Editor’s Introduction to JTP issue 31.4
| Published date | 01 October 2019 |
| Date | 01 October 2019 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819886225 |
| Subject Matter | Editors’ Introduction to JTP issue 31.4 |
Editorial
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2019, Vol.31(4) 477–479
ÓThe Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629819886225
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Editor’s Introduction
The relationship between nations, whether taking place within multinational organiza-
tions or on a bilateral basis, has long been the subject of formal investigation. This issue
contains several papers providing new insights to these international relations.
Malis and Smith study the question of diplomacy, which, as they point out,
takes up much executive time and resources. Are these efforts all about maintaining
peace, or are there other aspects at play?The authors introduce a model of top-level
diplomatic exchange between an incumbent and a foreign leader. Their key insight
is that these exchanges can provide information for opponentsof the regime, allow-
ing them to coordinate their actions in the absence of precise information about
regime strength. Opponents would prefer to attack a weak incumbent but refrain
from attacking a strong one. Foreign leaders, in turn, are incentivized to support
strong incumbents, who will reciprocate with policy concessions, and to distance
themselves from weak ones. Thus, the actions of an informed foreign leader provide
a focal point for would be insurgents and may (or may not) lead them to refrain
from attacking the incumbent. The authors consider the mutually reinforcing
mechanisms that underpin their equilibrium.
Two papers analyze international cooperation from the perspective of the collec-
tive action problem.
Johns studies the ability of organizations to enforce international law. Her focus
is on how defuse is the body of interests that benefits from such enforcement.
Defuse benefits creates more litigants likely to take action. But it can also plausibly
decrease litigation: each potential litigant will be less likely to challenge a possible
legal violation in the hope that another actor steps in and bears the litigation costs.
Which effect dominates depends on the costs of litigation: the free rider effect is
stronger when it is costly.
Smirnov analyzes contributions to climate change in a standard setting with
multiple equilibria: one where everyone contributes and others where a sufficient
target is reached. The novelty comes from the introduction of a new equilibrium
selection criterion: a fair equilibrium is one that minimizes the distance between a
set of players strategies and an (exogenous) set of strategies associated with the
most equitable outcome. The problem is not straightforward because ‘‘national
total emissions today and in the future may be orthogonal to national emissions
per capita as well as historical, i.e., cumulative, emissions. The nations with low
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