Ideological sorting
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/09516298221130261 |
| Published date | 01 January 2023 |
| Date | 01 January 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Ideological sorting
David P. Baron
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA
Abstract
This paper presents a model in which people sort between two districts based on economic and
ideological preferences. People are either ideologues who prefer redistribution over a public good
or non-ideologues who prefer a public good that benefits everyone equally. Individuals differ in
their productivity with the distribution of productivities the same for both ideologues and non-
ideologues. Ideologues back their ideology by working harder when there is redistribution even
when not recipients, and non-ideologues work harder when the public good is provided. The
tax rate in each district is chosen by majority rule with the median voter theorem identifying
the winner. In the focal equilibrium, high productivity ideologues and non-ideologues locate
together in a low tax district, and low productivity non-ideologues and ideologues locate together
in a high tax district to benefit from redistribution. Middle-income individuals separate with non-
ideologues locating in the low tax district and ideologues locating in the high tax district. Ideology
thus results in a polarization interval in the middle of the income distribution. If ideology leads to
partisanship and a strong party government that chooses the tax rate based on the party median,
partisanship widens the polarization interval.
Keywords
Ideology, sorting, economics
1. Introduction
In the past few decades, people locating near the Pacific Ocean have turned California,
Oregon, and Washington into deep blue states. Recently, residents of seven rural
eastern Oregon counties voted in non-binding referenda to move the Oregon-Idaho
border so that the counties would be in greater Idaho (www.greateridaho.org) rather
than in Oregon. In the second phase of the movement, two northern counties of
California and southwestern counties in Oregon would be invited to join greater Idaho.
Corresponding author:
David P. Baron, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 655 Knight Way, Stanford CA 94305, USA.
Email: dbaron@stanford.edu.
Article
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2023, Vol. 35(1) 3–30
© The Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/ 09516298221130261
journals.sagepub.com/home/jtp
Mike McCarter, president of Citizens for Greater Idaho, explained, “It has been talked
about for many years how eastern Oregon and southern Oregon are more like Idaho
than they are to northwest Oregon. Their lifestyles, their attachment to their lands—
those traditional values of people who live out in space, in open lands, feel that
they’re more aligned with the people in Idaho.”
1
People locate for a variety of reasons including job opportunities, housing prices, edu-
cational opportunities, weather, family, taxes, and so on. This paper examines the effect
of ideology pertaining to the priorities of government on the location choices of people.
Those choices can result in political jurisdictions that are relatively homogeneous and
polarized across jurisdictions. Economic and ideological sorting affects tax rates, redis-
tribution, and the provision of public goods, as well as representation. Sorting also
affects the pool of candidates in a district, which can become more homogeneous
because of ideological sorting, contributing to polarization. This is consistent with
Hall’s (2019) argument that much of the increase in polarization in Congress is explained
by who runs for office and who runs depends on the pool of potential candidates in a
district.
All individuals in the model are good willed, but some believe in a political system
(have an ideology) that provides direct redistribution to benefit low-income people.
Others believe in a political system that provides public goods that benefit everyone
equally. The public goods considered are not factors of production and simply benefit
each individual, as in the case of education, roads, and security provided by police and
fire fighters. The theory identifies how individuals locate based on their preferences for
economic well-being and on for their ideology. The model is also used to consider the
effects of ideological homophile, affect, and altruism.
Individuals work and their income is taxed by their district with the tax revenue allo-
cated between redistribution and the public good. High productivity individuals prefer a
lower tax rate than do low productivity individuals. Politics is at the district level with the
electorate directly choosing both the tax rate and the allocation of tax revenue.
Ideology is a preference for redistribution even when not a recipient. Ideology is both
tangible and actionable. It is tangible because it matters to a person only if tax revenue is
actually redistributed. It is actionable because when redistribution is provided ideologues
work harder the stronger their ideology. Redistribution funds a welfare system that
reduces work by recipients and attracts low-income self-interested individuals.
Ideology could more broadly be interpreted as spending on a cultural or social issue
that is valued differently by groups. Bonomi et al. (2021) consider groups that differ in
identification with income segments (or classes) versus cultural groups formed around
social identity based on views about issues such as “immigration, race relations, and abor-
tions.”In their model government allocates tax revenue to a public good viewed as redis-
tribution and also chooses “cultural policy”that appeals to an identity group. They do not
consider preferences for location among political districts. Voting with one’s feet is a
principal component of the model considered here.
Ideology could also pertain to the environment with the income tax replaced by a use
tax and tax revenue spent on environmental regulation and enforcement or on a public
good. One motivation for the Greater Idaho movement is to avoid the strict environmental
and land use regulations imposed by those in Eugene and Portland.
4Journal of Theoretical Politics 35(1)
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