‘Home and away’? Internationalism and territory in the post-1990 Norwegian defence discourse
| DOI | 10.1177/0010836710396347 |
| Author | Nina Græger |
| Published date | 01 March 2011 |
| Date | 01 March 2011 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Cooperation and Conflict
46(1) 3–20
‘Home and away’?
© The Author(s) 2011
Reprints and permission: sagepub.
Internationalism and
co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0010836710396347
cac.sagepub.com
territory in the
post-1990 Norwegian
defence discourse
Nina Græger
Abstract
Most NATO countries reformed their defence systems during the 1990s in response to the end of
the Cold War. Although Norway adjusted to new external framework conditions and participated
in the new international operations, territorial defence dominated the defence discourse and
military practices at home into the next millennium. This article argues that the continuity in
the discourse and the pace with which defence reform has been implemented during the period
1990–2005 is a result of social factors and relations at the national level. First, the nation-building
role of the Norwegian defence system has shaped central national concepts, values and military
practices, rendering it resistant to change. Second, reform has been counteracted by the weight of
the military institution – in terms of size, geographical extent and deep-rooted practices related
to training and education. Third, Norwegian defence policy is deeply intertwined with other
domestic policy areas, so when changes in the defence establishment have negative consequences,
especially for district policy, opposition is provoked. In contrast, the Norwegian defence discourse
and practices seem to have rapidly co-opted the changes invoked by the emerging multi-polar
system. This underscores the claim made here, that the Norwegian defence discourse is largely
about national, territorial defence.
Keywords
Norway, Norwegian defence discourse, reform, social factors
Introduction
This article examines how the end of the Cold War affected well-established perceptions
and practices in Norway’s defence policy, and which counterforces were unleashed.1 As
a result of the altered threat picture, NATO undertook important strategic moves and
embarked on a comprehensive process of trimming down its command structure and
Corresponding author:
Nina Græger, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, PO Box 8159 Dep, N-0033 Oslo, Norway.
[email: ng@nupi.no]
4
Cooperation and Conflict 46(1)
transforming its forces. Norway was involved in these decisions and started the readjustment
of its own security policy early in the 1990s. However, adapting the Norwegian defence
structure to the new international environment was to prove a slower process, and was
slower than was the case in many other NATO member states. For example, compulsory
military service was abolished in Belgium, France and the Netherlands in the 1990s. Italy
and Denmark retained compulsory military service, but gradually introduced a consider-
able voluntary element, leading to reduced participation (Sorensen, 2000). Norway
retained its system of compulsory military service, albeit with some changes, and the
training and personnel policy within the forces continued largely as before.
It is argued in this article that the slow reform of Norwegian defence policy during the
period 1990–2005 is a result of social factors and relations at the national level. This
argument can be specified in the form of three theses, which will be explored here. First,
that the nation-building role of the Norwegian defence system has been incorporated in
central national concepts, values and military practices, rendering it resistant to change.
Second, that the weight of the military as an institution, not merely in terms of size and
geographical extent but also in deep-rooted patterns of action or practices, has worked to
counteract change in the case of Norway. Third, that Norway’s defence policy is inter-
twined with other areas of domestic policy, so when changes in the defence establish-
ment have negative consequences for these areas, opposition is provoked, not least in the
case of district policy issues.2
The internationalization, restructuring and modernization of the Norwegian military
affected the lives of many people, directly and indirectly, and influenced basic percep-
tions of the uses of military power. There is much to indicate that Norway’s defence poli-
ticians and military leadership did not consider it necessary to adapt the nation’s defence
activities to a new external, post-Soviet ‘reality’. That is not to say that they failed to
acknowledge the altered threat picture, but rather that this was not seen in connection
with the defence concept and the Norwegian defence structure. How are we to under-
stand the continuity in discourse and military practice? Furthermore, unlike the case in
the 1990s, the present changes in Norway’s external environment and especially multi-
polarity seem to have influenced today’s Norwegian defence discourse and military
priorities relatively quickly. How is that to be understood?
The analysis of the Norwegian defence discourse since 1990 is based on official docu-
ments such as those issued by the Storting (the Norwegian Parliament) and the govern-
ment, official reports, speeches and public debates, as well as secondary literature and
some interviews. The following section provides a historical introduction to the theme
and to how the defence discourse will be analysed in this article. Then the three theses as
to how the continuity in the Norwegian defence discourse may be understood will be
discussed. The concluding section examines how more recent international changes have
influenced the Norwegian defence discourse and practices.
Historical context and theoretical approach
During the Cold War, Norway’s security and defence policy was largely defined by the
superpower rivalry and the perceived threat of an invasion led by the Soviet Union. The
Norwegian forces were so dimensioned as to deny an attacker the possibility of invading
Græger
5
Norwegian territory or, if invaded, of putting up resistance until Norway’s allies could
come to its assistance (see Ministry of Defence, 1997–8: 53). The deterrent element in
Norway’s security and defence policy lay in the NATO membership, with the concomi-
tant binding guarantee of mutual security in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In this
period, national defence was the main objective, with any international military involve-
ment being a secondary task. Participation in UN peacekeeping operations was seen as
an expression of how Norway was committed to carrying out its international obliga-
tions.3 To a certain extent, there was also recognition of the positive effects for Norwegian
foreign policy, as expressed by then Minister of Defence Johan Jørgen Holst (Labour):
‘[Norway’s defence] is also to help our country to play the international role that we as a
nation desire’ (S.tid., 1987–8: 1065). Today, Norwegian forces have indeed become an
important security and foreign policy tool. At the time that Holst made the statement,
however, and well into the 1990s, this position occupied a minor place in the Norwegian
defence discourse.
The major changes in international politics that came with the end of the Cold War
were soon reflected in Norwegian security policy, at the instigation of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1989–90). In line with this, the government
acknowledged that, ‘Russia’s forces in the North […] are gradually undergoing a re-
shaping aimed at a more defensive structure’ (Ministry of Defence, 1992–3: 12). Also,
the Standing Parliamentary Committee on Defence took note of the new situation: ‘The
military threat as previously understood is gone, and we now face a series of new chal-
lenges as a result of the political upheavals in Europe’ (Innst. S., 1992–3). All the same,
the Committee proclaimed special reasons for not rushing into making changes in
Norway’s defence, with reference to Russia’s military capabilities on the Kola Peninsula:
Even with the changes currently underway in the Soviet Union, the main structure of the
security situation remains unchanged. […] the military changes in the North are as yet by no
means comparable to the military changes that have taken place in continental Europe. (Innst.
B., 1992–3: 10)
Parallel with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Norway’s
defence apparatus was confronted with major financial challenges due to its large mobi-
lization army, number of permanent military installations and outdated defence materiel
in need of replacement. The defence budget, approximately 2.9% of the gross national
product from 1988 to 1990, was gradually reduced to 2.1% in 1997 (SIPRI Yearbook,
2010). The situation was characterized by a dual imbalance: first, between adopted budg-
ets and defence plans; and second, between the new tasks required of the Norwegian
military (e.g. participation in international operations) and its ability to carry them out.4
And all this took place at a time when the demand for collecting the peace dividend
through reduced defence budgets became stronger in the public discourse.
The main scenario of the Cold War was nevertheless not discarded until as late as
1998, and even then the possibility of invasion was not entirely dismissed (Ministry of
Defence, 1997–8: 7–8). At the same time, the government also stated that: ‘our interna-
tional military involvement must be an integral part of the overall activity and structure
of Norway’s defence’ (ibid.: 9). However, little was done to implement this change. In
6...
To continue reading
Request your trial