Erratum
| Published date | 01 September 2011 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0010836711421422 |
| Date | 01 September 2011 |
| Subject Matter | Erratum |
Cooperation and conflict
46(3) 415
© The Author(s) 2011
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DOI: 10.1177/0010836711421422
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Erratum
Panke, Diana (2011) ‘Small States in EU Negotiations: Political Dwarfs or Power-Brokers?’,
Cooperation and Conflict 46(2): 123-143, DOI: 10.1177/0010836711406346
The article ‘Small States in EU Negotiations: Political Dwarfs or Power-Brokers?’ pub-
lished in the June issue features a regression table with two models only in the part ‘testing
the country-level explanations’. Instead it should feature six models that control for the staff
and the budget of Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA),1 since well-equipped central coordi-
nating institutions could in theory influence the speed to which national positions are devel-
oped, thereby increase the level of negotiation activity. The quantitative (models 2, 5) and
the qualitative empirical analysis show that the budget of MFAs does not influence the level
of negotiation activity. MFA staff seems to speed up the development of national positions
as a precondition for active participation in negotiation (models 1, 4). However, most inter-
viewees stress the importance of efficient and strong MFAs, but do not directly link this to
the number of staff working in MFAs and a closer look reveals that staff and GDP/votes are
correlated. Thus, strong evidence that staff numbers of MFAs as the central coordinating
institutions systematically translate into more swiftly developed positions is lacking.
1 Data on budgets (average 2007-2008 budget in €) and staff numbers have been obtained
through a series of emails and phone interviews.
421422CAC46310.1177/0010836711421422ErratumCooperation and conflict
Erratum
Table 4 (referred to in part ‘testing the country-level explanations’): Regression Results
1 2 3 4 5 6
Power (votes) -0.216
(0.240)
0.212
(0.184)
0.338*
(0.195)
Power (GDP) -0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
Learning (membership) 0.253**
(0.076)
0.282**
(0.081)
0.294**
(0.091)
0.245**
(0.070
0.311***
(0.072)
0.330***
(0.087)
Learning (presidency)
Capacity (MFA staff) 0.005*
(0.002)
0.006**
(0.002)
Capacity (MFA budget) 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Capacity (PermRep) -0.158
(0.415)
-0.013
(0.393)
Constant 39.640***
(1.943)
40.620***
(2.048)
42.590***
(3.341)
41.004***
(2.301)
38.7770***
(2.408)
38.786***
(3.129)
Observations 27 27 27 27 27 27
Adjusted R-squared 0.68 0.63 0.59 0.69 0.62 0.58
OLS regressions with two-tailed t-tests. *** = p< 0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.1
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