INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IN THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY SINCE THE WAR
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1983.tb00130.x |
| Published date | 01 July 1983 |
| Date | 01 July 1983 |
| Author | James McGoldrick |
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND THE DIVISION
OF
LABOUR
IN
THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY SINCE THE WAR’
JAMES
MCGOLDRICK*
INTRODUCTION
In this paper I intend to present an analysis
of
the main industrial relations ‘issues’
experiences in the shipbuilding industry
in
Britain from the end of World War I1 to the
present. In order to achieve this analysis it is essential to situate the industry in a
number
of
contexts. Thus the initial part of the paper will be concerned with a
discussion of the general development
of
the industry which establishes the context
of
market development. In this respect the first signs of the post-war crisis can be
detected. The second section of the paper focuses specifically on the changes in the
development of the labour process. This provides a context for the analysis
of
technical change and the empirical aspects of the division of labour which can be seen
in
relatively straightforward statistical terms. These, however, have distinctly
qualitative implications which are taken up
in
the next section dealing with specific
aspects of the industrial relations of the industry. In this section the focus shifts from
the general to the particular by examining certain key issues: wages; technology; and
work organisation. In the next major section the relationship
of
industrial relations
questions with the crises is presented in terms of an analysis of the ‘solutions’ which the
industry offered to restore UK shipbuilding to competitiveness. Attention here will be
directed to the negotiation, both formally and informally, of the questions of
flexibility, interchangeability, and productivity. Some discussion will also be offered
of
the response of the trade unions, and the success of productivity bargaining
will
be
assessed. Following from this attention will turn to the growing role of the state
in
trying to solve the problems
of
international competitiveness of UK shipbuilding by
looking at the various forms
of
intervention and their consequences. The discussion
will also focus on specific moments of crisis and examine how these altered the paths of
government intervention and how they led to major changes in industrial relations
practices. The last section of the paper will provide a brief narrative account of the
processes that led up to nationalisation and how ultimately the character
of
industrial
relations was changed under public ownership.
Finally,
the
paper will seek to present a general evaluation of the themes and issues
which were raised and see how these have weathered the changeable climate of the
study of industrial relations.
THE POSITION
OF
THE
POST-WAR SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
The general position of the shipbuilding industry in Britain
in
the post war period
was
one
of relative prosperity from the end of World War I1
to
the late
1950’s.
As
Slaven
(1980)
has pointed out the post-war recession was precipitated by falling freight
rates between
1957
and
1958
which served to intensify competition within the industry
on
a global basis.
The
causes
of
the crisis, from which Britain’s shipbuilding industry
has never recovered, run deep. The intention of this article is
to
suggest that the crisis
in
shipbuilding was tied to a general tendency of falling rates of profit
in
UK industry
in ge‘neral. But also that the form
of
the crisis was influenced by specific features
of
the
development of industry. However, this paper explores the position
of
UK
*Department
of
Business Studies, Portsmouth Polytechnic.
197
198
BRITISH JOURNAL
OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
shipbuilding from a perspective which views the division of labour as the core
of
the
industry. Before coming to this discussion it is worthwhile to look at the general
contours of development of the industry in terms
of
pattern
of
output and market
shares; the general employment position
in
industry; the productivity
of
the industry
and its profitability.
OUTPUT
From 1946 to 1949 the average annual output of British shipyards was almost double
the average for the decade immediately preceding the war: 1.2m GRT (gross
registered tonnage) and 0.7m GRT respectively. This represented also a considerable
improvement in Britain’s share of the world market. From 1946 to 1949 the average
share was some 50%; in the period from 1930-1939 this had been only some 35%.
During the early 1950’s the upward trend in tonnage output continued fairly steadily
until 1955. Average output was just under 1.4m GRT but thereafter there was no
expansion in output. 1955 was the best post-war year which saw the launching of 1.47m
GRT. This period also saw a contraction in the share
of
the world market enjoyed by
UK builders; the average share shrunk to around 31%. In the period up to the first
government interventions in the mid 1960’s there was a contraction in output. The
average output from 1956 to 1965 was 1.2m GRT but this obscures the fact that from
1961 to 1965 the average was barely 1.0m GRT. The longer term share
of
the market
from 1956 to 1965 was even more drastically reduced to 14%. In more recent years,
from 1966 to 1978, there was a slight improvement in tonnage output with an annual
average for this period of l.lm GRT. The market share however dropped below 5% in
the early 1970’s and although
in
1975 the share was 5.3% for British tonnage, the
average share from 1970
to
1978 has been less than 4.5%. This is an average
of
about
9.0% of the immediate post-war position of market share yet the corresponding output
figures show that average output for the 1970’s is about 79% of that
of
the late 1940’s.
Since 1978 this contraction in both output and share of the world market has been
more pronounced. In the period from 1979 to 1981 average output dropped to around
0.5m GRT and the UK’s percentage
of
world output has dropped to below 2%.*
Thus Britain’s shipbuilding industry has dropped from being undisputed world
leader in the immediate periods after World War
I
and
I1
(Slaven estimates 60% and
50% respectively) to being merely one of many countries in the shadow
of
Japan and
developing third world shipbuilding countries.
EMPLOYMENT
During the inter-war period the employment position in shipbuilding was dire. In
1932-33 some 63% of the workforce was idle. In contrast the post war position was
one of relatively full employment; indeed a continuous theme in the shipbuilding
employers views of the industry was that there were severe shortages
of
some grades
of
labour, especially welders. However, by the early 1960’s unemployment amongst
those designated as shipbuilding employees (including ship repairing) began to grow;
there was a decrease
of
some
44,000
employees between 1958 and 1965.3 These figures
however, cannot be taken as anything more than an indicator
of
a general downward
trend in employment. Rates
of
unemployment are difficult
to
work out both
statistically and analytically. The nature of shipbuilding labour markets is cyclical,
although the effects of this are less important in the immediate post-war period as
firms with full order books tried to stabilise their labour force.
Between 1962 and 1979, according to Department
of
Employment figures, the
average number of shipbuilding and shiprepairing employees unemployed
is
around
9,000. But there is no comparable statistical base to work these out as percentages
of
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