Janos Vidák v Regional Court of Budapest (Hungary)
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Chamberlain |
| Judgment Date | 10 May 2023 |
| Neutral Citation | [2023] EWHC 1108 (Admin) |
| Docket Number | Case No: CO/1450/2020 |
| Year | 2023 |
| Court | King's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
[2023] EWHC 1108 (Admin)
Mr Justice Chamberlain
Case No: CO/1450/2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Hannah Hinton (instructed by Taylor Rose MW) for the Appellant
Hannah Burton (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service) for the Respondent
Hearing dates: 4 May 2023
Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 10 May 2023 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
Introduction
The appellant Janos Vidák is sought by Hungary pursuant to a European arrest warrant issued on 24 February 2017 and certified on 22 May of that year. The warrant seeks his surrender to serve a sentence of 2 years' imprisonment, of which all but three days remains to be served. The sentence was imposed on 27 February 2014 for 9 offences of theft and damage to property committed in March, April and May 2010, when he was 19 years old. The offences gave rise to a total loss and damage equivalent to more than £18,000.
The appellant was arrested pursuant to the warrant on 23 December 2019 and remanded in custody until 23 June 2020, when he was admitted to conditional bail. The conditions included a curfew between 11pm and 6am each day and a requirement to report to a police station 3 times per week. The extradition hearing took place before District Judge Baraitser (“the judge”) at Westminster Magistrates' Court on 16 April 2020. Only one bar to extradition was relied on: that extradition would be contrary to Article 8 ECHR and was therefore barred by s. 21 of the Extradition Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act”). The judge rejected that contention and ordered the appellant's extradition.
The appellant applied for permission to appeal to this Court on 20 April 2020. On 4 June 2020, his appeal was stayed pending decisions in other cases relevant to another ground which the appellant was pursuing or considering whether to pursue relating to prison conditions in Hungary. The application for permission to appeal was not considered until 21 September 2021, when it was refused by Sir Ross Cranston, sitting as a High Court Judge. The renewed application for permission came before Whipple J, who granted it on 2 November 2021. No transcript of her reasons is available, but counsel informs me that she noted that it was arguable that the appellant's situation had changed in the nearly 19 month period since the extradition hearing. Since then there has been another delay pending a decision in another case on the question whether changes to Hungary's judicial system meant that the respondent was no longer a “judicial authority” for the purposes of s. 2 of the 2003 Act.
The substantive appeal was first listed on 9 November 2022 but I vacated that hearing on the basis that it was necessary to investigate whether a limitation period for an offence in the warrant had expired. The case came back, this time before Morris J, on 18 January 2023. On the day before the hearing, the respondent had provided a disclosure note confirming the approach taken in Hungary to counting time spent on an electronically monitored curfew. The appellant made submissions of his own on that question. Both sides made oral submissions, but Morris J adjourned the appeal, requesting the provision of further information by way of answer to ten questions. The appellant was given permission to adduce further expert evidence in response in the form of a report from Dr András Kádár dated 19 March 2023. I have also considered an addendum to that report dated 3 May 2023.
The judge's reasons
The judge noted that, apart from the offences that are the subject of the warrant, the appellant had ten convictions between 17 November 2011 and 24 March 2015 for a total of 28 offences.
The appellant gave evidence. He confirmed that he had attended his trial on 27 February 2014, when he had pleaded not guilty. He was present when convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. The sentence was not activated immediately because he appealed. However, before the appeal was determined, the appellant left Hungary and came to the UK. At the time of the extradition hearing, he was living in Harlow with his father, sister, her partner and their children. He had lived an honest life in the UK, paying taxes. He had no family connections in Hungary and would have no prospects there given his convictions. He was in a relationship with a Hungarian national who lives in Enfield with her 10-year old son from a previous relationship, to whom the appellant was close. They met every Sunday afternoon.
