Generating Equality? Equal Pay, Decentralization and the Electricity Supply Industry
| Date | 01 June 1995 |
| Author | Judith Seeker,Kay Gilbert |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1995.tb00431.x |
| Published date | 01 June 1995 |
British Journal
of
Industrial Relations
33:2
June
1995
0007-1080
Generating Equality? Equal Pay,
Decentralization and the Electricity
Supply Industry
Kay
Gilbert and Judith Secker
Abstract
Despite the existence of effective equal pay legislation in the
UK
since 1975
aimed at eradicating pay discrimination, women are still in receipt
of
only 79.5
per cent of the hourly earnings received by men (EOR 19946). Whitehouse
(1 992) claims that a centralized collective bargaining model
is
more likely to
lead to equality for women in the labour market than a liberalized
individualistic model. The model was tested at an aggregated level for
13 OECD countries. This article provides a case study which charts a trade
union claim for equal pay over a period of ten years (198494), which may be
seen
as
an examination
of
the Whitehouse proposition at
a
disaggregated level.
The paper highlights the barriers to equality bargaining and analyses the case
study to identify the criteria necessary for achieving equality.
1.
Introduction
This paper examines the NALGO (now part of Unison) campaign for pay
equity in the electricity industry between
1984
and
1994.
It is an industry
that, in
1984,
resembled the collective model described by Whitehouse
(1992)
as well as any could within the UK. Over the period, it moved from a
strongly unionized industry with national bargaining to one that, although
maintaining a strong union organization throughout, has the bargaining
structure
‘decentralized’
as a result of privatization. Nevertheless, it
provides an interesting case study to examine the major propositions made
by Whitehouse at a disaggregated level. This disaggregation provides
evidence that helps to further specify Whitehouse’s model in respect of
centralization, union density and organization within industry and the role
of the law. It provides an insight into the manner in which the model might
operate at the micro level within the
UK,
and provides additional evidence
for testing of the model itself.
Kay Gilbert is at the Department
of
Human Resource Management, University
of
Strathclyde,
and Judith Secker is in the Electricity Section
of
UNISON.
192
British Journal
of
Industrial Relations
The paper first outlines the Whitehouse model and the background to the
claim
in
terms
of
negotiating and grading structures in the electricity supply
industry. It then demonstrates how the industry fits the collective model.
This is followed by a brief account
of
the negotiating process which finally
led to the lodging
of
30 applications to tribunal under the Equal Pay Act (as
amended by the 1983 Amendment Regulations) and the acceptance by some
employers of new grading structures. The paper proceeds to an evaluation
of
the processes
of
claiming equal pay, particularly in relation to the
propositions made by Whitehouse (1992).
This article comments on the process
of
the claim and the structures
surrounding it, not on the merit
of
the claim itself; nor does it examine the
relationship between NALGO and the other unions represented in the
electricity industry. The other trade unions did support the campaign, and,
while there is no doubt that the role
of
the other trade unions is of interest,
development
of
this issue would be impossible to include within this study.
Finally, the study does not attempt to examine the role
of
women in the
campaign; we intend to examine this issue in a separate paper.
2.
Background
Whitehouse (1992) argues that, although legislation can make an impact on
equality, the scale
of
the impact depends on supportive institutions and
policies. Whitehouse claims that her cross-national statistical analysis
endorses her view of the efficacy
of
legislation alone in achieving equality.
The aggregated analysis tests, across 13
OECD
countries, the influence
of
collective and liberal national structures on equality, measured in terms
of
participation and relative earnings.
Whitehouse describes the collective model as one where ‘legislative
mechanisms operate alongside processes which allow inequality issues to be
handled within the industrial arena’; it has a ‘strongly organized trade union
movement which operates centralized control over wage bargaining, and is
reluctant to cede these powers to the legal arena’; ‘comparisons for equal
pay decisions are not limited to an enterprise focus, and decisions will be
applicable across the labour market’. In terms
of
determining pay, it
is
stated
that ‘wage rates reflect an emphasis on the skills and responsibility
of
the job
itself rather than just its market value to an employer’; and as for the role of
government, ‘a high level
of
public employment’ and ‘active intervention in
the labour market in the interests in full employment and labour market
equity is the norm
.
.
.’
(Whitehouse 1992:
68).
The liberal model, according to Whitehouse, is less effective in achieving
equality.
It
is one that is based on a ‘reliance on legislative measures
. . .
separate from the industrial relations system’, where there is generally ‘little
scope for this focus to be broadened’. It is one in which the ‘evaluation
of
women’s work is based
on
the market value to the employer’, and wage
comparisons are ‘limited to an enterprise basis’ (Whitehouse 1992:
67-8).
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