Intensity and Impact Analysis of Insurgency/Extremism
| Author | Giridhari Nayak |
| Published date | 01 November 2001 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032258X0107400407 |
| Date | 01 November 2001 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
SHRI GIRIDHARI NAYAK, IPS
Deputy Director, SVP National Police Academy, Hyderabad
INTENSITY AND IMPACT
ANALYSIS OF INSURGENCYI
EXTREMISM
Insurgency and extremist activities are outcomes of neglect. Neglect of
a politico-administrative system can consist of the failure to understand
the socioeconomic and political limitations and aspirations relevant in
any area, the failure to scrutinise the activities of organised bands, and
the non-functioning of local administration. Such neglect can be the
fault of policymakers and decision-makers owing to calculated ambi-
guity, lack of understanding or lack of information, and distance from
the centre of power. Both government and society of a country have to
pay the price for such neglect and the nation has to bear the brunt as a
result.
Sierra Leone, Timor and Chechnya are recent examples of situa-
tions that went out of control and took each society and government by
surprise. (A past example is Mizo insurgency in India.) The insur-
gencies in Tripura, Jammu and Kashmir, the growing menace of
left-wing extremism in Central India, has also surprised the decision-
makers. Unexpected uprisings by any insurgent/extremist groups over-
power law-enforcement agencies, state governments are shocked, local
administration is crippled and the public is put under duress to support
the insurgents or extremists. With the growth of underground organiza-
tions and their activity, their sphere of influence increases and thereby
undermines the influence, authority and legitimacy of law-enforcement
agencies and administration, virtually causing the collapse of state
power. Ignoring ground realities feeds delusions that can lead to short-
term catastrophes and long-term defeats. Evil comes in many guises.
Unfortunately, at the early stage of infestation nobody recognises the
problem and by the late stage the problem has become incurable.
The above situation of sudden manifestation and virulent infestation
of insurgency automatically raises some classic questions:
1. Was there any early warning of insurgency?
2. What are the present dimensions of insurgency?
3. How effective are government counter-measures?
4. How effective are the security forces?
5. Which areas need governmental attention?
These pertinent questions can only be answered by analysis. Analysis
of insurgency is tedious, difficult and complicated but analysis of these
questions highlights two important underlying concepts: (1) the early
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The Police Journal, Volume 74 (2001)
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