Environmental Policy
| Author | RÜDIGER K. W. WURZEL |
| Published date | 01 June 2002 |
| Date | 01 June 2002 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0010836702037002982 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
SYMPOSIUM ON THE SWEDISH 2001 EU COUNCIL PRESIDENCY
Environmental Policy
RÜDIGER K. W. WURZEL
It is no surprise that the ‘environment’ became one of three main themes
— the three ‘Es’ — selected for the Swedish Presidency. Domestic public
environmental awareness has been high for a long time and Sweden has
traditionally adopted an environmental leader role on both the inter-
national and the EU level (Kronsell, 1997; Molin and Wurzel, 2000). The
environment therefore constituted a policy issue with which the Swedish
government sought to persuade a largely Euro-sceptic domestic audience
of the merits of deeper EU integration; the Swedish government also used
it to push for the adoption of (transnational) policy measures close to the
hearts of the Swedish public.
The 2001 Swedish Presidency may overall have lacked a clear political
vision for the EU and — as Elgström argues — acted instead as primarily
an efficient administrator and effective manager during its six months stint
at the helm of the EU. However, at least in the environmental field, Sweden
was ‘keen to show political ambition’ and ‘to help set the agenda for the
coming years’ (interview with a senior Swedish official in 2001). This
became apparent most clearly with regard to Sweden’s efforts in keeping
on track the climate change negotiations, paving the way for the first
reading of the Sixth Environmental Action Programme (EAP) and, to a
lesser degree, the adoption of the EU’s Sustainable Development Strategy
(SDS).
Climate Change
Sweden is widely credited with having run an extremely well-prepared and
managed Presidency in the environmental field (interviews in 2001).
However, the climate change issue shows that a Presidency must be able to
react quickly and flexibly to crisis situations and/or events that cannot be
planned for. This is also necessary in order to avoid the disruption of
normal (Environmental) Council business.
The decision by President Bush to abandon US support for the Kyoto
(climate change) Protocol took the EU (and the Swedish Presidency) by
surprise. It was announced shortly before an informal Environmental
Council meeting in Kiruna on 30 March — 1 April 2001. At least for the
media, the issue of climate change replaced nature protection and bio-
diversity as the main agenda items for the informal Environmental Council.
Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association
Vol. 37(2): 206–211. Copyright ©2002 NISA
Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
0010-8367[200206]37:2;206–211;023982
WURZEL: SYMPOSIUM
207
Yet, the Swedish Presidency acted swiftly in its attempt to ensure that the
EU would remain committed collectively to the Kyoto Protocol despite
the US defection. Prime Minister Göran Persson and Commission
President Romano Prodi wrote a joint letter to President Bush on 22 March
2001 in which they asked him to reconsider his decision while underlining
the Union’s continued commitment to the Kyoto Protocol. The Swedish
Environmental Minister, Kjell Larsson, issued a press statement on 31
March 2001. It categorically stated that ‘the Kyoto Protocol is still alive’
while pointing out that the EU troika (that is, the incumbent Swedish
Presidency, the Commission and the forthcoming Belgium Presidency)
would undertake ‘shuttle diplomacy’ in order to keep on track the climate
change negotiations. The fact that the Environmental Commissioner,
Margot Wallström, was a Swedish...
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