Introduction: The Responsibility to Protect after the Arab Spring
| Author | James Pattison,Aidan Hehir |
| Published date | 01 June 2016 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0010836715612853 |
| Date | 01 June 2016 |
| Subject Matter | Introduction |
612853CAC0010.1177/0010836715612853Cooperation and ConflictHehir and Pattison
research-article2015
Introduction
Cooperation and Conflict
2016, Vol. 51(2) 141 –147
Introduction: The
© The Author(s) 2015
Responsibility to Protect
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DOI: 10.1177/0010836715612853
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Aidan Hehir and James Pattison
Introduction
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has become the pre-eminent framework for discuss-
ing humanitarian intervention and issues related to human rights protection generally. Its
origins lie in the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS), which first proposed the notion of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’. Its
adoption at the 2005 United Nations (UN) World Summit, with over 160 heads of state in
attendance, has led to numerous inter-disciplinary debates within academia and beyond.
The R2P has often been controversial, but the eruption of the ‘Arab Spring’ in late 2010
has constituted the concept’s most exacting test and prompted a further spike in interest in
both its efficacy and desirability. The articles in this special issue assess the R2P in light
of the events during, and debates surrounding, the Arab Spring. Together, they constitute
a uniquely focused assessment of this significant and influential doctrine.
This introduction will first consider in more detail the importance of the R2P for the
Arab Spring, before going on to consider, conversely, the importance of the Arab Spring
for the R2P. It will then outline the focus of the special issue and the two central ques-
tions with which it is concerned. Finally, it will provide an overview of the debate in the
articles and how they address the two central questions.
The importance of the Responsibility to Protect for the
Arab Spring and vice versa
The Arab Spring comprised a dramatic series of protests and revolutions against authori-
tarian and repressive regimes. It is widely viewed as starting in Tunisia in December
2010 when the street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire in protest at police
harassment. This led to protests and a popular uprising that in turn led to the overthrow
of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s government. The protest movements spread to other states,
including Yemen, Bahrain, Algeria, Jordon and, notably, Egypt, where Hosni Mubarak’s
regime eventually succumbed to weeks of pressure from large-scale protests in Cairo and
elsewhere. In Libya, anti-Gaddafi protestors soon controlled Benghazi, the
Corresponding author:
James Pattison, University of Manchester, Manchester, M13 9PL, UK.
Email: james.pattison@manchester.ac.uk
142
Cooperation and Conflict 51(2)
second-largest city in the country, and the government launched a crackdown in response.
In Syria, thousands of protesters called for the resignation of President Basher al-Assad
in various cities across the country, leading to a violent response by the Assad regime
and, later in 2011, the armed uprising of the Free Syrian Army.
The international reaction to the Arab Spring was initially one of significant optimism
and some degree of support, albeit nervous. There was a sense that it could lead to long-
lasting, democratic rule in the Middle East and that this was an important moment for the
region. In Libya, the crackdown by the Gaddafi regime on the protesters led to robust
action by the international community. Resolution 1970 referred the situation to the
International Criminal Court and imposed an arms embargo, as well as a travel ban and
asset freeze on many members of the Gaddafi regime. In Resolution 1973, passed in
March 2011, the UN Security Council authorised the imposition of a no-fly zone and the
use of all necessary means to protect the Libyan population under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. This intervention was widely framed in the academic, public and political debate
in the context of the R2P.1 That said, it is moot how important the R2P was for motivating
the intervention in Libya (see, for instance, the articles by Hehir, Morris and Glanville in
this special issue). In Syria, the R2P has similarly informed the debates about how the
international community should react to the subsequent civil war between the Assad
regime, the Free Syrian Army and, increasingly, Islamic extremists. Yet the USA and
other states backed away from undertaking humanitarian intervention in 2013 in response
to chemical weapons attacks by the Assad regime and, ultimately, little has been done to
stop the bloodshed in Syria. For some, this shows the R2P fails to have any impact, but
others (such as Glanville in his...
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