Finland's Security Policy
| Author | Aimo Pajunen |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083676800300104 |
| Published date | 01 March 1968 |
| Date | 01 March 1968 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Aimo Pajunen Finland’s Security
Policy
Finland’s postwar foreign and defense
about the Finnish policy of neutrality.
policies-the term security policy came
Finland completed last year its first half-
into currency in Finland only in the
century as an independent nation. During
i96o’s-have been the object of several
this relatively short time the country has
different interpretations and evaluations,
experienced three devastating wars. Just
not least from abroad. To some extent
as one can little understand the background
this can be explained by the language
of Denmark and Norway’s present security
barrier. Another probable cause-espe-
policies without remembering 9 April 1940,
cially where defense policy is concerned
neither can one gain a full understanding
-is that access to official documents, com-
of the Finnish security problem without
mittee reports, etc., is much more limited
a brief glance back to events before and
than, for example, in Sweden. Serious de-
during World War II.
bate over defense policy has scarcely existed
The most important link in the chain
despite, among other things, attempts by
of events which led to today’s situation
the state authorities to encourage such a
was without doubt the Winter War of
debate. My intention here is to present
1939-40. Finland had attempted since the
the basic features of Finland’s security
mid-I930’s to follow a policy of neutral-
policy after World War II, giving special
ity and had openly declared its adhesion
attention to its goals and the results it
to the Nordic position, but despite all
achieved. The following Swedish defmi-
efforts it did not succeed in avoiding a
tion can be used as a description of the
conflict with the Soviet Union. Russian-
objective of a security policy:
Finnish relations were characterized by
’By various political measures we seek
mutual distrust and aversion. The Russians
to fulfill national objectives such as the
demonstrated with all possible clarity that
protection and development of our soci-
they doubted both Finland’s desire and its
ety’s political, economic, social and cultural
ability to maintain the declared neutrality
conditions. Through our secairity policy we
This was shown, for example, by a visit
attempt to ensure for ourselves a satis-
which the Soviet Envoy in Helsinki made
factory freedom of action in these regards
in 193 to the then Prime Minister, T.M.
even in the event of external threat to the
Kivim5ki, shortly after the British-German
nation.&dquo;
naval agreement had granted full freedom
to the German
fleet in the Baltic. The Soviet
The Historical
representative announced at that time that
Backyrouiid
in the event of war between the Soviet
Swedish neutrality, like the Swiss, has a
Unon and Germany, his Government
long tradition. The same cannot be said
would occupy Finland within six days.2
76
The Russian interests vis-i-vis Finland
explains the astonishing political and mili-
were then, as now, of a primarily strategic
tary errors of judgement made by the
nature. The distance from Leningrad to the
Soviet Government in the autumn of 1939.
Finnish border before the outbreak of the
The course of the Winter War showed
Winter War was only approximately
that the self-appointed outpost in the East
thirty kilometers. However, in Finnish
had to settle its own affairs as best it could
quarters there were no intentions of partic-
without help from the outside. Despite
ipating in an attack on Leningrad. When
the genuine sympathies for Finland’s plight
the Finnish army was mobilized in October
which undeniably existed in many quarters
1939 the artillery was placed so far from
abroad, it is no secret that the intervention
the border that it could not threaten Rus-
plans of France and Great Britain, for
sian territory. And when the Germans
example, were inspired first of all by ,a
during what has been called the ’Continua-
desire to take possession of Narvik and
tion War’ tried to convince their Finnish
the Swedish iron mines. The auxiliary
’brothers in arms’ to take part in the plan-
troops which were to be sent to Finland
ned offensive against Leningrad, The Fin-
would have been insufficient in any case
nish Commander-in Chief, Marshal Man-
and would moreover have arrived too late
nerheim, refused to go along with the
to be able to influence the Russian-Finnish
German plans. Despite this, it is difficult
settlement.3
to ignore completely the fact that the
Thus in i94o as well as in 1944, Finland
Finnish orientation at the end of the 1930’s
had to settle its dispute with the Soviet
did contain certain elements which the
Union on its own. Upon both occasions
