Grounding Police Accountability and Performance in Context: A Comparative Study of Stop and Frisk Between New York City and Taipei City
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1002/pad.1755 |
Author | Chun‐yuan Wang,Ting‐Jung Tsai,Chin‐chih Chu,Elaine Yi Lu |
Date | 01 May 2016 |
Published date | 01 May 2016 |
GROUNDING POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE IN
CONTEXT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF STOP AND FRISK BETWEEN
NEW YORK CITY AND TAIPEI CITY
CHIN-CHIH CHU
1
, ELAINE YI LU
2
, CHUN-YUAN WANG
1
*AND TING-JUNG TSAI
1
1
Central Police University, Taiwan
2
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY, USA
SUMMARY
The linkage between accountability and performance is not always positive. This study proposes that contextual factors affect
the accountability–performance link. The central question we explore in this research is how citizens’trust and police culture
influence the link between police accountability and performance. We conducted in-depth interviews and compared the stop
and frisk practices in both New York City in the United States and Taipei City in Taiwan, which are located in different
contexts. The article concludes that both citizens’high level of trust and an open police culture improve the performance return
of accountability pressure. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
key words—police; stop; frisk; accountability; performance; New York City; Taipei City
INTRODUCTION
Between 2003 and 2012, the number of New York City’s stop-and-frisk actions more than quadrupled, from
160 851 to 685 724, before declining by 22% in 2012 (Jones-Brown et al., 2013). In recent years, the disputes
of police executing stop-and-frisk actions continued without cessation. Although the performance of public
security improved under Bloomberg’s 12-year term, the policy of stop and frisk was declared unconstitutional
by Judge S. Scheindlin on 12 August 2013. New York City government appealed the ruling; however, on 22
November 2013, the federal appellate court rejected the city’s motion for a stay of the judge’s orders (Associated
Press in New York, 2013). Since 2014, the new administration under the leadership of Mayor Bill de Blasio has
taken steps to reform police practices. Meanwhile, at the opposite end of the world, the implementation of stops
and road checks has emerged in Taiwan in an effort to stop drunk driving. Especially in Taipei City, the capital of
Taiwan, stop-and-frisk actions have been implemented at high frequency. This situation leads to an intriguing
question: How can stop-and-frisk policies be implemented in an accountable way to achieve the desired
outcomes?
Indeed, the movement for more government accountability and performance is pervasive. Police organizations
are no exception. Various mechanisms for holding police accountable have attracted the interest of practitioners
and scholars. In the United States, civilian review boards were established in the 1950s, and a police auditor mech-
anism followed in the 1990s (Walker and Archbold, 2014). The creation of the Inspector General Office for the
New York Police Department in 2013 reflects the continuing challenges as wellas the efforts to strengthen police ac-
countability and improve police performance.
However, the link between accountability and performance is not always positive. When accountability
becomes a bureaucratic exercise, meeting the accountability pressure becomes “performance.”As Joaquin and
*Correspondence to: Chun-yuan Wang, Ph.D. is Associate Professor, Department of Administration Police, Central Police University, No. 56,
Shujen Rd., Kueishan Dist., Taoyuan City 33304, Taiwan. E-mail: g885422@seed.net.tw
public administration and development
Public Admin. Dev. 36, 108–120 (2016)
Published online in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/pad.1755
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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