Institutional contexts of environmental management: Water pollution control in Guangzhou, China
| Author | Carlos Wing‐Hung Lo,Shui‐Yan Tang |
| Published date | 02 November 2006 |
| Date | 02 November 2006 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1002/pad.4230140104 |
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT, VOL. 14,5344 (1994)
Institutional contexts
of
environmental management: water
pollution control in Guangzhou, China
CARLOS WING-HUNG LO
Department
of
Management, Hong Kong Polytechnic
and
SHUI-YAN
TANG
School
of
Public Administration, University
of
Southern California
SUMMARY
In the past decade, Guangzhou (Canton), China, has produced mixed results in water pollution
control: it has been successful
in
limiting pollution from industrial sources than from domestic
ones. This article examines the case
by
reference to a growing body
of
literature in institutional
analysis. The central arguments are that institutions affect the governance and management
of
natural resources by allocating decision-making authorities among different individuals,
agencies and levels of governments,
by
affecting whether rules and regulations can be effectively
enforced and by creating different incentive structures. These arguments
help
to explain the
divergent governmental efforts and outcomes in the two types of water pollution control
in
Guangzhou. The article concludes by discussing the case’s theoretical and practical impli-
cations.
Many large cities worldwide are experiencing severe environmental degradation. Con-
taminated water, air pollution and noise pollution are threatening millions of urban
residents (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1991). These threats are especially serious in
regions such as Asia and Latin America, where rapid urban growth has accompanied
economic development. While many individuals and government officials in these
regions are aware of their dire consequences, environmental problems continue to
worsen because
of
a lack of effective institutions for urban planning and environmen-
tal management.
A growing body of literature has recently emerged that focuses on the effects
of institutions on natural resource and environmental management (Ostrom, 1990;
Wunsch, 1991a,
b;
Blomquist, 1992; Bromley
et
al.,
1992; Tang, 1992; Ostrom
et
al.
1993). The central arguments of these publications are that institutions affect
the governance and management of natural resources by determining the distribution
of decision-making authorities, by affecting whether rules and regulations can be
effectively enforced and by creating different incentive structures. These arguments
provide
a
useful framework for understanding factors underlying the success and
failure
of
environmental management in many countries around the world. In this
Dr Wing-Hung
Lo
is Senior Lecturer, Department
of
Management, Hong Kong Polytechnic, Hong Kong
and Shui-Yan Tang
is
Assistant Professor in the School of Public Administration, University of Southern
California, Los Angeles, California 90080-0041, USA.
CCC
027
1-2075/94/010053-12
0
1994
by John Wiley
&
Sons, Ltd.
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