Soviet Union could fmd suspicious. Much
Finland’s only real resource was the re-
has been written and said about the Finnish
markably strong resistance of its national
sympathies for Germany and the Drag
defense. In all probability the tenacity of
nach Osten of certain private groups, which,
the Finnish defense saved the country from
among other things, found its expression in
a catastrophe. By March 1940 develop-
dreams of a Great Finland including large
ments had been such that the Soviet Union
parts of northwest Russia. Even though these
preferred a peaceful settlement with Fin-
currents can scarcely be considered to have
land rather than risk a protracted conflict
been representative of a more widespread
in Northern Europe among the Great
Finnish opinion, it is difficult to deny that
Powers. In the summer of 1944 as well,
there existed in Finland at this time a certain
the Finnish army succeeded in holding its
’outpost’ romanticism that was difficult to
stand long enough to check the Soviet large-
reconcile with a realistic security policy. It
scale offensive against the Karelian Isthmus
fondly saw Finland in the proud role of
and thus to create a more favorable basis
the Western world’s outpost in the East and
for peace than the unconditional surrender
abandoned itself in a national recklessness
demanded after the Russians had success-
which left little room for a more sober and
fully completed the first phase of their
politically practical viewpoint. To be sure,
offensive.
this attitude was not reflected in Finland’s
Thus, when assessing the developments
official foreign policy line, but the frontier
after World War II there is reason to re-
to the East was so well barricaded that
member that the Soviet Union in both
an objective exchange of views in practice
1939-40 and in 1944 had been unsuccessful
turned out to be impossible. This in part
in its attempts to break down the Finnish
77
resistance rapidly. This has also been rec-
German defeat was inevitable, and obstruc-
ognized since in Russian writings on war
tcd independent Finnish action in other
history.4 On the other hand the confronta-
ways as well. But at the same time events
tion with the Soviet Union had success-
had made it clear that Finland, situated in
fully stifled the myths cherished by certain
the nearly impenetrable Finno-Scandi-
Finnish extremist elements and had opened
navian terrain, was able to escape becoming
the way for a recognition of political and
one of the great theatres of war. This was
military realities. In actual fact it can be
naturally a factor which, in comparison
said that the bitter experiences of the war
with the Baltic countries, for example,
years created the preconditions necessary
improved Finland’s chances of main-
for a Russian-Finnish cooperation based on
taining its national security interests.
mutual respect and understanding.
When the peace treaty with the Soviet
As one of the losing parties, Finland was
Union had been signed in Paris on 10
faced at the end of the war with the thank-
February 1947, and the Allied Control
less task of building up a new foundation
Commission had left Helsinki, Finland
for its security without any outside help.
was in theory faced with a choice of three
Its situation thus contrasted sharply with
alternative solutions to its national security
that of the rest of Scandinavia. Both
problem: alliance with the Western powers,
Denmark and Norway had fallen victim to
alliance with the Soviet Union, or a return
German occupation after surprise attacks,
to a policy of neutrality. In 1945 the first
but escaped serving as battlefields during
alternative was hardly a political reality.
the rest of World War II. With the aid of
Apart from the fact that according to the
the Western allies they were able to shape
terms of the peace treaty Finland was not
their postwar security policies from points
allowed to enter into an alliance or take
of departure completely different from that
part in a coalition aimed against the Soviet
of Finland. With its security near zero,
Union, the war had opened the way for
Finland had to make its own way as best
a more realistic way of looking at things;
it could.
’outpost’ romanticism had faded in the
trenches. The second alternative-alliance
with the Soviet Union-became a real
The Road to Neictrnlity
possibility when on 22 February 1948
Stalin sent a letter to the Finnish President,
The experiences of the war years had taught
J. K. Paasikivi, in which was included the
many lessons. For one, it was now realized
following:
in Finland that the strategic interests of
’As you surely are aware, two of the
the Western Powers in Northern Europe
Soviet Union’s three neighboring countries
did not extend as far as the coasts of the
which waged war against the Soviet Union
Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia....
To continue reading
Request your trial