Editors’ Introduction to JTP issue 30.3
| Author | Torun Dewan,John W. Patty |
| Published date | 01 July 2018 |
| Date | 01 July 2018 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0951629818783114 |
| Subject Matter | Editors’ Introduction to JTP issue 30.3 |
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2018, Vol.30(3) 269–271
ÓThe Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629818783114
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Editors’ Introduction
to JTP issue 30.3
To r u n D e w a n
London School of Economics& Political Science, UK
John W. Patty
Emory University,UK
This issue of Journal of Theoretical Politics contains four original articles focusing
on elections and electoral design. In the first article, ‘Directional equilibria’, Chung
and Duggan define a new solution concept for spatial voting models. Their notion
of directional equilibrium extends the majority rule core and reflects the spirit of the
utilitarian equilibrium (the policy that maximizes the sum of voters’ utilities). In
addition to providing noncooperative foundations for the solution concept, Chung
and Duggan also show that directional equilibria possess desirable continuity and
welfare properties and, when voters’ preferences are Euclidean, there is at most one
equilibrium point.
In ‘Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in mixed-member proportional sys-
tems’, Kurella, Bra
¨uninger and Pappi consider a classic problem in electoral system
design: how do ‘mixed’ electoral systems (in which voters cast votes for both candi-
dates and party lists) affect candidates’ and parties’ incentives to adopt extreme
versus moderate policy positions? This ‘centripetal vs. centrifugal’ debate has a
long history.
1
Kurella et al. examine the question from an empirically informed
perspective, using data from German elections to calibrate a simulation model in
which parties compete for votes. The model incorporates not only classical ideolo-
gical and policy motivations for voters, but also includes valence characteristics.
2
Their model demonstrates the system-level importance of valence: parties with
large valences have an incentive to position themselves toward the centre of the
electorates’ preferences and parties with smaller valences have an incentiveto adopt
more extreme positions.
The question of platform convergence also arises in the third article, ‘A model
of electoral competition between national and regional parties’, by Mihir
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