than exercising the publc's right to assemble and demonstrate peacefully on the highway, and were not therefore to be considered as trespassers for the purposes of sections 14A and 14B.
The following matters were agreed and accepted by both parties in the course of argument. (a) The land on which the group of people were was to be considered as part of the public highway (the A344). (b) The group was peaceful, did not create an obstruction, and was not considered by the police inspector to be a public nuisance. (c) The public's right of access to land forming part of the public highway was “limited” as defined by section 14A(9); whether such limit had been exceeded in the circumstances of this case was at the heart of the dispute.
The defendants relied on the authorities cited in the skeleton argument to support their contention that peaceful assembly on the public highway could not be trespass, and therefore that the group could not have constituted a “trespassory assembly.”
The prosecutor contended that “trespassory assembly” need not necessarily mean “an assembly of trespassers” so as to incorporate the common law of trespass into section 14A and that even if there was a right of assembly on the highway, the “particular purpose” mentioned in section 14A(9) did not include the right of peaceful assembly where an order under section 14A(2) was in force.
The court was of the view that the issue was whether there was prima facie evidence that the group of 20 plus was exceeding the public's limited right of access to the highway; it found that there was not such evidence, and accordingly allowed the submission that there was no case to answer. The appeals therefore succeeded, and the convictions were quashed.
The questions for the opinion of the High Court were (i) whether, where there was in force an order made under section 14A(2), and on the public highway within the area and time covered by the order there is a peaceful assembly of 20 or more persons which does not obstruct the highway, did such an assembly exceed the public's rights of access to the highway so as to constitute a trespassory assembly within the terms of section 14A; and (ii) whether in order to prove an offence under section 14B(2), it was necessary for the prosecutor to prove that each of the 20 or more persons present was exceeding the limits of the public's right of access, or merely that 20 or more persons were present and that some of them were exceeding the limits of the public's right of access.
Michael Butt for the Director of Public Prosecutions.
Keir Starmer for the defendants.
23 January 1997. The following judgments were handed down.
MCCOWAN L.J. This is an appeal by way of case stated from a decision of the Crown Court at Salisbury (Judge MacLaren Webster Q.C. and justices) on 4 January 1996 allowing appeals by Margaret Jones and Richard Lloyd against their convictions by the Salisbury justices on 3 October 1995 of offences of trespassory assembly under section 14B(2) of the
By section 14A as inserted:
“(1) If at any time the chief officer of police reasonably believes that an assembly is intended toss or only a limited right of access and that the assembly — (a)is likely to be held...
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