Governing private security in New Zealand
| DOI | 10.1177/0004865814538038 |
| Date | 01 June 2016 |
| Published date | 01 June 2016 |
| Author | Trevor Bradley |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Governing private security in
New Zealand
Trevor Bradley
Institute of Criminology, School of Social and Cultural Studies, Victoria
University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
Abstract
The remarkable growth of private security has focused attention on the increased vulner-
ability to poor standards and malpractice among those now reliant upon it. A common
international response to this increased risk has been the introduction and/or reform of
‘special’ industry regulation. New Zealand is no exception. Here, the Private Security
Personnel and Private Investigators Act (2010) updated governing regulation first introduced
in 1975. This article presents a critical assessment of the regulatory framework supplied by
the Act and the form or modality of regulation it represents. Informed by original New
Zealand research on the vexed issue of industry standards and professionalism the article
contends that the new regulatory framework is insufficiently comprehensive in scope to
achieve its primary aims of raising standards and reducing risk. The article, therefore, advo-
cates a move beyond an exclusive dependence on a state centred ‘command and control’
approach that since the mid-1970s has proven largely unsuccessful and toward a more plur-
alistic, ambitious regulatory model within which the state constitutes just one, albeit signifi-
cant, node or ‘site’ of governance.
Keywords
Governance, New Zealand, private security, professionalism and standards, regulation
Introduction
Over the past three decades in New Zealand the remarkable growth of private security has
reconfigured the policing landscape. Between 1976 and 2012, the licensed security industry
grew by over 1000%.
1
Over the same period, despite recent and unprecedented recruit-
ment campaigns (Collins, 2010), the police grew by 117% (New Zealand Police, 2012).
2
Parliament’s Law And Order Select Committee (2013, p. 2) estimated Police base line
funding for 2013/2014 at $1.586 billion (NZ) while the New Zealand Security Association
(NZSA) estimates annual industry turnover at $2.8 billion (NZ). Private security has long
since moved beyond the ‘policing’ of private and ‘communal’ space (Kempa, Stenning, &
Wood, 2004) and now routinely performs ‘public’ duties formerly the responsibility of the
Australian & New Zealand
Journal of Criminology
2016, Vol. 49(2) 159–178
!The Author(s) 2014
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0004865814538038
anj.sagepub.com
Corresponding author:
TrevorBradley, Institute of Criminology, School of Social and Cultural Studies, Victoria University of Wellington,P.O.
Box 600, Wellington 6012, New Zealand.
Email: trevor.bradley@vuw.ac.nz
police (Bradley & Sedgwick, 2009).
3
Reflecting a successful programme of ‘responsibilisa-
tion’ (Hinds & Grabosky, 2010) a growing number of New Zealanders have adopted of a
‘mentality of self protection’ (Prenzler & Sarre, 2012; see Bradley & Sedgwick, 2009) and
for whom private security has become a routine feature of everyday life.
Private security’s growth has also forced attention on the increased vulnerability to
poor standards and malpractice among those reliant upon it
4
(see Button, 2008; Prenzler
& Sarre, 2008, p. 2). A common governmental response to this increased risk has been to
introduce or reform ‘special’ regulation to protect an increasingly dependent public
(Hakala, 2008; White, 2009). New Zealand is no exception. The Private Security
Personnel and Private Investigators Act (2010) (PSP and PI Act), enacted in April
2011, finally replaced industry regulation first introduced in 1974. The Private
Investigators and Security Guards Act (1974f) (PI and SG Act) introduced licensing
for contract but not in-house SG – a ‘catch all’ category that covered mobile/static
guards, security technicians (installers: alarms, safes and cameras), monitoring staff
(alarms/cameras) and security consultants – and PI. Beyond a range of disqualifying
criminal convictions no other license approval criteria were imposed. There were no
minimum standards or mandatory training and thus no evidence of expertise or com-
petence was required. Licenses (companies and sole traders) and certificates of approval
(employees) were issued for one year. Its replacement, the PSP and PI Act (2010) is both
‘wider’ and ‘deeper’ and hence more comprehensive (Button & George, 2006).
Regulation has been extended. In addition to PI, it now includes contract SG and per-
sonal (body) guards, contract and in-house crowd controllers (event security/door super-
visors), security technicians (installers and monitors), security consultants and secure
document destruction. The imposition of mandatory minimum training for contract and
in-house crowd controllers/door supervisors and contract but not in-house SG, has
‘deepened’ the new regulatory regime. Licenses are now issued for five years and an
‘annual return’ detailing employment changes is required in-between licensing periods.
Under the Button and George (2006, pp. 570–571) schema, New Zealand has shifted
from a ‘minimum wide’ to a ‘Comprehensive Wide’ model of regulation within which
responsibility for regulation/enforcement is ‘divided’ between a licensing authority (the
Private Security Personnel Licensing Authority (PSPLA)) and enforcement body (the
complaints, investigation and enforcement unit).
This article presents a critical assessment of the regulatory framework supplied by the
Act and the form or modality of regulation it represents. The critique draws briefly on
insights generated by two separate though related New Zealand studies both of which
focus on the vexed and, from an international perspective, familiar issue of professional
standards and service delivery within the contract security industry. The first surveyed a
wide range of practitioners on industry standards and professionalism and the second
considered industry standards through a 2011 analysis of security license applications
and approvals. Where the first revealed particularly negative ‘insider’ perceptions and
experiences the second identified often inappropriate and ineffective patterns of license
approval. Together they throw much needed light on the contemporary ‘condition’ of
the industry inherited by the new regulatory regime.
Considered in the light of this and similar international research (see Button, 2007,
Hakala, 2008; O’Connor et al., 2008; Prenzler & Milroy, 2012; Sarre & Prenzler, 2011),
the article contends that the regulatory framework supplied by the 2010 Act, although a
160 Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 49(2)
To continue reading
Request your trial