Group cooperation against a hegemon
| Author | Guillaume Cheikbossian |
| Published date | 01 January 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629820963177 |
| Date | 01 January 2021 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2021, Vol.33(1) 25–55
ÓThe Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629820963177
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Group cooperation against
a hegemon
Guillaume Cheikbossian
CEE-M (Universite
´de Montpellier- INRAE- CNRS - SupAgro), Montpellier, France
Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse, France
Abstract
In this paper,I study the ability of a group of citizens to cooperate againsta hegemon in a repeated
contest game and where groupmembers and the hegemon have different valuations of theprize. I
first consider that group members use grim trigger strategies (GTSs) to support cooperative
behavior and show that full cooperation within the group is more easily sustained as a stationary
subgame perfect (Nash) equilibrium (SSPE) as either group size or the heterogeneity in the valua-
tion of the prize increases. In turn, I show that full cooperation within the group can also be sus-
tained as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium (WRPE). However, an increase in group size
makes it more difficult to sustain within-group cooperation, but an increase in the relative valua-
tion of the prize by group membersstill facilitates group cooperation.
Keywords
Collective action; group cooperation; renegotiation; repeated game; trigger strategies
1. Introduction
According to the conventional rational choice theory (Olson, 1965; Tullock, 1971),
participation to mass political action, such as protest or rebellion, is a paradox
because the group’s success has the characteristics of a (pure) public good whereas
participation to collective action induces private costs. In other words, there is a
free-rider problem that should discourage people from participating in collective
political action. For instance, regarding revolutions, Tullock (1971: 92) writes:
Corresponding author:
Guillaume Cheikbossian,Universite
´de Montpellier, Faculte
´d’Economie, Avenue RaymondDugrand, 34960
Montpellier cedex 2, France.
Email: guillaume.cheikbossian@umontpellier.fr
‘‘Under these circumstances, the public good remains in the equation, but has very slight
weight unless the individual feels that his participation or non-participation will have a
major influence on the outcome. Since most participants in revolution should have no
such illusions, it would appear that the public good aspects of a revolution are of rela-
tively little importance in the decision to participate. They should, therefore, be of rela-
tively little importance in determining the outcome of the revolution.’’
Both Olson (1965) and Tullock (1971) thus consider that citizens will not partic-
ipate in mass political action unless there exist ‘‘selective incentives’’ or personal
material rewards. The traditional theory of collective action has given rise to
numerous conceptual and empirical papers. For instance, Finkel et al. (1989) pro-
posed two explanations of individual participation in a collective protest. The first
is that citizens tend to overestimate the effect of their own contributions to the
probability of group success.
1
The second type of explanation, what they call the
‘‘collective rationality model,’’ is that citizens’ decisions to participate in collective
political action is based on the belief that the participation of all group members is
necessary for group success or on the ethical belief that there is a moral obligation
to participate in collective action if others are participating. Using three surveys
conducted in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1987 and 1988, they show that
the first explanation is supported for legal and illegal protests, whereas the ‘‘collec-
tive rationality’’ explanation is supported only for legal protests.
Subsequently, scholars have emphasized that collective action does not (only)
rely on Olsonian ‘‘selective incentives,’’ but on whether people strongly identify
with a group and, thus, feel the moral obligation to do their part in collective
action (see, e.g., Goldstone, 1994; Moore, 1995; Oberschall, 1994; Opp, 2012).
Furthermore, the social identity theory originally formulated by social psycholo-
gists Tajfel and Turner (1979) has pointed out that individuals derive a ‘‘social
identity’’ from the group to which they belong even though the group is not formed
according to some intrinsic characteristics but by random assignment (Tajfel,
1970). In turn, social identity can foster individual participation in the collective
action of one’s own group. Indeed, a large number of experimental studies by
social psychologists show, in simple team games, that intergroup competition
enhances group effort above the level corresponding to that chosen by a purely
self-interested individual (see, e.g., Bornstein, 1992, 2003; Bornstein et al., 2002;
Rapoport and Bornstein, 1987, 1989). Economists have also conducted experimen-
tal studies with monetary incentives and generally conclude that subjects over-
contribute to group effort in group contests or conflicts, compared with the predic-
tions implied by the Homo economicus paradigm (see, e.g., Abbink et al., 2010,
2012).
Another solution to the free-rider problem in collective political action that
remains in the tradition of the cost–benefit analysis, without referring to notions
such as ethical norms or social identity, is based on strategies of reciprocity when
the situation is repeated over time (Axelrod, 1981; Taylor, 1976). The idea is that
mutual cooperation in political collective action can be achieved with the use of
26 Journal of Theoretical Politics 33(1)
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