Dynamics of agency governance: Evidence from the Nuclear safety sector
| Author | Kjerstin Kjøndal,Jarle Trondal |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/09520767211019575 |
| Published date | 01 October 2022 |
| Date | 01 October 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Dynamics of agency
governance: Evidence
from the Nuclear safety
sector
Kjerstin Kjøndal
Department of Political Science and Management, University
of Agder, Kristiansand, Norway
Jarle Trondal
ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo,
Oslo, Norway; Department of Political Science and
Management, University of Agder, Kristiansand, Norway
Abstract
Public organizations are compound bodies characterized by competing endogenous
dynamics of governance. This study makes two main contributions. First, it contributes
to an organizational approach to studies of public policy and administration by concep-
tualizing compound agency governance. Second, by determining how variation in agency
governance reflects endogenous organizational factors. Based on a study of the
Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (DSA), two observations are
highlighted: Firstly, DSA staff are torn between two competing behavioural logics: A
governmental and a transnational logic. Moreover, portfolios of core state powers are
more closely monitored by parent ministries than portfolios that relate to non-core
state powers. Secondly, the study suggests that organizational factors are vital deter-
ments in balancing behavioral logics in agency governance.
Keywords
Agency governance, core state powers, institutionalism, nuclear safety, organization
theory, radiation protection
Corresponding author:
Kjerstin Kjøndal, Universitetet i Agder, P.O. Box 422, 4604 Kristiansand, Norway.
Email: kjerstin.kjondal@uia.no
Public Policy and Administration
!The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/09520767211019575
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2022, Vol. 37(4) 387–409
388 Public Policy and Administration 37(4)
Introduction
Formulating and implementing public policy is a prerogative for national govern-
ments and administrations. Moreover, the capacity of the regulatory state to
govern has largely been determined by ‘the [administrative] capacity of the state
to effectively achieve the chosen policy outcomes’ (Matthews, 2012: 281). This
study makes two wider contributions. First, it contributes to an organizational
approach to studies of public policy and administration by conceptualizing com-
pound agency governance. Second, by determining how variation in agency gov-
ernance reflects endogenous organizational factors. The study suggests how
endogenous tensions of agency governance between a ‘governmental model’ and
a ‘transnational model’ is organizationally contingent and how transnational
agency governance is prevalent even in portfolios of core state powers. Agency
governance is thus shown to be compound. The key to understanding compound
bureaucracy is that governing institutions are likely to mobilize a multidimensional
set of conflicting roles and identities that actors may attend to and act upon
(Marcussen and Trondal, 2011).
Examining governance dynamics within one selected regulatory agency, this
study makes contributions to three sets of literature. First, it contributes to studies
of regulation. Majone (1994) suggests that administrative regulation – regulation
by agencies operating at arm’s length from direct regulatory oversight by the
government - is a frontier in our understanding of public policy and administra-
tion. Reliance on regulation will thus characterise the regulatory state, suggesting
that the regulatory role of the state is more important than other state functions
(Majone, 1994; Majone, 1996b: 55; Majone, 2001). This is highlighted by the
growth of governmental rule-making and regulatory agencies (Levi-Faur, 2011:
12; Majone, 1994; Vibert, 2014: 14). Consequently, the regulatory state suggests a
transformation of the nation-state and the way states control and influence the
activities of regulatory actors. Studies have been particularly interested in under-
standing the relationship between the scope of state authority and the role of
regulatory bodies (Levi-Faur, 2011: 3 and 5). Empirical data also suggests an
intimate relationship between regulation and the role of government agencies
(Bach et al., 2014; Koop and Lodge, 2017; Levi-Faur, 2011: 5; Majone, 1996a:
9). Furthermore, scholars have argued that the regulatory state is increasingly
embedded in complex webs of non-state actors and that their modus operandi is
difficult to disentangle from other relevant actors (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson,
2006: 9). Our study contributes to studies of the regulatory state by showing how
endogenous tensions of agency governance is organizationally contingent and how
expertise-based transnational agency governance is prevalent even in portfolios of
core state powers.
Secondly, this paper contributes to an organizational turn in studies of public
policy and administration both by conceptualizing the compound nature of agency
governance and illuminating how it reflects endogenous institutional factors
(Egeberg and Trondal, 2018). The organizational ‘school’ argues that institutions
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