Enlargement: From the Perspective of `Fusion'
| Author | LEE MILES |
| Published date | 01 June 2002 |
| Date | 01 June 2002 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0010836702037002006 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Enlargement: From the Perspective
of ‘Fusion’
LEE MILES
Introduction
It was obvious to many political observers that further enlargement of the
European Union would be a key priority of the Swedish EU Council
Presidency. Negotiations with the six leading applicants — Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia — were well
advanced and the enlargement process had been enhanced by the Union’s
decision in 2000 to begin accession negotiations with the ‘other applicants’
— Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia. The Union
had also recently agreed the ‘road map’ for the accession process at the
Nice EU Council Summit in December 2000. The enlargement process tes-
tifies that such Council agendas are largely set by structural dynamics —
irrespective, to some extent, of which EU country holds the Council
Presidency.
Therefore, it was quite easy for the Swedes to decide that enlargement
was to be one of their preferred policy issues for their Presidency. Swedish
governments had been stating since 1995 that enlarging the Union espe-
cially to include the Baltic Republics was a major objective of national EU
policy (see Miles and Sundelius, 2000). There was thus substantial pressure
— both from inside and outside the Union and from within Sweden — to
make sure that the Swedish Presidency made a ‘good job’ of the enlarge-
ment portfolio as one of the three ‘Es’ (Enlargement, Employment, and
Environment).
However, in order to assess the Swedish Presidency in the enlargement
area, it is necessary to examine the criteria the Swedes used to measure
their ‘success’.This author argues that it was easy for the Swedish govern-
ment to claim a ‘success’ of enlargement principally due to the limited — if
realistic — ambitions in the first place. Moreover, in an effort to widen
debate on the theoretical implications of the Presidency for Swedish EU
participation, this author argues — somewhat tentatively — that the
Swedes acted as de facto ‘EU fusionists’ (cf.Wessels, 1996,1997) in the case
of EU enlargement policy.These conclusions are based on a survey of offi-
cial documents and primary speeches made prior to and during the
Presidency and corroborated by interviews during 2000–2001.
Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association
Vol.37(2): 190–198. Copyright ©2002 NISA
Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
0010-8367[200206]37:2;190–198;023980
SYMPOSIUM ON THE SWEDISH 2001 EU COUNCIL PRESIDENCY
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