DPP v Walker
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judgment Date | 1974 |
| Date | 1974 |
| Court | Privy Council |
Crime - Homicide - Self-defence - Issue of self-defence nor raised at trial - Whether self-defence to be inferred from evidence - Whether jury to be directed to consider issue - Privy Council - Leave to appeal - Special leave - Criminal proceedings - Decision tending to divert due and orderly administration of justice - Whether appeal io de allowed
The respondent killed his wife by stabbing her 11 times His defences to a charge of murder were automatism, provocation cation and diminished responsibility. The issue of self-defence was not raised but the respondent made an unsworn statement that he and his wife had quarrelled in the car about another man. She had rushed out of the car; he had gone after her and pulled her back. While he was trying to get her back into the car, the wife had seized his testicles and he, feeling faint from the pain, had picked up a knife and stabbed her. A witness said that he had thereafter said to his young son, who was also in the cai, “There was nothing left for me to do.” The jury found him guilty of manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility. He appealed against conviction to the Court of Appeal of Jamaica. The Court of Appeal accepted the submission that the evidence raised the issue of whether he had acted in self-defence and, therefore, held that the trial judge should have left that issue to the jury. They allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a retrial. The court granted the Director of Public Prosecutions special leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee on the ground, under section 7 of the
On appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions: —
Held, allowing the appeal, (1) that, since the force used by the respondent was far greater than could have been necessary to defend himself, his statement did not disclose that he had acted in self-defence and, since the issue of self-defence had neither been raised by the defence during the trial nor was there any evidence to support it, the judge was right not to leave that issue to the jury (post, p. 1094D–G).
(2) That the appeal involved a point of law of exceptional public importance and if the decision of the Court of Appeal were allowed to stand it would tend to divert the due and orderly administration of justice because, in future, a trial judge might feel obliged to direct a jury to consider not only possible defences but also any impossible defence not raised by the defendant (post, pp. 1095E–1096A).
Observations on the objective evidential value of unsworn statements (post, p. 1096A–F).
The following cases are referred to in the judgment:
Bullard v. The Queen [
Lashley v. The Queen (
Nirmal v. The Queen (unreported), February 8, 1972,
Reg. v. Badjan (
Reg. v. Porritt [
The following additional cases were cited in argument:
Anderson v. The Queen [
Bratty v. Attorney-General for Northern Ireland [
Callwood v. The Queen (
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Nasralla [
Ibralebbe v. The Queen [
Kelly v. The King (
Mraz v. The Queen (
Palma v. The Queen [
Reg. v. Lobell [
Rex v. Dinnick (
Rex v. Gauthier (
Rex v. MacDonald [
Rex v. Philpot (
APPEAL (No. 35 of 1972) from a judgment (June 21, 1972) of the Court of Appeal of Jamaica (Henriques P., Edun and Graham-Perkins JJ.A.) allowing an appeal by the respondent, Leary Walker, against his conviction in the Kingston Circuit Court (Grannum J. and a jury) for manslaughter for which he was sentenced to imprisonment for life, by special leave granted to the appellant, the Director of Public Prosecutions, under section 7 of the Judicature (Appellate Jurisdiction) (Amendment) Act, No. 12 of 1970.
The facts are stated in the judgment of their Lordships.
J. S. Kerr Q.C. (Director of Public Prosecutions, Jamaica) and Stuart N. McKinnon for the appellant Director of Public Prosecutions.
T. O. Kellock Q.C. and Eugene Cotran for the respondent.
April 3. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SALMON.
The respondent was charged with murdering his wife. He pleaded not guilty and the jury found him not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility. The evidence that he had stabbed his wife to death was overwhelming and unchallenged.
At no time before or during his trial was it ever suggested by or on behalf of the respondent that he had killed his wife in self-defence. The defences relied upon were automatism, provocation and diminished responsibility. The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal against his conviction and sentence. His notice...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Juraimi Husin v PP
- Mills and Others v The Queen
-
R v Bonnick
...jury "would only tend to confuse and hinder them in reaching a true verdict" and would "divert the due and orderly administration of justice" Walker (1974-) 1 WLR 1090, 1096A per Lord Salmon giving the judgment of the Privy Council in another homicide appeal. He did not ask us to apply the......
-
R. v. Cinous (J.), (2002) 285 N.R. 1 (SCC)
...accused's raising the defence of provocation rather than relying upon the trial judge, as Lord Salmon explains in D.P.P. v. Walker , [[1974] 1 W.L.R. 1090 (P.C.),] 'might prejudice the accused by offering the jury an option of returning a verdict of manslaughter, which could result in the a......