How Does the Nuclear Arms Race Work?
| Author | Colin S. Gray |
| Date | 01 March 1974 |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083677400900127 |
| Published date | 01 March 1974 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
How
Does
the
Nuclear
Arms
Race
Work?
COLIN
S.
GRAY
Department
of
War
Studies,
King’s
College,
University
of
London
Gray,
C.
S.
How
Does
the
Nuclear
Arms
Race
Work?
Cooperation
and
Conflict,
IX,
1974,
285-295.
Many
analysts
are
convinced
that
they
understand
how
arms
races
work.
However,
very
few
arms
race
studies
rest
upon
a
disciplined
use
of
historical
data,
or
upon
a
willingness
to
consider
seriously
more
than
one
or
two
of
the
more
prominent
candidates
for
the
role
of
the
driving
factor
in
an
arms
race.
This
article
suggests
that
any
ana-
lysis
of
the
dynamics
of
the
nuclear
arms
race
cannot
afford
to
neglect
the
operation
of
the
following
factors:
inter-state
action-reaction
processes;
inter-armed
service
action-reaction
processes;
intra-armed
service
action-reaction
processes;
bureaucratic
political
games;
the
very
individual
structures
and
processes
of
each
political
system;
military-industrial
complexities;
foreign
policy
goals
and
strategies;
and
finally,
techno-
logical
innovation.
Synergistic
combinations
of
the
operation
of
the
forementioned
factors
produce
and
sustain
what
we
term
arms
races.
Policy
prescription
for
arms
control,
if
it
is
to
be
relevant,
must
rest
upon
a
deep
understanding
of
the
processes
to
be
controlled.
An
appreciation
of
the
true
complexity
of
arms
race
phenomena
is
one
important
intellectual
step
towards
the
ability
to
control.
Colin
S.
Gray,
Department
of
War
Studies,
King’s
College,
University
of
London,
London.
I
Twenty-eight
years
into
the
nuclear
age,
no
very
persuasive
answers
to
the
question
in
the
title
may
be
located.
There
is
no
shortage
of
tidy
and
confident
responses,
but
unfortunately
the
partial
explanations
that
have
been
and
are
still
being
ad-
vanced
should
really
be
seen
as
building
blocks
for
a
total
theory -
not
as
the
theory
itself.
This
article
examines
the
crucial
arms
control
question
of
what
do
we
think
we
know
about
the
functioning
of
what
is
termed
the
nuclear
arms
race.
It
would
seem
now
to
be
mandatory
for
all
substantial
studies
of
strategic
problems
to
include
some
discussion
of
’arms
race
consequences’.
This
relatively
new
aware-
ness
is
to
be
welcomed,
but
it
must
be
remembered
that
there
is
no
well-tried
stock
of
arms
race
axioms
to
offer
en-
lightenment
to
the
student
of
particular
defense
decisions.
The
question
in
the
title
should
not
be
interpreted
so
as
to
imply
either
that
the
nuclear
arms
race
’works’
in
a
mechanistic
fashion,
or
that
any
very
certain
knowledge
is
attainable.
Instead,
it
is
reasonable
to
presume
that
disciplined
historical
analysis
of
the
nu-
clear
and
other
arms
races
should
yield
a
non-specific
wisdom.
The
analyst
of
arms
races
will
not
be
able
to
provide
a
use-
fully
precise
answer
to
such
a
question
as,
’what
will
be
the
detailed
consequences
of
a
particular. mix
of
agreements
for
SALT
II?’
However,
an
analyst
who
has
exam-
ined
the
totality
of
arms
race
experience,
as
opposed
to
a
narrow
concentration
upon
the
recent
apparent
thrust
and
parry
of
strategic
decisions,
would
provide
an
answer
that
made
due
allowance
for
technological
innovation
and
for
inter-
and
intra-state
political
rivalries.
The
complex
of
factors,
of
variables
dependent
and
independent,
that
in
dynamic
inter-
actions
drive
an
arms
race,
are
of
course
known
to
analysts
of
all
political
persua-
sions.
However,
the
fact
remains
that
a
general
awareness
of
complexity
and
of
regions
of
analytical
darkness,
have
not
forestalled
policy
prescription
and
polit-
ical
lobbying
endeavors
that
rest
upon
arguments
of
an
inexcusably
excessive
simplicity.
Arms
race
understanding
is
not
a
matter
solely
of
scholastic
interest.
All
of
the
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