The judge set out the case law on Article 8 in the extradition context: Norris v USA [2010] UKSC 9, [2010] 2 AC 487; HH v Italy [2012] UKSC 25, [2013] 1 AC 338; and Celinski v Poland [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin), [2016] 1 WLR 551. She undertook a balancing exercise. The judge found that there was no significant culpable delay by the Hungarian authorities either in bringing the proceedings in Hungary or in issuing the warrant. He had left Hungary knowing of his sentence. He was well aware of how the justice system worked and could not assume that the appeal would succeed. Although she did not use the word, it is common ground that the effect of the judge's findings was that the appellant was a fugitive.
The factors in favour of extradition were the mutual confidence and respect to be shown to decisions of the judicial authorities of States party to the Framework Decision, the constant and weighty public interest in extradition, the seriousness of the offences (as reflected in the sentence imposed), the fact that the appellant had come to live in the UK knowing that he had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the lack of any dependents, the fact that the relationship with his partner was relatively recently established and she was not financially dependent on him and the lack of significant culpable delay on the part of the requesting State.
Tending against extradition were the fact that the appellant had lived in the UK since 2014 and until he was remanded in custody had worked in a warehouse, his strong family ties to the UK through his father and sister, his lack of convictions in the UK and the fact that the offences had been committed long ago.
The judge found that there was no compelling feature or combination of features which overrode the strong public interest in extradition.
The position today
As at the date of the hearing before me, the appellant had spent 6 months on remand in custody and 2 years, 10 months 1 week and 5 days on an electronically monitored 7-hour curfew pending extradition. During that time, he reported to a police station three times per week (i.e. 448 times).
Morris J's questions and the respondent's answers
The questions approved by Morris J were as follows:
“Home detention
1. Please could the text of the provisions of the Criminal Code which relate to crediting pretrial detention and criminal supervision which apply to this case be provided.
2. Please confirm whether the time spent on electronically monitored curfew in the UK can be deducted from the time remaining to be served in Mr Vidak's case.
3. If the answer the question 2 is yes, please confirm whether the time spent on curfew in the United Kingdom by Mr Vidak will be deducted from the time remaining to be served and, if so, in what circumstances.
4. If the time spent on electronically monitored curfew will be deducted in Mr Vidak's case, please confirm how this will be calculated.
Early release
5. Please could the text of the provisions of the Criminal Code which relate to release on parole from fixed-term imprisonment, applicable to this case, be provided.
6. Please explain the procedure that a sentenced person parole to be considered. For example:
a. Is a sentenced person required to make an application to a parole board, or a court order to be considered for release on parole?
b. Is release on parole automatic once a point in time during the sentence has been reached, or do conditions have to be satisfied before a person is eligible for release?
c. If release on parole is conditional, please explain what these conditions are? Who determines whether parole should be granted?
7. Please explain what release on parole entails. For example, being released on parole?
8. Please confirm whether the convicting Court specified Mr Vidak's pursuant to Section 38(1) of the Hungarian Criminal Code?
9. Please explain whether Mr Vidak will be eligible for release on parole in respect of the 2-year sentence for which he is wanted to serve, taking into account the six months spent in custody and the time spent on curfew.
10. If Mr Vidak is eligible for release on parole, at what point in his sentence will he be eligible for release? Will release at this point be automatic, or subject to consideration by a court or other decision—making body?”
The respondent's reply did not separately answer all of these questions. It set out the Hungarian legal provisions which permit the imposition of measures corresponding to the electronically monitored curfew imposed by the UK authorities, but noted that such measures had not been included in the prison sentence imposed by the Hungarian authorities. It also set out the provisions governing deduction of time spent on remand and release on parole. It continued:
“Based on the above, in the opinion of the Court, the part over six months cannot be deducted from the sentence.
Releasing someone on parole is never automatic according to Hungarian law. A sentenced person can make an application for parole, but the penitentiary institute will make a decision based upon the conduct and...
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