Is There a ‘Practical Benefit’ to an Extended Sentence?: R v Baker & Richards [2020] EWCA Crim 176
| Date | 01 August 2020 |
| Published date | 01 August 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022018320923784 |
| Author | Andrew Beetham |
| Subject Matter | Case Notes |
The Journal of Criminal Law
2020, Vol. 84(4) 377–379
Is There a ‘Practical Benefit’
ª The Author(s) 2020
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to an Extended Sentence?
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DOI: 10.1177/0022018320923784
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R v Baker & Richards [2020] EWCA Crim 176
Keywords
Extended sentence, indeterminate sentence, compatibility between sentences, distinguishing
judgment of Supreme Court in R v Smith
In September 2011, the Appellant, Baker, was convicted of robbery and sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence for public protection (IPP). He was subsequently released by the Parole Board in August 2016.
As a result of the IPP, he remained on licence for a minimum of 10 years. In November 2016, he
committed a further offence of robbery and was sentenced, having pleaded guilty, in May 2017 to an
extended sentence (EDS; pursuant to Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 226A) totalling 10 years 4 months
comprising a custodial period of 5 years 4 months with an extended licence period of 5 years. At the time
of sentence, the Appellant had already been recalled to prison.
In November 2002, the Appellant, Richards, was convicted of murder and sentenced to a mandatory
life sentence. He was subsequently released by the Parole Board in June 2017. He remained on licence
for the rest of his life. In September 2018, he committed robbery and was sentenced, having pleaded
guilty, in December 2018 to an EDS (again, pursuant to s 226A) totalling 11 years comprising a custodial
period of 8 years and an extended licence period of 3 years. Again, at the time of sentence, the Appellant
had already been recalled to prison.
Richards was granted permission to appeal by the single judge and Baker’s application was referred to
the Full Court to consider permission, which was granted.
The Appellants’ central contention was that it was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive to
impose an EDS when they had already been recalled to prison and that as the future assessment of risk
that would be undertaken by the Parole Board was sufficient to protect the public (at [7 & 18]). The
Appellants also contended that the total of the EDS was excessive.
As far as is relevant, section 226A provides that an EDS may be imposed where there is a significant
risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission by the offender of further
specified offences (s 226A(1)(b)).
...
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