Integrating power in institutional analysis: A micro-foundation perspective
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629815586877 |
| Published date | 01 January 2016 |
| Author | Prakash Kashwan |
| Date | 01 January 2016 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2016, Vol.28(1) 5–26
ÓThe Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629815586877
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Integrating power in
institutional analysis: A
micro-foundation perspective
Prakash Kashwan
Department of PoliticalScience, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA
Abstract
Studies of social dilemmas consistently report higher than expected levels of cooperation, espe-
cially in the presence of appropriate institutions. At the same time, scholarshave argued that insti-
tutions are manifestations of power relations. The higher than expected levels of cooperation
amidst widespread power asymmetriesconstitute an important puzzle about the linkages between
power asymmetries and the outcomes of local institutional deliberation. In this paper, I develop a
microfoundation-based approach that examines incentives and imperatives to explain how power
asymmetries shape individuals’ responses to institutional development and institutional change. I
argue that local power asymmetries work across multiple interlinked institutional arenas. A fuller
examination of the effects of power asymmetries, therefore, requires that scholars account for
how interlinked institutional arenas shape strategic actions of the members and leaders within
local communities.
Keywords
Collective action; institutional analysis; interlinked institutional arenas; power asymmetries; social
dilemma
1. Introduction
Institutions of collective action remain one of the central concerns of social scien-
tists. Commons scholars examine the factors that foster successful collective action,
that is, prevent free riding and regulate individual actions that do not conform to
Corresponding author:
Prakash Kashwan, Departmentof Political Science, University of Connecticut, 365Fairfield Way, Storrs,CT
06269, USA.
Email: Prakash.kashwan@uconn.edu
the goals of sustainable management of common pool resources (Agrawal, 2001;
Coleman, 2009; McKean, 1992; Ostrom, 1990). The need for coercive enforcement
is minimal in local communities that are homogeneous. However, most local com-
munities are divided along multiple axes of caste, class, and gender that often rein-
force long entrenched inequalities within a local community (Agrawal and Gibson,
1999). The divisions within local communities are often tied to differences of stakes
and interests related to common pool resources.
The costs and benefits of collective action, in particular of coercive enforcement,
are often distributed unevenly across different groups within local communities.
Such outcomes are attributed in part to the differences of wealth and power that
enable local elites to secure institutional arrangements to serve their interests
(Olson, 1965). Studies show that, ceteris paribus, local elites often free-ride even as
they are able to subject the relatively powerless actors within local communities to
the enforcement of collectively agreed rules (Pe
´rez-Cirera and Lovett, 2006).
Others show that effectively functioning local institutions help dampen the nega-
tive effects of local inequalities (Andersson and Agrawal, 2011; Varughese and
Ostrom, 2001). In light of the ubiquity of intra-community power differences, these
two findings about the effects of power asymmetries on local institutional out-
comes point to a paradox: even though powerful local actors – community leaders
and government officials – prefer to put in place institutions of their liking, the lit-
erature on common pool resources suggests that a majority of local communities
are able to build consensus to design institutions that foster local collective action.
In this article, I propose the framework of multiple interlinked institutional are-
nas to explain the frequent cases of local consensus despite entrenched power asym-
metries. I argue that the choices actors make in one institutional arena reflect their
understanding about how those choices affect their interests and stakes in other
institutional arenas. The framework of interlinked institutional arenas is thus moti-
vated by a microfoundational theory about the drivers of the political behavior of
key actors involved in institutional bargaining (Achen, 2002). The framework of
interlinked action arenas prompts researchers to expand the analytical field of
vision to get a closer approximation of the full array of incentives, imperatives, and
expectations that shape individual choices. While other scholars examine interlin-
kages between multiple policy and programmatic arenas (Lubell et al., 2010;
McGinnis, 2011), I conceive of these interlinkages from the vantage point of the
interests and stakes individuals have in multiple institutional arenas. Such an
expansion of the scope of inquiry puts a greater empirical burden on the researcher,
but the payoff is a significant improvement in the ability of the researcher to predict
institutional outcomes. I also draw specific theoretical implications and hypotheses
that can be tested in the context of social dilemmas.
The empirical cases I use for this investigation are related to the multi-tier gov-
ernance of forests in India. The analysis presented in this article draws on two
rounds of field research conducted between 2007 and 2009 in the western Indian
state of Gujarat, which included participant observation of key events, such as
meetings of forestry associations, interviews with key government officials and
community leaders, and triangulation of information by referring to multiple
6Journal of Theoretical Politics 28(1)
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