A global game of diplomacy
| Author | Alastair Smith,Matt Malis |
| Published date | 01 October 2019 |
| Date | 01 October 2019 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819875517 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2019, Vol.31(4) 480–506
ÓThe Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629819875517
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A global game of diplomacy
Matt Malis and Alastair Smith
Department of Politics, NewYork University,USA
Abstract
Diplomacy always occurs in the shadowof domestic political competition. We developa model of
top-level diplomatic exchangebetween an incumbent and a foreign leader, embedded within a glo-
bal game of regime change, and examine four mechanisms that induce a relationship between dip-
lomatic visits and regime survival. First, the foreign leader chooses to visit incumbents who are ex
ante more secure in office (a selection effect). Second, because the foreign leader’s decision is
based partly on private information, the citizens update on the revelation of that information (a
learning effect) and are discouraged from mounting a challenge. Third, the foreign leader can bol-
ster the incumbent’s strength in office with a transfer of material support (a strengthening effect).
The latter two effects are then amplified by the complementarities in the citizens’ strategies (a
multiplier effect). Contrary to standard global games results, we show that increased precision in
the public information transmitted strategically by the foreign power induces a unique equilibrium,
as citizens coordinate on the foreignleader’s action. Our findings explain why leaders areso eager
to receive state visits from major world powers.
Keywords
Diplomacy; diplomatic visits; global game; leader survival;state visits
1. Introduction
Diplomacy always occurs in the shadow of domestic political competition. Existing
accounts of diplomatic activity between heads of state look overwhelmingly to
international threats and hostilities as causes and consequences of such activity
(Druckman and Wallensteen, 2017; Galtung, 1964; Kastner and Saunders, 2012;
McManus, 2018; McManus and Yarhi-Milo, 2017; Trager, 2016). Yet despite the
frequency of diplomatic exchange—diplomatic visits take up one-third of recent
Corresponding author:
Alastair Smith, Departmentof Politics, New York University, 19 West 4th St., New York NY 10012, USA.
Email: Alastair.Smith@nyu.edu
US presidents’ days in office, by our count
1
—violent interstate conflicts are exceed-
ingly rare events. Either diplomacy is exceptionally effective at deterring interstate
conflict, or there are other motives that warrant consideration.
In this paper, we examine the relationship between international diplomacy and
domestic political contestation. Above all else, leaders seek to maintain office
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003); the primary challenge they face arises not from
foreign adversaries but from opponents within their own country.
2
To explain dip-
lomatic interactions among heads of state,the struggle for political survival seems a
logical starting point. Our analysis departs from a standard global game of regime
change (Carlsson and Van Damme, 1993; Morris and Shin, 2003). Citizens who
wish to overthrow their political leadership are incompletely informed as to the
incumbent’s strength. They receive utility from participating in a successful revolu-
tion but face costs for participating in a failed one, and must coordinate in the face
of uncertainty as to which outcome will come to pass. Into this context, we intro-
duce a foreign leader as a strategic actor who decides whether to offer diplomatic
support to the incumbent, in the form of a diplomatic visit, whichmay be accompa-
nied by a transfer (or future commitment) of material assistance. Diplomatic sup-
port is a costly investment for the foreign power; but if the recipient leader survives
in office, he reciprocates the foreign power with a policy concession that more than
offsets the cost. Thus the foreign leader, analogously to the citizens, is incentivized
to support strong regimes, but to keep a distance from weak ones.
Four mechanisms induce a relationship between diplomatic exchange and
regime survival. First, a correlation arises between state visits and leader survival
via a selection effect, whereby the foreign leader chooses to support incumbents
who are sufficiently stable in office. Second, because of this selection process, the
show of support (or lack thereof) is revealing of the foreign leader’s private assess-
ment of the incumbent’s strength, so the citizens update on this new information—
alearning effect—and are discouraged from challenging the regime. Third, sym-
bolic support may be accompanied by a transfer of material support to the regime,
making it more durable in the face of domestic opposition and further driving
down the citizens’ incentives to rebel (a strengthening effect). Finally, the impact of
these mechanisms on regime survival is amplified by the complementarities in the
citizens’ strategies, inducing a multiplier effect. We seek to examine how each of
these mechanisms operates, independently and interactively, and to draw useful
inferences for empirical examination of diplomatic visits and related forms of
statecraft.
Our study makes two primary contributions, one formal and one substantive.
Formally, the model presented here adds to the rich and growing body of global
game models, which have been applied broadly to the study of financial invest-
ments (Sakovics and Steiner, 2012), currency crises (Angeletos et al., 2006), party
leadership (Dewan and Myatt, 2007), and, most commonly in political science,
coups and popular revolutions (Aldama et al., 2019; Boix and Svolik, 2013; Casper
and Tyson, 2014; Edmond, 2013; Egorov and Sonin, 2017; Little, 2012; Shadmehr
and Bernhardt, 2015; Tyson and Smith, 2018). The particular innovation we offer
is the introduction of an endogenous information structure resulting from a
Malis and Smith 481
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