From “Shared Responsibility” to a Migration Agreement? The Limits for Cooperation in the Mexico‐United States Case (2000–2008)1
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2435.2009.00572.x |
| Author | Alexandra Delano |
| Published date | 01 February 2012 |
| Date | 01 February 2012 |
From ‘‘Shared Responsibility’’
to a Migration Agreement?
The Limits for Cooperation in
the Mexico-United States Case
(2000–2008)
1
Alexandra Delano*
ABSTRACT
Why were the Mexican and United States governments unable to establish formal coop-
eration for the management of migration flows even after agreeing on the need for a
‘‘shared responsibility’’ approach and establishing an agenda for negotiations on a bilat-
eral agreement in the spring of 2001? Conventional wisdom is that the terrorist attacks
of September 11th were the main reason for the shift from a bilateral to a unilateral
approach to the management of US-Mexico migration flows. Although this event chan-
ged the US government’s foreign policy priorities, in order to understand the reasons
why the proposal for a migration agreement failed, it is necessary to look beyond the
security context that permeated the US agenda after September 11th and analyse the
underlying structural, domestic and ideological factors that influenced the governments’
positions during and after the negotiations. By examining the context of power asymme-
try in the US-Mexico relationship, the domestic politics that surround the issue and pub-
lic perceptions of immigration in the United States, this paper identifies the challenges
implied in efforts to expand bilateral cooperation over migration issues in the NAFTA
framework. The fact that both countries’ migration policies are mostly pursued unilater-
ally despite the acceptance of a ‘‘shared responsibility’’ raises key questions regarding
the limits of regional integration and bilateral or multilateral cooperation for the man-
agement of migration.
On 16 February 2001 the Presidents of Mexico and the United States, Vicente Fox and George
W. Bush, met in the San Cristobal Ranch in Guanajuato, Mexico to discuss their approach to
the most pressing issues in the bilateral agenda. In their joint declaration ‘‘Towards a Partner-
ship for Prosperity: The Guanajuato Proposal’’, the Presidents expressed their intention to
strengthen the North American economic community and expand their collaboration to
address issues related to border control, drug traffic, energy resources and, most importantly,
migration. They recognised the need to create an orderly framework for migration ‘‘that ensures
* New School for Social Research, The New School, New York.
2009 The Author
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., International Migration 2009 IOM
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK, International Migration Vol. 50 (S1) 2012
and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. ISSN 0020-7985
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2435.2009.00572.x
human treatment, legal security, and dignifies labour conditions’’ (Official Statement, 2001a).
In order to achieve this, they created a high-level group of negotiators chaired by the Secretary
of State and the Attorney General of the United States, Colin Powell and John Ashcroft, and
by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior of Mexico, Jorge G. Cas-
tan
˜eda and Santiago Creel.
In the following seven months, the high-level group held a series of formal and informal
meetings where they discussed the bilateral agenda on migration and the possibilities for col-
laboration. On 6 September 2001, in the spirit of their ‘‘special relationship’’ and ‘‘authentic
partnership,’’ the Presidents met in Washington, DC and issued a joint declaration. In this
statement they highlighted the progress made by the bilateral working group on migration,
described as ‘‘the most fruitful and frank dialogue we have ever had on a subject so impor-
tant to both nations’’, and they recognised migration issues as ‘‘deeply felt by our publics
and vital to our prosperity, well-being, and the kind of societies we want to build’’. The most
important aspect of this statement was that they agreed on the framework within which the
‘‘new and realistic approach’’ to migration was to be based. This included ‘‘matching willing
workers with willing employers; serving the social and economic needs of both countries;
respecting the human dignity of all migrants, regardless of their status; recognizing the con-
tribution migrants make to enriching both societies; and shared responsibility for ensuring
migration takes place through safe and legal channels’’. The Presidents requested that the
working group provide specific proposals with respect to border safety, a temporary worker
programme and the status of undocumented Mexicans in the United States. Finally, they
agreed to form a public-private alliance to address some of the root causes of migration
through the ‘‘Partnership for Prosperity’’ initiative to foster economic growth in Mexico,
particularly in the areas where most migrants came from (Official Statement, 2001c).
The terrorist attacks of September 11th altered the course of these bilateral negotiations as
the US government’s foreign and domestic policy priorities changed. Although migration
issues were not dropped completely from the agenda, they were viewed through a security lens
and addressed in a very different manner by the Bush administration. This ‘‘re-conceptualiza-
tion of how to protect U.S. borders and prevent the entry of any foreign nationals who would
pose a new threat’’ (Mohar, 2004) did not incorporate the possibility of negotiating a migra-
tion agreement with Mexico to manage existing migration flows and protect migrants’ rights.
Mexico and the United States continued to collaborate closely on the security front and
signed the 22-point ‘‘Mexico-U.S. Border Partnership Action Plan’’, also known as the
‘‘Smart Borders Initiative’’, in March 2002. This included agreements in areas of infrastruc-
ture and secure flow of people and goods. They also signed the ‘‘Partnership for Prosperity’’
initiative in Monterrey in March 2002, – expanded into the ‘‘Security and Prosperity Partner-
ship of North America’’ in 2005 – to promote foreign and domestic investment in Mexico’s
marginal areas, among other goals that do not include regulating the flow of migrant work-
ers in the region. Migration-related initiatives were thus left out of the bilateral agenda and
in November 2002, Colin Powell declared that the political conditions did not exist in the
United States to advance the migration discussions and Mexican officials should be patient
(Mohar, 2004). The idea of a bilateral agreement was never put back on the table despite
Mexico’s efforts to reframe and resume the negotiations.
Instead, on 7 January 2004 President Bush proposed creating a Temporary Worker Pro-
gramme that would ‘‘match willing foreign workers with willing American employers, when
no Americans can be found to fill the jobs’’ and make US immigration laws ‘‘more rational
and more humane’’ (Official Statement, 2004). This proposal triggered a debate in Congress
that led to the introduction of various legislative proposals for immigration reform between
2005 and 2007.
2
Yet, the initiatives that focused on comprehensive reform failed to build
consensus as restrictionist positions strengthened in a heightened security context, a period of
e42 Delano
2009 The Author. International Migration 2009 IOM
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