Gendered preferences: How women’s inclusion in society shapes negotiation occurrence in intrastate conflicts
| Date | 01 May 2021 |
| Author | Robert Ulrich Nagel |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343319899456 |
| Published date | 01 May 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Gendered preferences: How women’s
inclusion in society shapes negotiation
occurrence in intrastate conflicts
Robert Ulrich Nagel
Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security
Abstract
To what extent do gender relations in society influence the likelihood of negotiations during intrastate disputes? A
substantial body of literature recognizes gendered inequalities as integral to understanding conflict, yet they have
received little attention in systematic studies of conflict management. I argue that patriarchal gender relations that
reflect a preference for masculinity over femininity influence states’ propensity to negotiate with rebels. I draw on the
concept of practices to explain how gender relations shape government preferences for negotiations. Specifically, I
contend that practices of excluding women from fully participating in public life institutionalize violence as the
preferred way of managing conflict. The implication is that countries with more patriarchal gender relations are less
likely to engage in negotiations during intrastate conflicts. I test this argument on all civil conflict dyads between
1975 and 2014. The analyses show that countries that marginalize women’s participation in public life are signif-
icantly less likely to engage in negotiations. The results provide strong support for my theoretical argument and offer
systematic evidence in support of core claims of the feminist peace theory.
Keywords
conflict, gender inequality, negotiation
Introduction
How does women’s status in societies influence how
these manage violent conflict? Over the past two decades
a substantial body of research has emerged supporting
the link between gender and conflict. Studies show that
men who subscribe to patriarchal values of honor and
idealize masculine notions of toughness are more likely
to participate in political violence (Bjarnegård, Broune
´us
& Melander, 2017), and that political organizations that
have more gender-inclusive ideologies are more likely to
employ nonviolent tactics (Asal et al., 2013). States in
which gendered inequality is prevalent are more likely to:
go to war (Caprioli, 2000); use severe violence (Caprioli
& Boyer, 2001); be the first to use violence in interstate
disputes (Caprioli, 2003); suffer intrastate conflict
(Caprioli, 2005); escalate to high intensity violence and
to be less likely to de-escalate violence once it begins
(Melander, 2005). An analysis of women’s relative status
and peacekeeping missions shows that peacekeeping
missions in more egalitarian countries are more success-
ful (Gizelis, 2009). This, however, omits the critical
phase of conflict management efforts. In other words,
the question of how gender relations influence a state’s
preferences towards negotiations in intrastate conflicts
has so far been left unexplored.
I fill this lacuna by developing an argument linking
gendered inequalities with a government’s propensity to
enter into negotiations in intrastate conflicts. I argue that
patriarchal gender relations, those that reflect a prefer-
ence for masculinity over femininity, influence govern-
ments’ predisposition to negotiate. Specifically, I argue
that governments in countries with lower levels of
women’s inclusion in the public sphere, that is, in soci-
eties that more extensively curtail women’s inclusion and
participation in education, commerce, and politics, are
Corresponding author:
nagel.robert@me.com
Journal of Peace Research
2021, Vol. 58(3) 433–448
ªThe Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343319899456
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less likely to engage in negotiations to resolve armed
conflict. Patriarchal gender relations normatively and
structurally sanction the use of violence to manage con-
flicts because they embody and reinforce values of a
violent hegemonic masculinity such as domination, sub-
jugation, and denigration of women and femininity.
Therefore, I expect that all else being equal, countries
in which gender relations are more patriarchal are less
likely to engage in negotiations. I identify practices as the
missing link in explaining how gender relations influence
state behavior. Practices diffuse between individuals,
society, and formal state institutions; they thereby influ-
ence states’ preferences, including how to manage armed
rebellions. Gender relations manifest in inequitable gen-
der practices such as restricting women’s access to eco-
nomic, educational, and political opportunities, which
means these practices tangibly express a gender hierarchy
that reflects individual and societal beliefs about mascu-
linity’s superiority over femininity, that is, an idealiza-
tion of masculinity. Consequently, this study presents an
important refinement of the theoretical framework
underpinning the majority of work on the gender–con-
flict nexus. Besides contributing to the burgeoning
gender-conflict literature, this study also contributes to
the emerging literature on social and political factors
shaping negotiations in civil wars (Ogutcu-Fu, 2016;
Ari, 2018).
