From polarization of the public to polarization of the electorate: European Parliament elections as the preferred race for ideologues
| Author | Michele Fenzl,Jonathan B Slapin,Samuel Wilhelm |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/14651165221098501 |
| Published date | 01 December 2022 |
| Date | 01 December 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
From polarization of the
public to polarization of the
electorate: European
Parliament elections as the
preferred race for
ideologues
Michele Fenzl
Institute of Political Science, University of Zürich, Zürich,
Switzerland
Jonathan B Slapin
Institute of Political Science, University of Zürich, Zürich,
Switzerland
Samuel Wilhelm
Independent Researcher
Abstract
This study examines the effect of voters’ideological extremism on turnout in European
national and European Parliament elections. Using data from recent European Election
Studies, the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, and other national election studies,
we find that, relative to centrists, ideological extremists (measured by self-placement on
the left–right scales) are more likely to vote in European Parliament elections (2014 and
2019) but not national elections. We argue that these differences stem from the fact that
European Parliament elections are second-order races. The results help to explain why
the European Parliament has become more polarized, even in the absence of significant
changes in overall attitudes among the European public, and why extreme parties have
been more successful in recent European Parliament than national elections.
Corresponding author:
Jonathan B Slapin, Institute of Political Science, University of Zürich, Affolternstrasse 56, Zürich 8050,
Switzerland.
Email: slapin@ipz.uzh.ch
Article
European Union Politics
2022, Vol. 23(4) 590–611
© The Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/14651165221098501
journals.sagepub.com/home/eup
Keywords
Elections, European Parliament, participation, polarization, voter turnout
Introduction
Voter turnout in European Parliament (EP) elections is notoriously low compared with
national elections, a fact oft lamented by commentators and scholars of European dem-
ocracy (Follesdal and Hix, 2006; Ford, 2014)—and one which may have long-term
effects on the likelihood of participation in national elections (Hobolt and Franklin,
2011). Low turnout and different voting patterns to those in national elections have led
scholars to refer to EP elections as second-order national contests (Hix and Marsh,
2007; Reif and Schmitt, 1980). Many voters who regularly participate in national elec-
tions simply decide to remain on the sidelines during EP elections. But at the same
time, commentators have noted that countries that do experience higher turnout tend to
see the mobilization among voters on the ideological extremes. And while some have
even feared that higher mobilization among anti-EU extremists has the potential to
drown out a silent pro-EU majority, others have pointed out that mobilising turnout at
the EP elections would likely help moderate parties.
1
So just what is the link between
voter ideology and participation in elections? Do ideological extremists and moderates
mobilize at different rates in EP and national elections? And, if so, why? To answer
these questions, we posit a theory that links individual voter-level ideology with turnout
and we explore this relationship in EP and European national elections. We argue that
turnout among moderate and extreme voters is driven by different processes, leading
them to participate at different rates in national-level and European-level contests.
The second-order nature of EP elections means that the calculus of voting in these contests
differs from national elections. Moreover, we argue that the calculus is different for ideo-
logical moderates and extremists. Second-order elections are viewed as less important and,
thus, voters of all ideological stripes experience lower social pressure to vote in these elections
compared with national contests. But for some voters—namely, ideological extremists—the
negative impact of lower social pressure on turnout is offset by increases in other motivations
to vote. The ability to cast an instrumental and expressive vote can motivate extremists to
participate in EP elections compared with national elections. Moderates, in contrast, do
not experience an increase in instrumental and expressive motivations in EP elections
compared with national elections. Over time, this process can lead ideologues to experi-
ence electoral gains in EP elections, reinforcing their willingness to participate.
Empirically, we test our argument using data from four recent European Election
Studies (EES; for the years 2004, 2009, 2014 and 2019) as well as 17 comparable national
election studies (14 studies from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Modules,
CSES, 4 and 5, supplemented with three additional national studies).
2
We demonstrate
that in recent EP elections voters holding extreme ideological attitudes, measured by self-
placement on a left–right ideological scale, are more likely to vote relative to moderates.
Higher participation in EP elections among ideologues started in Western European
countries after the economic crisis. In contrast, ideologues have not become more
Fenzl et al. 591
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