Expanding the Model of Human Nature Underlying Self-control Theory: Implications for the Constructs of Self-control and Opportunity
| Date | 01 April 2004 |
| Author | Richard P. Wiebe |
| DOI | 10.1375/acri.37.1.65 |
| Published date | 01 April 2004 |
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THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY
VOLUME 37 NUMBER 1 2004 PP.65–84
Address for correspondence: Richard P. Wiebe, JD, PhD, Assistant Professor, Northeastern
University College of Criminal Justice, 204 Churchill Hall, 360 Huntington Ave, Boston,
MA 02115, USA. Email: r.wiebe@neu.edu
Expanding the Model of Human Nature
Underlying Self-control Theory:
Implications for the Constructs
of Self-control and Opportunity
Richard P. Wiebe
Self-control theory holds that human nature consists of selfish
impulses whose satisfaction often entails offending. Modern behav-
ioural science has discerned emotional systems and cognitive biases
underlying tendencies to engage in prosocial and self-directed behav-
iours, which themselves predict offending. Many of these tendencies
appear in the construct of self-control, but are not sufficiently dealt with
by life-course criminology.This paper presents an expanded model of
human nature that implies that self-control is factorially-complex,
containing self-regulation; prosociality (tendencies to form social bonds
and engage in social reciprocity); and self-direction (tendencies to work
on one’s own long-term behalf without external sanctions).This model
also suggests that the construct of opportunity should be expanded to
include opportunities for prosocial and self-directed behaviours in
addition to crime and deviance.
What is human nature, and what does it have to do with crime? Human nature
consists of the inherent potentials and abilities shared by all or most individuals.
These potentials interact with environmental influences to produce behaviour,
some of which is considered criminal. In the 20th century, many behavioural
scientists, including criminologists, embraced radical environmentalism, a doctrine
that considers only environmental influences when explaining human behaviour
(Walsh, 2002). In this view, human nature consists of “vague and consequently
plastic predispositions” that constitute “the indeterminate material that the social
factor molds and forms” (Durkheim, 1895/1962, pp. 105–106). Thus, social
influences determine behaviour, and predispositions may be ignored.1
In contrast, self-control theory expressly rejects radical environmentalism.
Consistent with the “classical” view of Hobbes and other 18th-century thinkers, it
postulates that humans seek the immediate gratification of selfish desires and
commit crimes in pursuit of this gratification (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; see
Greenberg, Tamarelli, & Kelley, 2002). This pursuit often occurs at the expense of
the legitimate rights of others, undermining group interests. To enhance its
interests and reduce offending, the group must either teach self-control — the
restraint of natural impulses out of concern for their long-term consequences
(Hirschi & Gottfredson, 2000) — or limit opportunities to satisfy these impulses
(Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990).
Self-control theory is not alone in speculating about human nature. Though
they may preach radical environmentalism, most criminological theories, in
practice, make implicit assumptions about inner motives (Kornhauser, 1978;
Walsh, 2002). Cultural deviance theory, for example, postulates that humans seek
the approval of their group and commit crimes at the group’s behest (Kornhauser,
1978), while strain theory postulates that humans seek goals determined by the
dominant culture and commit crimes when blocked from legitimate opportunities
to attain those goals (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990).
So, by most lights, humans have a “nature”. But is this nature innately selfish or
social? This is a “false dichotomy” (Brannigan, 1997, p. 428). Modern behavioural
science has replaced both radical environmentalism and one-sided theories with a
model that describes a host of innate predispositions (Pinker, 1997), including but
not limited to both selfish and social traits and tendencies (Alexander, 1987;
Brannigan, 1997; de Waal, 1996; Hrdy, 1999; Wilson, 1993) as well as drives to
pursue self-directed activities for their own sake (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Contrary
to radical environmentalism, but consonant with self-control theory, this model
considers predispositions to be relevant causes of behaviour and, indeed, of social
and cultural influences themselves (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Although predispo-
sitions for prosocial and self-directed traits and tendencies may fully develop only
in prosocial environments, while many selfish traits appear perinatally (Brannigan,
1997; see also Kagan, 1998; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992), this does not make proso-
ciality or self-direction any less “natural”.
Acknowledging the naturalness of each of these sets of traits could have
important implications for criminological theory and practice. This paper discusses
these implications in the context of self-control theory. While not the only
plausible option, self-control theory was chosen as the foundation of the present
inquiry because of its explicit focus on intrapersonal traits, unusual within
criminology, as well as its influential status and consistent empirical support (Pratt
& Cullen, 2000; R.A. Wright, 2000). In addition, self-control theory can easily
accommodate the expanded model, because, although it does not consider
prosocial or self-directed tendencies to spring from human nature, it considers
them important predictors of offending.
Although compatible, the model presented here differs in one important way
from self-control theory. As noted by an anonymous reviewer, self-control theory
posits a “logic and a time ordering” in which prosocial behaviour follows “effective
socialisation”, without which “antisocial behaviour is a given”. In contrast, the model
presented here suggests that predispositions fostering effective socialisation are
present in the child at the same time as those fostering antisocial behaviour. For
example, the Darwinian logic behind an infant’s smile is to elicit caregiving behav-
iour from a parent or other available adult. Thus, the smile is a prosocial behaviour
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RICHARD P. WIEBE
THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY
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