Editors’ introduction
| Date | 01 April 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629820913120 |
| Published date | 01 April 2020 |
| Subject Matter | Editorial |
Editorial
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2020, Vol.32(2) 185–187
ÓThe Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629820913120
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Editors’ introduction
To r u n D e w a n
London School of Economics& Political Science, UK
John W Patty
Emory University,USA
This issue contains several papers covering broad areas within political economy,
ranging from the effects of private information in lobbying and international con-
flict to the role of uncertainty and political turnover on policy stability; from the
origins and source of partisan cohesion and delegation in legislatures to the politi-
cal economy of military conscription and inequality. These six articles jointly rep-
resent the type of substantively engaged, applied theoretical work that we seek to
publish in JTP.
In ‘Subpoena power and informational lobbying,’ Dellis and Oak develop a
model in which interest groups seek access to attention-constrained policymakers
in order to provide verifiable evidence. They show that if the policymaker is unable
to implement policy change on all issues, then he or she is made better off by hav-
ing subpoena power. However, if the policymaker has unconstrained power to
implement policy change, then he or she can be made worse off by having sub-
poena power, because possession of subpoena power alters the amount of informa-
tion voluntarily provided by interest groups through lobbying.
In ‘War and diplomacy on the world stage: Crisis bargaining before third par-
ties,’ Scott Wolford analyzes a three-actor model of crisis bargaining in which dip-
lomatic opposition by the third party can raise the costs of war and, while an
‘informed’ state can avoid such increased costs by conveying restraint during the
crisis, the means of conveying restraint may lead the other disputant to doubt the
‘restrained’ state’s willingness to fight and thereby lead to conflict. In this setting,
Wolford demonstrates that the probability of conflict is higher when the third
party believes the informed state to be generally restrained. In addition, when dip-
lomatic opposition modestly affects the cost of war, bluffing is made less attractive.
Finally, when diplomatic opposition greatly increases the cost of war, disputants
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