Escalation of interstate crises of conflictual dyads
| Author | Akisato Suzuki,Neophytos Loizides |
| DOI | 10.1177/0010836710396770 |
| Published date | 01 March 2011 |
| Date | 01 March 2011 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Cooperation and Conflict
46(1) 21–39
© The Author(s) 2011
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DOI: 10.1177/0010836710396770
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Escalation of interstate
crises of conflictual dyads:
Greece–Turkey and
India–Pakistan
Akisato Suzuki and Neophytos Loizides
Abstract
This article examines the causation and extent of interstate crisis escalation among two
conflictual dyads, namely Greece–Turkey and India–Pakistan. It draws from the International
Crisis Behaviour dataset to present a new sub-dataset of 12 interstate crises involving the two
dyads in the period 1987 to 2002. While crisis behaviour in Greece–Turkey has frequently been
analysed within the context of two major regional organizations (NATO and the EU), Indian–
Pakistani crises have been studied within the perspective of nuclear proliferation. To examine
the linkage between these features and interstate crises, the article operationalizes the security
dilemma and the diversionary theory of war through a probabilistic model. Using Ragin’s (2000)
comparative qualitative analysis, it demonstrates that both the security dilemma and diversionary
theory explain crisis escalation, although the latter covers more cases with a smaller margin of
error. Moreover, the article demonstrates that Greek–Turkish crises have generally escalated to
relatively low levels of conflict (threat of war or show of force), while Indian–Pakistani crises
have spiralled to higher levels of confrontation (use of force). In both dyads, nuclear weapons
and regional organizations have shaped the boundaries of possible escalatory action. The EU and
NATO have contributed to mitigating crisis escalation and the use of force between the Aegean
neighbours, while unintentionally encouraging low intensity confrontations; meanwhile, in South
Asia, nuclear weapons in combination with fragile domestic regimes have exacerbated crises,
particularly in the form of state-sponsored unconventional warfare.
Keywords
crisis escalation, democratic peace, diversionary theory, nuclear weapons, regional organization,
security dilemma
Corresponding author:
Neophytos G. Loizides, School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy, Queen’s University Belfast, 21
University Square, Belfast, BT7 1PA, Northern Ireland.
[email: n.loizides@qub.ac.uk]
22 Cooperation and Conflict 46(1)
Introduction
The article examines interstate crisis escalation in contemporary world politics, focusing
on two conflictual dyads, India–Pakistan and Greece–Turkey. Crisis escalation has been
a major concern in conflict studies (Huth and Russett, 1988; Geller, 1990; Fearon, 1994;
Carlson, 1995; Brecher, 1996; Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000; Colaresi and Thompson,
2002; Kinsella and Russett, 2002), especially as interstate crises increase the possibility
of full-fledged war and constrained regional integration. More specifically, interstate
crises in the world’s periphery are increasingly more likely to cause violence than those
between major powers (Brecher, 1996: 219). The disruptive effects of interstate crises
include the destabilization of bilateral security, the provocation of ethnic tensions in
contested territories such as Kashmir, and the posing of a threat to regional and interna-
tional security (Wilkenfeld et al., 2003: 279).
The article discusses the causation and extent of crisis escalation in Greece–Turkey
and India–Pakistan. Conventional wisdom assumes moderate levels of escalation for
these dyads in the past few decades either due to the mitigating role of regional organiza-
tions in the case of Greece–Turkey, or the ‘pacifist effect’ of nuclear weapons in the case
of India–Pakistan. Yet both cases have defied conventional wisdom, as they came to the
brink of war on at least three occasions each in the period between 1987 and 2002. Both
dyads pose theoretically intriguing questions, albeit for different reasons. On the one
hand, the study of Greek–Turkish conflicts presents challenges for liberal institutional-
ism, while, on the other, the Indian–Pakistani conflict questions nuclear deterrence the-
ory based on neo-realist theorizing. Although both approaches are based on the
assumption of the anarchic nature of international politics, each addresses anarchy in a
different way. Liberal institutionalism argues that international institutions enable states
to cooperate and achieve peace (Keohane and Martin, 1995; Wallander et al., 1999). In
particular, security institutions play a positive role in managing security issues and
reducing the security dilemma (Wallander and Keohane, 1999). Meanwhile, neo-realism
points out that the balance of power based on nuclear deterrence maintains international
stability (Mearsheimer, 1990). The defensive superiority derived from nuclear deter-
rence reduces the security dilemma (Jervis, 1978: 206–14). Thus, examining the role of
the security dilemma in Greek–Turkish crises and Indian–Pakistani crises is meaningful
in that it enables us to test neo-realist and liberal institutionalist approaches to crisis
management.
Greece–Turkey and India–Pakistan are asymmetrical dyads representing different
levels of democratization,1 a point relevant in debates on democratic peace in democra-
tizing states. Pakistan is ‘on its way to democratization’, while Greece, Turkey and India
have democratized to a much larger extent, albeit with significant problems (e.g. the role
of the military in the shaping of Turkey’s foreign policy).2 Given that the major peace-
building approach focuses on democratization in post-conflict societies, it seems impor-
tant to consider whether democratization is conducive to international peace and security
in terms of crisis escalation. To this end, this article operationalizes the diversionary
theory of war, examining how domestic political situations affect the decision-making of
political leaders about foreign affairs (Levy, 1992; Davies, 2002; Mitchell and Prins,
2004; Tarar, 2006). Simply stated, when state leaders are faced with domestic challenges,
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