Fairlie v Hill
| Jurisdiction | Scotland |
| Judgment Date | 17 December 1943 |
| Docket Number | No. 7. |
| Date | 17 December 1943 |
| Court | High Court of Justiciary |
HIGH COURT.
Lord Justice-General, Lord Fleming, Ld. Moncrieff.
Statutory Offences—Road Traffic Acts—Use of motor vehicle on road without insurance against third-party risks—Permitting such use—Disqualification for holding licence—"Special reasons" for reducing or remitting statutory period of disqualification—Road Traffic Act, 1930 (20 and 21 Geo. V, cap. 43), sec. 35 (1) and (2).
The Road Traffic Act, 1930, by sec. 35 (2), enacts that any person convicted under sec. 35 of the offence of using, or permitting the use of, a motor vehicle on a road when not insured against third-party risks "shall, unless the Court for special reasons thinks fit to order otherwise," be disqualified for twelve months for holding a licence.
Held that under sec. 35 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, just as under sec. 15 of that Act (which deals with driving when under the influence of drink or drugs) the question which the Court has to consider in relation to disqualification is whether the protection which the section gives to the public will or will not be prejudiced by the remission or reduction of the statutory period of disqualification. If the Court considers that the reasons adduced on behalf of the offender tend to show that the public will not be prejudiced as regards this protection, then there are special reasons, and the Court has a discretion, in the exercise of which it may have regard to considerations of personal hardship.
Adair v. Munn, 1940 J. C. 69, and Murray v. Macmillan, 1942 J. C. 10, commented on, anddicta in the latter case disapproved by Lord Moncrieff.
Margaret Fairlie and John Fairlie were charged in the Sheriff Court at Paisley on a complaint at the instance of John Hill, Procurator-fiscal, which set forth that "(1) you, Margaret Fairlie, did drive a motor lorry recklessly and at a speed and in a manner which were dangerous to the public and did cause the same to collide with a motor car … contrary to section 11 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930 … or otherwise and as an alternative to said charge drive said motor lorry without due care and attention and without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road and did cause the same to collide with said motor car …contrary to the Road Traffic Act, 1930, section 12 … (2) you Margaret Fairlie did drive said motor lorry, you not being the holder of a licence for the purpose: contrary to section 4 of said Act … (3) you John Fairlie did aid and abet you Margaret Fairlie to commit the offence specified in the second charge hereof: contrary to section 119 (8) of said Act … and (4) you Margaret Fairlie did use, and you John Fairlie did cause and permit you Margaret Fairlie to use, said motor lorry, there not being in force in relation to the user thereof by you Margaret Fairlie such a policy of insurance or such a security in respect of third party risks as complied with the requirements of Part II of the Road Traffic Act, 1930: contrary to section 35 of said Act, whereby you are each liable to the penalties set forth in said section."1
The accused pleaded guilty to the second, third and fourth charges, and, their plea having been accepted by the Procurator fiscal, the Honorary Sheriff-substitute (Thomas Hunter), on 27th August 1943, fined each of them £2 and, in terms of section 35 (2) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, disqualified each of them for holding or obtaining a driving licence for a period of one year from that date. At the request of both accused he stated a case for appeal to the High Court of Justiciary.
The stated case, after setting forth the admitted facts,† further set forth:—"It was stated by the agent for the appellants in mitigation of sentence that the second named appellant was the owner of two lorries which he used in the course of his business as a “contractor” that he drove one of these lorries himself, and employed a driver to drive the other lorry; that shortly before 1st July 1943 he had lost the services of his driver; that he was unable to get anyone to replace him, and that, at the time the incident giving rise to the charges in the complaint took place, he was teaching the first named appellant to drive, in order that she could take the driver's place. Further, with reference to the fourth charge, I was asked by the agent for the appellants not to disqualify the male appellant for holding or obtaining a licence, as it would prevent the male appellant from carrying on his contractor's business, and would thereby deprive him of his sole means of livelihood, in respect that he only operated two motor vehicles in connection with his business, one of which the male appellant drove himself; that the driver of the other vehicle had been called up for national service, and that it was impossible for the male appellant to obtain the services of a substitute driver for either of the vehicles. It was not suggested by the agent for the appellants that any prejudice to the public interest was likely to arise from the appellants' disqualification. The agent for the appellants was invited to give me details of the business carried on by the second named appellant, but stated that he was unable to do so, and could only say that the second named appellant was a “contractor.” I was given no information by the agent for the appellants as to the position of the first named appellant in the event of disqualification. As regards the second named appellant, I held that the circumstances stated by the agent for the appellants were merely considerations of hardship personal to him, and were not relevant for my consideration as “special reasons” within the meaning of section 35 (2) of said Act. As regards the first named appellant, there were not before me any considerations amounting in my opinion to “special reasons” within the meaning of said Act, nor any considerations of hardship."
The questions of law for the opinion of the Court were:—"(1) Was I...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
DPP v Skillington
...to in the course of the case stated includingAdare v. Munn, Adare v. Brash [1940] JC 69, Murray v. MacMillan [1942] JC 10, Fairlie v. Hill [1944] JC 53 and Irvine v. Pollock [1952] JC 51. Not all of the cases go the same way. So, in Murray v. MacMillan, a young medical practitioner who plea......
-
Irvine v Pollock
...B. 194, Lord Goddard, C. J., at pp. 201-202. 3 Adair v. MunnSC, 1940 J. C. 69; Murray v. MacmillanSC, 1942 J. C. 1.0; Fairlie v. HillSC,1944 J. C. 53; Trotter v. BurnetSC, 1947 J. C. 151;Crichton v. BurrellTAX, 1951. T. C. 107: Ellice v. HendersonUNK, [1951] C. L. Y. 4 Jones v. EnglishUNK, ......
-
Smith v Henderson
...to in the rubric. 2 24 and 25 Geo. V, cap. 50. 3 20 and 21 Geo. V, cap. 43. 4 Whittall v. Kirby, [1947] K. B. 194. 5 1940 J. C. 66. 6 1944 J. C. 53. HIGH COURT. Lord Justice-General. Lord Carmont. Lord Russell.No. 9. Smith and Henderson Statutory Offences—Road Traffic Acts—Driving without d......
-
McArthur v Henderson
...from the rubric. 2 Reference was made to Adair v. Munn, 1940 J. C. 69. 3 1942 J. C. 10. 4 Leggat v. Hill, supra, p. 1. 5 Fairlie v. Hill, 1944 J. C. 53. 6 1952 J. C. 7 20 and 21 Geo. V, cap. 43. 8 1944 J. C. 53. 9 20 and 21 Geo. V, cap. 43. to deal with the case. The Court found that the Sh......