Federal employee unionization and presidential control of the bureaucracy: Estimating and explaining ideological change in executive agencies
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629813518126 |
| Author | Jowei Chen,Tim Johnson |
| Date | 01 January 2015 |
| Published date | 01 January 2015 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Federal employee
unionization and presidential
control of the bureaucracy:
Estimating and explaining
ideological change in
executive agencies
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2015, Vol. 27(1) 151–174
©The Author(s) 2014
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629813518126
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Jowei Chen
Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, USA
Tim Johnson
Atkinson Graduate School of Management, Willamette University, USA
Abstract
We present a formal model explaining that US presidents strategically unionize federal employees
to reduce bureaucratic turnover and ‘anchor’ the ideological composition of like-minded agency
workforces. To test our model’s predictions, we advance a method of estimating bureaucratic
ideology via the campaign contributions of federal employees; we then use these bureaucratic
ideal point estimates in a comprehensive empirical test of our model. Consistent with our
model’s predictions, our empirical tests find that federal employee unionization stifles agency
turnover, suppresses ideological volatility when the president’s partisanship changes, and occurs
more frequently in agencies ideologically proximate to the president.
Keywords
Bureaucracy; ideological measurement; bureaucratic ideal points; unionization; executive politics;
public administration and management
The growth of public sector unions during the past half-century constitutes an important
change in US politics (Moe, 2009, 2011; Riccucci, 2011). In addition to protecting the
job security and benefits of bureaucratic employees (Frazier, 1985; Moe, 2006, 2011),
public sector unions have influenced electoral outcomes (Anzia, 2011; Blais et al., 1997;
Johnson and Libecap, 1994; Moe, 2006, 2011; Troy, 1994) and the policy outputs of the
Corresponding author:
Jowei Chen, University of Michigan, 5700 Haven Hall, 505 South State Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1045,
USA.
Email: jowei@umich.edu
152 Journal of Theoretical Politics 27(1)
bureaucracy (e.g., Freeman and Ichniowski, 1988; Lewin et al., 1988; Moe, 2009, 2011).
Furthermore, and perhaps most notably, the long-term growth of publicsector unions has
weakened politicians’ control over bureaucratic agents (Moe, 2006, 2011).
A voluminous literature has argued that politicians structure the bureaucracy (Lewis,
2003; Moe, 1989) and write legislation (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999; Huber and
Shipan, 2002) in an effort to exert tighter control over the actions of bureaucrats. Unions,
however, provide job protections that—by adding to the generous protections already
provided by standard civil service procedures (Donahue, 2008; Frazier, 1985; Thomp-
son, 2007)—shield bureaucrats from termination, disciplinary actions, and other adverse
personnel decisions that facilitate political control of the bureaucracy (Moe, 2011).
Given that unions hinder control of the bureaucracy, politicians’ support for union-
izing public employees is puzzling. Why would politicians ever support unionization
activities that weaken their control of public bureaucrats? This puzzle proves partic-
ularly vexing when researchers consider bureaucratic unionization in the US federal
government. Legal precedent and historical anecdote indicate that presidents have pro-
vided the primary impetus for expanding federal employee unionization (Slater, 2004).
While Congress has provided the statutory basis for federal employee unionization and
the Courts have enforced those laws, both Democratic and Republican presidents have
enlisted unilateral action to expand federal employee unions’ rights and coverage (see
Brenner et al., 2009; see Howell, 2003, on unilateral action more generally). This expan-
sion of federal unionization rights is surprising. It is well established that each subsequent
president has sought tighter political control over administrative agencies (e.g., Howell
and Lewis, 2002; Moe, 1993; Nathan, 1975; Woodand Waterman, 1991); thus, one would
expect chief executives to use their powers to impede bureaucratic unionization. Only on
rare occasions, however, have presidents pursued such limits (see Thompson, 2007). That
broad trend enriches the puzzle of federal employee unionization: whydo presidents will-
ingly permit and even support the continued unionization of some federal agencies, even
though unionization weakens presidential control over bureaucratic personnel?
To resolve this puzzle, we argue that bureaucratic unionization serves the long-
term ideological interests of sitting presidents by inhibiting future executives’ control
over the bureaucracy. This logic begins from the observation that unionization protects
bureaucrats—above and beyond standard civil service protections (Donahue, 2008; Fra-
zier, 1985; Thompson, 2007)—from job termination and disciplinary action. These addi-
tional job protections create an incentive for sitting presidents to accept weaker control
over civil servant termination in the present so that they can prevent future presiden-
tial administrations from drastically altering the ideological composition of an agency’s
workforce. Unionization, in other words, ‘anchors’ the current ideological composi-
tion of a bureaucratic agency by protecting civil servants’ jobs and reducing personnel
turnover. This phenomenon compels presidents—via their control over the appointment
and removal of Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) board members—to accept
unionization in agencies with employees sharing their ideology. In the following sec-
tions, we formalize this logic and present empirical evidence testing predictions of that
formalization.
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