To test this argument, I use logistic regression models
in 249 armed intrastate conflict dyads between 1975 and
2014 taken fromthe Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflictdata-
set (Gleditsch et al., 2002). This involves 1,955 conflict
dyad years, of which 521 feature negotiations. I rely on
recently released data on negotiations (Ari, 2018), and
gender relations in a society (Karim & Hill, 2018). This
enables me to capture practices that reflect different levels
of patriarchal gender relations within and between coun-
tries over time. The statistical analysis substantiates my
argument, provides cross-national support for micro-
level findings that patriarchal values and ideals of mascu-
line toughness drive participation in political violence
(Bjarnegård, Broune
´us & Melander, 2017), and offers
systematic evidence in support ofsome core claims under-
pinning the feminist peace theory (Hudson et al., 2012).
Following the quantitative analysis, I present the Philip-
pines as a crucial case study to illustrate the argument.
Conflict management
Why and how do disputants manage intrastate conflict?
Conflict management research largely focuses on conflict
characteristics and dynamics such as the balance of
power, relative rebel strength, number of actors, conflict
costs and the power to hurt, and the ro le of external
parties in bringing about negotiations and mediations
(Ghosn, 2010; Beardsley & Lo, 2014; Greig, 2014;
Thomas, 2014; Kaplow, 2016). These conflict dynamics
are frequently presented as gender-neutral. However,
gender is an integral organizing element of societal and
governmental decisionmaking institutions (Chappell,
2010; Bjarnegård, Broune
´us & Melander, 2017; Barnes
& O’Brien, 2018; Webster, Chen & Beardsley, 2019)
thereby shaping perceptions of threat, willingness to use
or abstain from violence, and willingness to negotiate. In
this article I focus on these overlooked gendered influ-
ences arguing that patriarchal gender relations expressed
through practices of women’s exclusion shape govern-
ments’ preferences, thereby affecting the likelihood of
peace talks.
The balance of power between belligerents is an
important factor influencing decisions to continue to
fight or to seek a nonviolent method of managing con-
flicts (Beardsley, 2010; Clayton, 2013; Nilsson, 2010).
The power balance between conflict actors is seldom
seen through a gender lens; however, power and control
are inherently tied to the masculine nature of govern-
ments. Constituents frequently expect masculinity from
their leaders and challenge them ‘when their policies fall
short of characteristics associated with the states’ mascu-
linized strategic culture or state identity’ (Sjoberg, 2013:
162). Coupled with governments’ structural advantages
such as greater economic and military resources (Gent,
2011), this frequently results in governments first pursu-
ing a military victory rather than a diplomatic solution.
This asymmetry means it takes stronger opposition for
governments to agree to talks and agree to more conces-
sions (Clayton, 2013; Gent, 2011; Hultquist, 2013).
Although relative power remains largely stable
throughout a conflict episode (Cunningham, Gleditsch
& Salehyan, 2009, 2013), belligerents have opportuni-
ties to shape conflict dynamics to their advantage by
leveraging their power to hurt as power to bargain (Hult-
man, 2012; Thomas, 2014; Wood & Kathman, 2014).
The ‘power to hurt’ argument suggests that insurgents
do not need to win militarily to achieve their objectives;
it can be enough to impose high enough costs to force
the government to accept negotiations. This sensitivity
to cost can influence the onset of conflict management as
well as the duration and outcome of conflicts (Greig,
2001; Filson & Werner, 2007; Greig & Regan, 2008;
Ruhe, 2015). The underpinning idea is that rebels
change states’ cost/benefit analyses of continuing armed
conflict, for example by targeting civilians (Thomas,
434 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 58(3)
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