Is Carrying a Flag in Support of a Proscribed Organisation a Strict Liability Offence?
| DOI | 10.1177/00220183221102017 |
| Published date | 01 June 2022 |
| Date | 01 June 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Case Notes |
Is Carrying a Flag in Support of a
Proscribed Organisation a Strict
Liability Offence?
Pwr v Director of Public Prosecutions [2022] UKSC 2
Akdogan and Another v Director of Public Prosecutions
Keywords
Demonstration, proscribed organisation, carrying flags, s.13(1)(b) Terrorism Act 2000, strict
liability, Article 10 ECHR
The Kurdistan Workers Party (the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK)) was launched in 1984. It was pro-
scribed by the UK as a terrorist organisation in March 2001 under the Terrorism Act 2000, and has con-
tinued to be proscribed ever since. The PKK is also regarded as being a terrorist organisation by the EU,
and by states including the USA, Canada, Germany, Australia and Turkey. On 27
th
January 2018, the
three appellants took part in a demonstration held in central London against the perceived actions of
the Turkish state in Afrin, a town in north-eastern Syria. During the course of the march, which began
outside the BBC at Langham Place and proceeded to Downing Street, the appellants were observed
by police officers to be carrying the same flags over a significant period of time. Evidence given by
an expert from the Royal United Services Institute at their subsequent trial confirmed that the flags
had been the same as that which had been adopted by the PKK in 2005.
In respect of their behaviour, each appellant was charged with an offence contrary to s.13(1)(b) of the
2000 Act, which provides that: “A person in a public place commits an offence if he …(b) wears, carries
or displays an article, in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a
member or supporter of a proscribed organisation”. They were convicted in the Westminster Magistrates’
Court. Two of the appellants were given three-month conditional discharges, and the other received an
absolute discharge. On appeal, which was heard by HHJ Bartle QC and two lay magistrates at the
Southwark Crown Court, a submission of no case to answer was rejected. That court was satisfied that
on the basis of the clear and unambiguous wording of the 2000 Act, s.13 provided for a strict liability
offence. On the application of the appellants, the Crown Court stated a case in which the High Court
was asked: (i) whether s.13 created a strict liability offence; and (ii) if it did, whether that was compatible
affirmatively by the Divisional Court and the appeals against conviction were dismissed: see [2020]
EWHC 798 (Admin); [2020] 1 WLR 3623. Whilst that Court refused permission to appeal, it did
certify two questions (in broadly the same terms as those in the case stated) as points of law of
general public importance pursuant to s.1(2) of the Administration of Justice Act 1960. Permission to
appeal was subsequently granted by a panel of the Supreme Court.
It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that applying the strong common law presump tion of
mens rea, s.13(1)(b) was not a strict liability offence. Rather, it was possible to read into the offence
Case Note
The Journal of Criminal Law
2022, Vol. 86(3) 206–211
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/00220183221102017
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