Embedding African Democracy and Development: The Imperative of Institutional Capital
| Date | 01 September 2004 |
| Author | Kalu N. Kalu |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020852304046208 |
| Published date | 01 September 2004 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Review of
Administrative
Sciences
Embedding African democracy and development: the
imperative of institutional capital
Kalu N. Kalu
Abstract
The concept of democracy has remained central in most academic and political
discourse on African development. Beyond the state-centric model of democracy,
what alternative approaches are open to African states and how could they
enhance the nature of state–society relations and the process of economic
development? While this question informs the general thesis as well as the
specific arguments advanced in this article, suffice it then to state that Africa’s
peculiar condition presents a case not so much about transitions to democracy
(since these have been attempted in many cases) but about the consolidation of
enduring democracies. The missing link is in the acquisition of critical institutional
capital that would facilitate a systemic shift from traditional models of develop-
ment to more pragmatic and integrative approaches. In order of priority, what
Africa needs most are institutional reconstruction, state consolidation, and demo-
cratic governance.
Contemporary experience indicates that everywhere in Africa the history of dem-
ocracy and economic development has mostly been based on a history of dis-
appointments. In the same vein, conventional analyses or studies of these experiences
have generally been built around a theory of criticisms with a less alternative voice
granted to the fundamental issues inherent in the African context (Bates, 1981;
Sandbrook, 1993; Widner, 1994; Clapham, 1996; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997;
Ayittey, 1998; Herbst, 2000). To address this epistemological anomaly, this article
begins by elaborating four central themes: the meta-political context of African
Kalu N. Kalu is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Director, Public Affairs Program,
Emporia State University. He is also a Research Fellow at the Yale Center for International and Area
Studies, Yale University.
An original version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies
Association-Midwest, St Louis, MO, 2–4 November 2001.
Copyright © 2004 IIAS, SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
Vol 70(3):527–545 [DOI:10.1177/0020852304046208]
528 International Review of Administrative Sciences 70(3)
democracy, the dynamics of the state system, the challenge of post-modern liberal-
ism, and the case for the primacy of institutional capital.
By building on the central thesis of Parsonian structural functionalism and its impli-
cation for contemporary institutional analysis, this article advances a central argument
that the lack of stable democracies in Africa is due mainly to the weakness or
absence of institutions rather than the ‘state’ per se. The purpose of institutions is to
create the basis for collective action, while the basis for ‘states’ is the integration of
action in such a way that it serves a purposeful and legitimate end. A failure in the
first obligation makes success in the latter more difficult or impossible.
Evolving mechanisms of democracy
When viewed as a desirable end for which all societies ought to aspire, democracy
takes on the semblance of a universal norm. This also goes with the presumption that
if it can work in a particular country, it should also work in others. But once exposed
to the dynamics of different geopolitical and cultural contexts, democracy offers quite
unique variations both in its substantive merit as well as in its rhetorical appeal. It is
in this light that we can view democratic failures in Africa as both a structural and cul-
tural issue. As Amartya Sen (1999: 2) argues, ‘a country does not have to be deemed
fit for democracy, rather it has to become fit through democracy’ (my emphasis).
What matters most is not a pre-emptive assumption on the universality of dem-
ocracy’s promise but rather on how specific cultural processes engender the condi-
tions that make democracy an indispensable choice for political consensus and
governance. When seen in this light, we are then in a better position to assess
properly democracy’s multiple virtues which includes ‘the intrinsic importance of
political participation and freedom in human life; the instrumental importance of
political incentives in keeping governments responsible and accountable; and the
constructive role of democracy in the formation of values and in the understanding
of needs, rights, and duties’ (Sen, 1999: 7).
The irony of democracy is that while it makes it possible for issues and policies to
be contested, genuine victory is only possible if all actors agree to abide by the rules
of the game. But where fundamental institutions are lacking or where they are easily
changed and replaced according to the political wind, it becomes very difficult to
establish a permanent placeholder or an institutional anchor upon which these rules
of the game can be constituted and legitimized. Effective democracy, therefore,
requires both an institutional and procedural legitimacy based on mutual consensus
among competing actors. Where this consensus is lacking and the pressures for
democratization are placed on the political society, premature democratization occurs
in such a way that it could enable competing groups to strike out on their own on the
basis of a zero-sum calculation. This condition is akin to what Jurgen Habermas
(1973: 27) refers to as ‘the “fundamental contradiction” of a social formation when
its organizational principle necessitates that individuals and groups repeatedly con-
front one another with claims and intentions that are, in the long run, incompatible’
(my emphasis). But as ‘soon as incompatibility becomes conscious, conflict becomes
manifest, and irreconcilable interests are recognized as antagonistic interests’
(Habermas, 1973: 27). By defining group interests in terms of their conflict with one
Kalu Embedding African democracy and development 529
another, thereby excluding the idea of an interest of society as a whole, the resultant
of the group pressure (conflict) would thus become the only determinant of the
course of government policy (Bentley, 1949). This phenomenon seems to embrace
many of Africa’s contemporary experiments in democracy.
The dialectics of African democracy
At the prodding of the World Bank, the IMF, the United States and major European
powers such as Britain and France, African countries like Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania,
Niger, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Mali, and others were forced into engaging in what would
be considered premature liberalization of their economies and politics. Nonetheless,
the process of democratic transition requires a passage of two phases, liberalization
and democratization. Linz and Stepan (1996: 3) point out that in a non-democratic
setting, liberalization may entail a mix of policy and social changes, such as less cen-
sorship of the media, somewhat greater space for the organization of autonomous
working-class activities, the introduction of some legal safeguards for individuals such
as habeas corpus, the releasing of most political prisoners, the return of exiles,
perhaps measures for improving the distribution of income, and, most important, the
toleration of opposition. However, democratization entails liberalization but is a
wider and more specifically political concept. Democratization requires open con-
testation over the right to win control of the government and this, in turn, requires
free competitive elections, the results of which determine who governs. But though
these ideals may be generally acceptable, democracy requires a preliminary con-
sensus among competing interests that specific electoral procedures would be
recognized, that electoral results would be upheld, and that the institutions charged
with expending such collective responsibilities be granted legal and popular legiti-
macy.
However, the level of openness and political permissiveness that liberalization
entails oftentimes generates its own contradiction. Political liberalization has the
tendency to resurface critical issues of poverty, resource redistribution, property rights,
and power relations as the cornerstone of political contestation. When broad political
interests diverge and become factionalized, they present breeding grounds for fac-
tional conflict and political dissent. Various social forces and reactionary elements
arise to challenge the legitimacy of those in control of state power, and economic
opportunists, both internal and external, move in to take advantage of the uncertain
situation. The ensuing crisis of legitimacy, struggle for state power, and economic
uncertainty reproduces itself into a state of anarchy that quickly brings the liberaliza-
tion process to an abrupt end. The first stage (liberalization) in the process of demo-
cratic consolidation is thus aborted, as the regime in power cracks down and scuttles
most of the liberties granted at the beginning of the liberalization process.
Test cases abound in the African context. In November 1987, Kenya’s Daniel Arap
Moi closed Nairobi University and had several student leaders arrested following
demonstrations and protests critical of his government. Consequent attempts to
liberalize the economy as well as institute governmental accountability ran head on
with the interests of the entrenched political élite. As the Kenyan business élite
(mainly the European and Asian middle class) teamed up to resist the seemingly
530 International Review of Administrative Sciences 70(3)
state-centric...
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