INCREMENTALISM RUN AMOK? LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE IN BRITAIN

AuthorGLEN BRAMLEY
Date01 March 1985
Published date01 March 1985
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1985.tb00589.x
100
PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
be much more incentive to develop other policies, such as work measurement and
improved job training.
The
NHS
has got to create a different pattern of employment incentives
if
it is
to get short-term efficiency and long-term flexibility. Some
of
the greatest challenges
to any new approach lie in the long stay services and in achieving change to social
models
of
care.
NICK
BOSANQUET
Centre
for
Health Economics,
University
of
York
NOTES
'
N.
Bosanquet, Living with Cash Limits: The case
of
the
NHs,
Public
Money,
September 1982.
*
J.
Atkinson. Manning for Uncertainty: some emerging
UK
work patterns,
IMS
1984 and Contribu-
tions to
G.
Bain (ed)
Industrial Relations in Great Britain,
Blackwell 1983, have good discussions
of
these issues.
INCREMENTALISM
RUN
AMOK?
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE
IN
BRITAIN
Introduction
Local government finance in Britain has been in a state of almost continual turmoil
since the election of a self-styled radical, reforming Conservative government in
1979. Far from settling down, at the time
of
writing the system is entering a new
phase of uncertainty characterized by 'financial brinkmanship' and the probability
of large-scale legal defiance
of
the government on the issue of rate-capping. In
reviewing the evolution and implementation of this government's policies on local
government finance, it seems to this observer that what we find is less
a
case of
radical reform in line with carefully considered analysis, and more one of costly
and destabilizing incrementalism. Before attempting
to
explain and justify this view,
it seems appropriate to review the current situation, which contains
as
much
uncertainty
as
at any time since 1979.
The
current situation
Six major uncertainties surround the immediate prospects for local government
finance. The first, and most worrying, is what is going to happen in the selective
rate-capping exercise in 1985/6.
Of
the
18
authorities selected for rate limitation,
none have sought 'derogation' (i.e. a re-negotiation of the limit under section
3
of the 1984 Rates Act).
All
but two are Labour-controlled authorities and appear
set on a political confrontation with the government rather than compliance; In
this way they may subsequently be joined by other authorities in a similar financial
position owing to the operation of the grant system, and all may have been
Public Administration
Vol.
63
Spring 1985 (100-107)
0
1985 Royal Institute
of
Public Administration
ISSN
0033-3298.

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