Editors’ Introduction to JTP issue 31.3
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629819863171 |
| Date | 01 July 2019 |
| Published date | 01 July 2019 |
| Author | Torun Dewan,John W Patty |
| Subject Matter | Editorial |
Editorial
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2019, Vol.31(3) 283–285
ÓThe Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629819863171
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Editors’ Introduction to JTP
issue 31.3
To r u n D e w a n
London School of Economics and PoliticalScience
John W Patty
Emory University
Editors’ Introduction
The role that information plays in political processes is central to contemporary
theoretical models of these processes. This issue contains several papers generating
new insights into the way that incomplete information affects electoral account-
ability, political hiring, judicial decision-making and collective action.
Two papers in this issue focus on signalling in hierarchies. In principle, the fact
that agents can take costly actions that might reveal their type should be good for
principals. And yet, as is well known, the opportunity to take such actions can cre-
ate perverse incentives: agents of one type mimic (what is known as pooling) that
limits learning and can (though need not) be detrimental to welfare.
Fan and Yang study a model of hierarchy were a promoter decides whether to
promote an underling, but is herself under the influence of a third party and cares
about her reputation in the eyes of this party. Outcomes are jointly produced and
depend on the actions and competence of the principal and her agent. Yet the third
party observes only the promotion decision. The key insight is that promotion can
be used as a signaling tool to build reputation and, perversely, good agents might
then be denied deserved promotions. This insight has several implications for a
range of examples discussed by the authors including to authoritarian politics.
Hierarchy and signalling are also the topic of Strayhorn’s article ‘Competing
signals in the judicial hierarchy’. Here the hierarchy reflects institutional supremacy
(rather than individual career structure). The question Strayhorn asks is as follows:
is the Supreme Court actually supreme, or does it struggle to manage its hierarchi-
cal subordinates who deal with a vastly larger case load? A key source of potential
conflict between the Supreme Court and those that are ostensibly inferior is ideol-
ogy that might mitigate compliance. Considering the role of litigants in providing
information (a curious omission in existing models of judicial politics), Strayhorn
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